## CryptoDB

### Paper: Theoretical Use of Cache Memory as a Cryptanalytic Side-Channel

Authors: D. Page URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/169 Search ePrint Search Google We expand on the idea, proposed by Kelsey et al, of cache memory being used as a side-channel which leaks information during the run of a cryptographic algorithm. By using this side-channel, an attacker may be able to reveal or narrow the possible values of secret information held on the target device. We describe an attack which encrypts $2^{10}$ chosen plaintexts on the target processor in order to collect cache profiles and then performs around $2^{32}$ computational steps to recover the key. As well as describing and simulating the theoretical attack, we discuss how hardware and algorithmic alterations can be used to defend against such techniques.
##### BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2002-11692,
title={Theoretical Use of Cache Memory as a Cryptanalytic Side-Channel},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={DES, cache memory, side channel analysis, smart cards, cryptanalysis},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/169},
note={University of Bristol Technical Report CSTR-02-003, Sumbitted to TISSEC page@cs.bris.ac.uk 12002 received 11 Nov 2002},
author={D. Page},
year=2002
}