Secrecy-Oriented First-Order Logical Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
We present a computationally sound first-order system for security analysis of protocols that places secrecy of nonces and keys in its center. Even trace properties such as agreement and authentication are proven via proving a non-trace property, namely, secrecy first. This results a very powerful system, the working of which we illustrate on the agreement and authenti- cation proofs for the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key and the amended Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocols in case of unlimited sessions. Unlike other available formal verification techniques, computational soundness of our approach does not require any idealizations about parsing of bitstrings or unnecessary tagging. In particular, we have total control over detecting or eliminating the possibility of type-flaw attacks.
Computational Semantics for Basic Protocol Logic - A Stochastic Approach
This paper is concerned about relating formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first order logic. We first present a criticism of the way Datta et al. defined computational semantics to their Protocol Composition Logic, concluding that problems arise from focusing on occurrences of bit-strings on individual traces instead of occurrences of probability distributions of bit-strings across the distribution of traces. We therefore introduce a new, fully probabilistic method to assign computational semantics to the syntax. We present this via considering a simple example of such a formal model, the Basic Protocol Logic of K. Hasebe and M. Okada, but the technique is suitable for extensions to more complex situations such as PCL. The idea is to make use of the usual mathematical treatment of stochastic processes, hence be able to treat arbitrary probability distributions, non-negligible probability of collision, causal dependence or independence.
Computational Soundness of Formal Indistinguishability and Static Equivalence
In the research of the relationship between the formal and the computational view of cryptography, a recent approach uses static equivalence from cryptographic pi calculi as a notion of formal indistinguishability. Previous work has shown that this yields the soundness of natural interpretations of some interesting equational theories, such as certain cryptographic operations and a theory of XOR. In this paper however, we argue that static equivalence is too coarse for sound interpretations of equational theories in general. We show some explicit examples how static equivalence fails to work in interesting cases. To fix this problem, we propose a notion of formal indistinguishability that is more flexible than static equivalence. We provide a general framework along with general theorems, and then discuss how this new notion works for the explicit examples where static equivalence failed to ensure soundness. We also improve the treatment by using ordered sorts in the formal view, and by allowing arbitrary probability distributions of the interpretations.
Soundness and Completeness of Formal Logics of Symmetric Encryption
We consider expansions of the Abadi-Rogaway logic of indistinguishability of formal cryptographic expressions. The formal language of this logic uses a box as notation for indecipherable strings, through which formal equivalence is defined. We expand the logic by considering different kinds of boxes corresponding to equivalence classes of formal ciphers. We consider not only computational, but also purely probabilistic, information-theoretic interpretations. We present a general, systematic treatment of the expansions of the logic for symmetric encryption. We establish general soundness and completeness theorems for the interpretations. We also present applications to specific settings not covered in earlier works: a purely probabilistic one that interprets formal expressions in One-Time Pad, and computational settings of the so-called type 2 (which-key revealing) cryptosystems based on computational complexity.