On The Indistinguishability-Based Security Model of Key Agreement Protocols-Simple Cases
Since Bellare and Rogway's work , the indistinguishability-based security models of authenticated key agreement protocols in simple cases have been evolving for ten years. In this report, we review and organize the models under a unified framework with some new extensions. By providing a new ability (the Coin query) to adversaries and redefining two key security notions, the framework fully exploits an adversary's capability and can be used to prove all the commonly required security attributes of key agreement protocols with key confirmation. At the same time, the Coin query is also used to define a model which can be used to heuristically evaluate the security of a large category of authenticated protocols without key confirmation. We use the models to analyze a few pairing-based authenticated key agreement protocols.
Pairing-Based One-Round Tripartite Key Agreement Protocols
Since Joux published the first pairing-based one-round tripartite key agreement protocol , many authenticated protocols have been proposed. However most of them were soon broken or demonstrated not to achieve some desirable security attributes. In this paper we present a protocol variant based on Shim's work . As the formalized model of this type of AK protocols is not mature, the security properties of the protocol are heuristically investigated by attempting a list of attacks. The attack list presented in the paper has both the importance in theory and the meaning in practice and can be used to evaluate other tripartite and group key agreement protocols.