International Association
for Cryptologic Research

We show the key ideas of the above-referenced work for lattice Gaussian sampling are not new; the same ideas have been proposed by Ling et al. in 2014.

Event date: 8 March 2026
Submission deadline: 1 November 2025
Notification: 19 December 2025

Event date: 6 July to 10 July 2026
Submission deadline: 27 January 2026
Notification: 20 April 2026

Event date: 1 June to 6 June 2026
Submission deadline: 25 August 2025
Notification: 19 November 2025

atsec is looking for cryptography experts to join our team in Austin, TX as product-oriented information security analysts. These positions may be at an entry, senior or principal level, depending on your applicable work experience and skill sets.

As an analyst, you are expected to:
• Learn and use security concepts and techniques such as entropy, access control, authentication, auditing, side-channel analysis, etc.
• Become fluent in security standards such as FIPS 140 and Common Criteria
• Master and serve as an authority in technical domains such as cryptography, network protocols/security, hardware security, software engineering, database, mobile devices, virtualization and operating systems
• Apply your knowledge and talents to scrutinize the security architecture, implementation, and deployment of a variety of cutting-edge IT products
• Support atsec customers in security related areas and become, or continue to be, a recognized industry expert in your field

Qualifications:
Candidates possessing a solid understanding of cryptography and its use in data protection will have an advantage in our hiring process.

This position does requires the following:
• A degree in Mathematics or Electric Engineering with Computer Science emphasis or vice versa (equivalent experience may be acceptable)
• Knowledge of cryptographic algorithms, and the mathematical concepts behind them
• Strong programming and code analysis skills
• Familiarity with Unix-based command line environments (e.g., Linux)
• Knowledge of network protocols (e.g., TLS/SSL, SSH, IPsec, IKE, SRTP, SNMP)
• Knowledge of information security (e.g., authentication, access control, network security)
• Strong technical report writing skills
• Team player who can work independently
• Eagerness to delve into technical subjects
• Enthusiasm, good customer interface skills, positive attitude, strong communication skills (written and verbal), and effective teamwork and technical collaboration skills
• The flexibility to travel



Closing date for applications:

Contact: Send resume to us-jobs@atsec.com

More information: https://www.atsec.com/

This is an urgent call for interested applicants. A funded Ph.D. student position is available for Spring 2026 (Deadline Oct. 15, 2025 but apply earlier) to work on different aspects of Cryptographic Engineering in the Bellini College at USF (Tampa, FL) with Dr. Mehran Mozaffari Kermani.

The required expertise includes:

- Master’s in Computer Engineering or Computer Science with hardware background (do not contact if you have not obtained a Master’s degree, this position is not for direct Bachelor’s to Ph.D.)

- Solid background in cryptographic engineering and theory of cryptography

- Solid HDL and FPGA/ARM expertise

- Outstanding English (if English tests are taken) to be eligible for funding

- Motivation to work beyond the expectations from an average Ph.D. student and publish in top tier venues Please closely observe the admission requirement details before emailing.

We are looking for motivated, talented, and hardworking applicants who have background and are interested in working on different aspects of Cryptographic Engineering with emphasis on hardware/software implementation, and side-channel attacks.

Please send email me your updated CV (including list of publications, language test marks, and references), transcripts for B.Sc. and M.Sc., and a statement of interest to: mehran2 (at) usf.edu as soon as possible. NOTE: The successful candidate will be asked to apply formally very soon to the college, so all the material has to be ready. We do not require GRE.

Research Webpage: https://cse.usf.edu/~mehran2/

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Mehran Mozaffari Kermani

The Danish Advanced Research Academy (DARA) is offering fully funded three-year PhD fellowships starting in 2025. As part of this program, you can join the Coding and Visual Communication research group at DTU Electro, Denmark. Our group conducts research at the intersection of information theory and cryptography, with applications in communications, data processing, and visual media. We are seeking motivated candidates with a strong background in mathematics, computer science, or engineering, and an interest in theoretical foundations and secure systems. Interested candidates should contact Assistant Professor Stanislav Kruglik at stakr@dtu.dk by 22 August 2025 to discuss proposal ideas and supervision possibilities.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: stakr@dtu.dk

We invite applications for a Lecturer/Senior Lecturer position in Cybersecurity. The level of appointment will depend on the successful candidate's relevant experience.

We welcome applications from candidates conducting cutting-edge research in any area of cybersecurity. Areas of interest include, but are not limited to: adversarial machine learning, post-quantum cryptography, privacy-enhancing technologies, software and supply chain security, secure systems and memory-safe languages, cloud and virtualization security, human-centred and usable security, and the security implications of AI systems. We are particularly interested in candidates whose work addresses emerging threats, combines theory and practice, or takes an interdisciplinary approach to security and privacy.

You will contribute to teaching in core cybersecurity and computer networking subjects, as well as being encouraged to develop a strong, externally funded research programme, supervise undergraduate and postgraduate students, and collaborate with other academics in the department's teaching and research activities. The appointee will be expected to develop links with and contribute to the wider computer science and/or software engineering profession at local, national and international levels.

More information on eligibility criteria and how to apply here: https://jobs.canterbury.ac.nz/jobdetails/ajid/TFkG9/Lecturer-Senior-Lecturer-Computer-Security,26437

Closing date for applications:

Contact:

We do not accept applications by email, however, we are happy to answer any queries at WorkatUC@canterbury.ac.nz.

For further information specifically about the role, please contact: Ben Adams, benjamin.adams@canterbury.ac.nz.

More information: https://jobs.canterbury.ac.nz/jobdetails/ajid/TFkG9/Lecturer-Senior-Lecturer-Computer-Security,26437

A homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) scheme allows a client to delegate a computation to a group of untrusted servers while achieving input privacy as long as at least one server is honest. In recent years, many HSS schemes have been constructed that have, in turn, found numerous applications to cryptography.

Prior work on HSS focuses on the setting where the servers are semi-honest. In this work we study HSS in the setting of malicious evaluators. We propose the notion of HSS with verifiable evaluation (ve-HSS) that guarantees correctness of output even when all the servers are corrupted. ve-HSS retains all the attractive features of HSS and adds the new feature of succinct public verification of output.

We present black-box constructions of ve-HSS by devising generic transformations for semi-honest HSS schemes (with negligible error). This provides a new non-interactive method for verifiable and private outsourcing of computation.

FALCON is a NIST-selected post-quantum digital signature scheme whose performance bottleneck lies in the SamplerZ subroutine for discrete Gaussian sampling. We present a throughput-optimized, full hardware implementation of SamplerZ that introduces several architectural and algorithmic innovations to significantly accelerate signature generation. Our design incorporates a datapath-aware floating-point arithmetic pipeline that strategically balances latency and resource utilization. We introduce a novel Estrin's Scheme-based polynomial evaluator to accelerate exponential approximation, and implement a constant-latency BerExp routine using floating-point exponentiation IP, thereby eliminating critical-path logic associated with fixed-point decomposition. Additionally, we optimize rejection handling through parallel sampling loops, full loop unrolling, and a speed-optimized flooring circuit, collectively enabling high-throughput discrete Gaussian sampling. As a result, these optimizations yield FPGA implementations of SamplerZ that achieve 55%-71% reduction in sampling latency, leading to a 36%-46% reduction in overall FALCON signature generation latency compared to the current state-of-the-art. Furthermore, our design achieves up to a 48% reduction in the Area-Time Product (ATP) of SamplerZ, setting a new benchmark for high-throughput and efficient discrete Gaussian sampling, advancing the practical deployment of post-quantum lattice-based signatures in high-performance cryptographic hardware.

Rekeying is an effective technique for protecting symmetric ciphers against side-channel and key-search attacks. Since its introduction, numerous rekeying schemes have been developed. We introduce Post-Quantum Stateless Auditable Rekeying (PQ-STAR), a novel post-quantum secure stateless rekeying scheme with audit support. PQ-STAR is presented in three variants of increasing security guarantees: (i) Plain PQ-STAR lets an authorized auditor decrypt and verify selected ciphertexts; (ii) Commitment-based PQ-STAR with the additional binding guarantee from the commitments, preventing a malicious sender from potentially claiming a random or wrong session key. (iii) Zero-knowledge PQ-STAR equips each session key with a signature-based zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), which proves that the session key was derived honestly, without ever revealing the secret preimage. We formally prove that all variants achieve key-uniqueness, index-hiding, and forward-secrecy, even if a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary arbitrarily learns many past session keys. PQ-STAR provides a formally verified, stateless, and audit-capable rekeying primitive that can be seamlessly integrated as a post-quantum upgrade for existing symmetric-key infrastructures.

Asynchronous byzantine agreement extension studies the message complexity of $L$-bit multivalued asynchronous byzantine agreement given access to a binary asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol.

We prove that asynchronous byzantine agreement extension can be solved with perfect security and optimal resilience in $O(nL+n^2 \log n)$ total communication (in bits) in addition to a single call to a binary asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol. For $L = O(n \log n)$, this gives an asymptotically optimal protocol, resolving a question that remained open for nearly two decades.

List decoding is a fundamental concept in theoretical computer science and cryptography, enabling error correction beyond the unique decoding radius and playing a critical role in constructing robust codes, hardness amplification, and secure cryptographic protocols. A key novelty of our perfectly secure and optimally resilient asynchronous byzantine agreement extension protocol is that it uses list decoding - making a striking new connection between list decoding and asynchronous Byzantine agreement.

SCALES (Small Clients And Larger Ephemeral Servers) (Acharya et al., TCC 2022, CRYPTO 2024) is a recently proposed model for MPC with several attractive features, including resilience to adaptive corruption. Known SCALES constructions, while offering reasonable asymptotics for large-scale MPC, incur high concrete costs both in computation and communication. As our primary contribution, we dramatically improve both asymptotic and concrete costs of SCALES for permutation branching programs (PBP), a well-motivated practical model of computation. We achieve linear cost in program length, input size, and the security parameter. Our instantiations of the building blocks may be of independent interest. Further, we present generic transformations to extend any semi-honestly secure SCALES protocol to achieve (1) guaranteed output delivery in the presence of mixed adversaries (that corrupt servers maliciously and clients semi-honestly) in the all-but-one corruption setting; and (2) protocols for computing general functionalities where each server's computation scales sub-linearly in the function~size.

Construction of efficient and provably-secure (T)PRPs and (fixed/variable input-length) PRFs has been one of the central open problem in modern symmetric-key cryptography. Many Feistel-based constructions has been proposed and analysed to solve this problem. Inspired by some recent works, in this paper, we revisit the problem of constructing provably secure Feistel constructions using permutations as the round functions. More specifically, following the idea of Naor and Reingold, we try to reduce the number of inner permutations used by replacing them with cheap hash functions, without sacrificing optimal security. We affirmatively show that with the use of a suitable hash function along with a four-round Feistel construction, which uses only three independent permutations, one can achieve optimally secure (T)PRPs and PRFs.

Bitcoin is a decentralized, permissionless network for digital payments. Bitcoin also supports a limited set of smart contracts, which restrict how bitcoin can be spent, through bitcoin script. In order to support more expressive scripting functionality, Robin Linus introduced the BitVM family of protocols. These implement a weaker form of ``optimistic" smart contracts, and for the first time allowed bitcoin to verify arbitrary computation. BitVM allows a challenger to publish a ``fraud proof" that the computation was carried out incorrectly which can be verified on chain, even when the entire computation cannot. Jermey Rubin introduced an alternative optimistic smart contract protocol called Delbrag. This protocol uses Garbled Circuits (GC) to replace the BitVM fraud proof with by simply revealing a secret. He also introduced the Grug technique for malicious security.

We introduce a new formalization of GC based optimistic techniques called Garbled Locks or Glocks. Much like Delbrag, we use the GC to leak a secret and produce a signature as a fraud proof. We further propose the first concretely practical construction that does not require Grug. Like BitVM2 and Delbrag, Glock25 reduces verification of arbitrary bounded computation to verification of a SNARK. In Glock25, we use a designated verifier version of a modified of the SNARK Pari with smaller proof size. We make Glock25 maliciously secure using a combination of Cut-and-Choose, Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS), and Adaptor Signatures. These techniques reduce the communication, computational, and on-chain complexity of the protocol compared to other approaches to construct a Glock, e.g. based on Groth16.

Payment channel networks (PCNs) are a promising technology that alleviates blockchain scalability by shifting the transaction load from the blockchain to the PCN. Nevertheless, the network topology has to be carefully designed to maximise the transaction throughput in PCNs. Additionally, users in PCNs also have to make optimal decisions on which transactions to forward and which to reject to prolong the lifetime of their channels. In this work, we consider an input sequence of transactions over $p$ parties. Each transaction consists of a transaction size, source, and target, and can be either accepted or rejected (entailing a cost). The goal is to design a PCN topology among the $p$ cooperating parties, along with the channel capacities, and then output a decision for each transaction in the sequence to minimise the cost of creating and augmenting channels, as well as the cost of rejecting transactions. Our main contribution is an $\mathcal{O}(p)$ approximation algorithm for the problem with $p$ parties. We further show that with some assumptions on the distribution of transactions, we can reduce the approximation ratio to $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{p})$. We complement our theoretical analysis with an empirical study of our assumptions and approach in the context of the Lightning Network.

Conventional Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols focus on the workflow within a group of nodes. In recent years, many applications of consensus involve communication across groups. Examples include communication between infrastructures running replicated state machine, sharding-based protocols, and cross-chain bridges. Unfortunately, little efforts have been made to model the properties for communication across groups.

In this work, we propose a new primitive called cross-consensus reliable broadcast (XRBC). The XRBC primitive models the security properties of communication between two groups, where at least one group executes a consensus protocol. We provide three constructions of XRBC under different assumptions and present three different applications for our XRBC protocols: a cross-shard coordination protocol via a case study of Reticulum (NDSS 2024), a protocol for cross-shard transactions via a case study of Chainspace (NDSS 2018), and a solution for cross-chain bridge. Our evaluation results show that our protocols are highly efficient and benefit different applications. For example, in our case study on Reticulum, our approach achieves 61.16% lower latency than the vanilla approach.

We discuss how Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), and in particular the TFHE scheme, can be used to define an e-voting scheme for the Alternative Vote (AV) election system. This system has a more complex tallying phase than traditional First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) election variants. Previous work on e-voting schemes that used homomorphic encryption has focused on FPTP systems only, and utilized mainly linearly homomorphic encryption. We show, by using FHE, that more complex electoral systems such as AV can also be supported by homomorphic encryption. We show security of our protocol by considering it as a simple MPC functionality, and we also show practicality by presenting some experimental runtimes using the tfhe-rs library.

A Symmetric Key Encryption scheme using Camera Zooming is pre- sented using a familiar Paper-pencil cipher. The Camera can have a mag- nification/scaling up to some integer. The encrypter and decrypter are two hardware systems that are assumed to have the capability to zoom a given image with text from the resolution of a single character to a page by applying an appropriate scaling factor and an appropriate polynomial time zoom algorithm. Using the symmetric key, the Camera or a zooming algorithm implementation repeatedly zooms on different boxes in an im- age filled with cipher text and spurious redundant non-correlated pseudo- random data. Then, it decrypts the cipher using the Merkle-Hellman Knapsack Cryptosystem (MHKC) trapdoor algorithm or variants for ef- ficient encryption/decryption. As shown, the MHKC algorithm’s crypt- analysis vulnerability using Lattice-based LLL and other density attacks would not affect this scheme—as long as the key is private.

Kleptography was first proposed by Adam Young and Moti Yung in 1996, while algorithm substitution attack was introduced by Mi- hir Bellare et al. as a variation of kleptography in 2014 after the Dual EC incident with the confidential documents revelation by Edward Snowden. These two paradigms share a common goal: to enable attackers to embed covert capabilities into cryptographic implementations while maintaining the appearance of normal functionality. The goal of this paper is to con- solidate existing research on kleptographic attacks, integrate it into a uni- fied definition, and explore future directions for the research in this field. This paper begins by introducing and comparing the two major branches of kleptographic attacks: traditional kleptography and post-Snowden al- gorithm substitution attack, highlighting their theoretical distinctions, threat models, and historical development. Then, it analyzes the spe- cific goals that attackers aim to achieve through such subversions and propose a generalized definition of algorithm substitution attack that in- clude all the goals. The paper also presents practical examples framed within my definition and classify prior research works as either strong or weak attacks based on their structure and undetectability. Finally, it discusses the current landscape of research in kleptographic attacks, and then suggest future directions for the attack and defense perspectives.