International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Event date: 27 May 2020

Applications are invited for multiple PhD student positions at the IMDEA Software Institute, Madrid, Spain.

Selected candidates will work under the supervision of Marco Guarnieri on the design, verification, and implementation of countermeasures against CPU micro-architectural attacks.

The specific topic of the research will be determined based on the common interests of the candidate and the supervisor.

The positions are fully funded by a research grant from Intel Corporation.

How to apply?

Applicants interested in the position should submit their application at https://careers.software.imdea.org/ selecting option 5 - PhD Student and reference code 2020-05-phd-uarchsec.

Questions

For any questions about these positions, please contact Marco Guarnieri directly (marco dot guarnieri at imdea dot org).

Closing date for applications:

Contact:

Marco Guarnieri, Assistant Professor @ IMDEA Software

Email: marco dot guarnieri at imdea dot org

Website: https://mguarnieri.github.io

More information: https://software.imdea.org/open_positions/2020-05-phd-uarchsec.html

We have two post-docs posts (Research Fellow and Senior Research Fellow, each for up to 4 years) available in the Department of Computer Science, University of Warwick, as part of a 4-year EPSRC project on "End to End Authentication of Caller ID in Heterogeneous Telephony Systems", working with Professor Feng Hao (PI) and Dr Adrian Von Mühlenen (co-I). The primary aim of this project is to improve security in telecommunication systems, in particular, providing reliable authentication of the caller ID without requiring any PKI, and protecting end-to-end privacy of the call contents.

The candidates will join a dynamic and growing team of security researchers in the Department of Computer Science, University of Warwick. Warwick Computer Science is ranked 1st in research output, 2nd in research impact, and 2nd overall among all computer science departments in the UK based on REF 2014. The candidates will have the flexibility to collaborate with other members in the security team on a wider range of topics, such as key exchange, e-voting, e-auction, PUF, cryptocurrency, mobile security, IoT, web security and e-payment security. Our work has been largely driven by tackling real-world security problems. Candidates who have a strong interest in working on real-world problems for practical impacts are encouraged to apply. Those who have industrial experiences are also most welcome to apply.

1. Research fellow: https://tinyurl.com/y8spmtb5
2. Senior research fellow (equivalent grade as Assistant Professor): https://tinyurl.com/ybjyqzh4

Application deadline: 17 June, 2020. After the deadline, the posts will be vacant until they are filled. Interested candidates are encouraged to contact Prof Feng Hao with an expression of interest as early as possible.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Professor Feng Hao (feng.hao@warwick.ac.uk)

We offer one 2-year and one 3-year position as postdoctoral researcher in the area of symmetric cryptography.

The positions will be fulfilled within the Digital Security group at Radboud University in Nijmegen in the team led by Joan Daemen and Bart Mennink. Your main tasks will be to perform research and supervise that of the PhD of our ESCADA and SCALAR teams and master students. The research subjects are cryptanalysis and design of primitives, provable security of modes of use, implementation attacks and countermeasures. We concentrate on cryptography based on permutations as in the sponge, duplex and farfalle constructions. As such, we are building an alternative for block cipher based cryptography, both in the lightweight as in the high-performance arena.

There are possibilities for teaching courses within our BSc in Cyber Security program and MSc in Computer Security.

The starting date is negotiable but is preferably not later than October.

The successful candidate should ideally have a PhD in Computer Science, Mathematics, or Electrical engineering and a good publication record in the area.

Applications will be considered until the position is filled.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Joan Daemen, joan (at) cs.ru.nl and Bart Mennink, b.mennink (at) cs.ru.nl

Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a technique for compiling any program to an oblivious counterpart, i.e., one whose access patterns do not leak information about the secret inputs. Similarly, Oblivious Parallel RAM (OPRAM) compiles a parallel program to an oblivious counterpart. In this paper, we care about ORAM/OPRAM with perfect security, i.e., the access patterns must identically distributed no matter what the program's memory request sequence is. We show two novel results.

The first result is a new perfectly secure OPRAM scheme with $O(\log^3 N/\log \log N)$ expected overhead. In comparison, the prior literature has been stuck at $O(\log^3 N)$ for more than a decade.

The second result is a new perfectly secure OPRAM scheme with $O(\log^4 N/\log \log N)$ worst-case overhead. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first perfectly secure OPRAM scheme with polylogarithmic worst-case overhead. Prior to our work, the state of the art is a perfectly secure ORAM scheme with more than $\sqrt{N}$ worst-case overhead, and the result does not generalize to a parallel setting. Our work advances the theoretical understanding of the asymptotic complexity of perfectly secure OPRAMs.

We propose a new approach for building efficient, provably secure, and practically hardened assembly implementations of masked algorithms. Our approach is based on a Domain Specific Language in which users can write efficient assembly implementations and fine-grained leakage models. The latter are then used as a basis for formal verification, allowing for the first time formal guarantees for a broad range of leakage effects not addressed by prior work. The practical benefits of our approach are demonstrated through a case study of the PRESENT S-Box: we develop a highly optimized and provably secure masked implementation, and show through practical evaluation based on TVLA that our implementation is practically resilient. Our approach significantly narrows the gap between formal verification of masking and practical security.

Public permutations have been established as valuable primitives since the absence of a key schedule compared to block ciphers alleviates cryptanalysis. While many permutation-based authentication and encryption schemes have been proposed in the past decade, the birthday bound in terms of the primitive's block length n has been mostly accepted as the standard security goal. Thus, remarkably little research has been conducted yet on permutation-based modes with higher security guarantees. Only recently at CRYPTO'19, Chen et al showed two constructions with higher security based on the sum of two public permutation. Their work has sparked increased interest in this direction by the community. However, since their proposals were domain-preserving, the question of encryption schemes with beyond-birthday-bound security was left open. This work tries to address this gap by proposing CENCPP, a nonce-based encryption scheme from public permutations. Our proposal is a variant of Iwata's block-cipher-based mode CENC that we adapt for public permutations, thereby generalizing Chen et al.'s Sum-of-Even-Mansour construction to a mode with variable output lengths. Like CENC, our proposal enjoys a comfortable rate-security trade-off that needs w + 1 calls to the primitive for w primitive outputs. We show a tight security level for up to O(2^(2n/3)/w^2) primitive calls. While w can be arbitrary, two independent keys suffice; moreover, although we propose CENCPP first in a generic setting with w + 1 independent permutations, we show that only log_2(w + 1) bits of the input for domain separation suffice to obtain a single-permutation variant that still maintains a security level of up to O(2^(2n/3)/w^4) queries.

Nakamoto invented the longest chain protocol, and claimed its security by analyzing the private double-spend attack, a race between the adversary and the honest nodes to grow a longer chain. But is it the worst attack? We answer the question in the affirmative for three classes of longest chain protocols, designed for different consensus models: 1) Nakamoto's original Proof-of-Work protocol; 2) Ouroboros and SnowWhite Proof-of-Stake protocols; 3) Chia Proof-of-Space protocol. As a consequence, exact characterization of the maximum tolerable adversary power is obtained for each protocol as a function of the average block time normalized by the network delay. The security analysis of these protocols is performed in a unified manner by a novel method of reducing all attacks to a race between the adversary and the honest nodes.

In multi-party threshold private set intersection (PSI), $n$ parties each with a private set wish to compute the intersection of their sets if the intersection is sufficiently large. Previously, Ghosh and Simkin (CRYPTO 2019) studied this problem for the two-party case and demonstrated interesting lower and upper bounds on the communication complexity. In this work, we investigate the communication complexity of the multi-party setting $(n \geq 2)$. We consider two functionalities for multi-party threshold PSI. In the first, parties learn the intersection if each of their sets and the intersection differ by at most $T$. In the second functionality, parties learn the intersection if the union of all their sets and the intersection differ by at most $T$.

For both functionalities, we show that any protocol must have communication complexity $\Omega(nT)$. We build protocols with a matching upper bound of $O(nT)$ communication complexity for both functionalities assuming threshold FHE. We also construct a computationally more efficient protocol for the second functionality with communication complexity $\tO(nT^2)$ under a weaker assumption of threshold additive homomorphic encryption.

As a consequence, we achieve the first "regular" multi-party PSI protocol where the communication complexity only grows with the size of the set difference and does not depend on the size of the input sets.

We revisit the problem of two-party private set intersection for aggregate computation which we refer to as private matching for compute. In this problem, two parties want to perform various downstream computation on the intersection of their two datasets according to a previously agreed-upon identifier. We observe that prior solutions to this problem have important limitations. For example, any change or update to the records in either party's dataset triggers a rerun of the private matching component; and it is not clear how to support a streaming arrival of one party's set in small batches without revealing the match rate for each individual batch.

We introduce two new formulations of the private matching for compute problem meeting these requirements, called private-ID and streaming private secret shared set intersection, and design new DDH-based constructions for both. Our implementation shows that when taking advantage of the inherent parallelizability of these solutions, we can execute the matching for datasets of size upto 100 million records within an hour.

In this paper we cryptanalyse the two accumulator variants proposed by Au et al., namely the $a$-based construction and the reference string-based ($RS$-based) construction. We show that if non-membership witnesses are issued according to the $a$-based construction, colluding users can efficiently discover the secret accumulator parameter $a$ and takeover the Accumulator Manager. More precisely, if $p$ is the order of the underlying bilinear group, the knowledge of $O(log(p)loglog(p))$ non-membership witnesses permits to successfully recover $a$. Further optimizations and different attack scenarios allow to reduce the number of required witnesses to $O(log(p))$, together with practical attack complexity. Moreover, we show that accumulator collision resistance can be broken if just one of these non-membership witnesses is known to the attacker.

In the case when non-membership witnesses are issued using the $RS$-based construction (with $RS$ kept secret by the Manager), we show that a group of colluding users can reconstruct the $RS$ and compute witnesses for arbitrary new elements. In particular, if the accumulator is initialized by adding $m$ secret elements, $m$ colluding users that share their non-membership witnesses will succeed in such attack.

In this paper we present a bitstream modification attack on the Trivium cipher, an international standard under ISO/IEC 29192-3. By changing the content of three LUTs in the bitstream, we reduce the non-linear state updating function of Trivium to a linear one. This makes it possible to recover the key from 288 keystream bits using at most $2^{19.41}$ operations. We also propose a countermeasure against bitstream modification attacks which obfuscates the bitstream using dummy and camouflaged LUTs which look legitimate to the attacker. We present an algorithm for injecting dummy LUTs directly into the bitstream without causing any performance or power penalty.

An encryption scheme is called indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attack (short IND-CPA), if an attacker cannot distinguish the encryptions of two messages of his choice. Alternatively there are other variants of this definition, that all turn out to be equivalent in the classical case. However in the quantum case, there is a lack of a comprehensive study of all quantum versions of IND-CPA security notion. We give an overview of these different variants of quantum IND-CPA for symmetric encryption schemes. In total, 57 different notions are valid and achievable. We investigate the relations between these notions and prove various equivalences, implications, non-equivalences, and non-implications between these variants. Some of non-implications are left as conjectures and need further research.

In Time-Specific Encryption (TSE) [Paterson and Quaglia, SCN'10] system, each secret-key (resp. ciphertext) is associated with a time period t s.t. 0<=t<=T-1 (resp. a time interval [L,R] s.t. 0<=L<=R<=T-1. A ciphertext under [L,R] is correctly decrypted by any secret-key for any time t included in the interval, i.e., L<=t<=R. TSE's generic construction from identity-based encryption (IBE) (resp. hierarchical IBE (HIBE)) from which we obtain a concrete TSE scheme with secret-keys of O(log T)|g| (resp. O(log^2 T)|g|) and ciphertexts of size O(log T)|g| (resp. O(1)|g|) has been proposed in [Paterson and Quaglia, SCN'10] (resp. [Kasamatsu et al., SCN'12]), where |g| denotes bit length of an element in a bilinear group G. In this paper, we propose another TSE's generic construction from wildcarded identity-based encryption (WIBE). Differently from the original WIBE ([Abdalla et al., ICALP'06]), we consider WIBE w/o (hierarchical) key-delegatability. By instantiating the TSE's generic construction, we obtain the first concrete scheme with constant-size secret-keys secure under a standard (static) assumption. Specifically, it has secret-keys of size O(1)|g| and ciphertexts of size O(log^2 T)|g|, and achieves security under the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption.

Devising efficient and secure signature schemes based on coding theory is still considered a challenge by the cryptographic community. In this paper, we construct a signature scheme by exploring a new approach to the area. To do this, we design a zero-knowledge identification scheme, which we then render static via standard means (e.g. Fiat-Shamir). We show that practical instances of our protocol have the potential to outperform the state of the art on code-based signatures, achieving small data sizes with a low computational complexity.

Many alt-coins developed in recent years make strong privacy guarantees, claiming to be virtually untraceable. This paper explores the extent to which these claims are true after the first appraisals were made about these coins. In particular, we will investigate Monero (XMR) and Zcash (ZEC), competitors in the private cryptocurrency space. We will test how traceable these currencies are after the most recent security updates, and how they hold up against their claims. We run some traceability experiments based on previously published papers for each coin. Results show that, introducing strict security and anonymity requirements into the cryptocurrency ecosystem makes the coin effectively untraceable, as shown by Monero. On the other hand, Zcash still hesitates to introduce changes that alter user behavior. Despite its strong cryptographic features, transactions are overall more traceable.

Performing ML computation on private data while maintaining data privacy aka Privacy-preserving Machine Learning (PPML) is an emergent field of research. Recently, PPML has seen a visible shift towards the adoption of Secure Outsourced Computation (SOC) paradigm, due to the heavy computation that it entails. In the SOC paradigm, computation is outsourced to a set of powerful and specially equipped servers that provide service on a pay-per-use basis. In this work, we propose SWIFT, a robust PPML framework for a range of ML algorithms in SOC setting, that guarantees output delivery to the users irrespective of any adversarial behaviour. Robustness, a highly desirable feature, evokes user participation without the fear of denial of service.

At the heart of our framework lies a highly-efficient, maliciously-secure, three-party computation (3PC) over rings that provides guaranteed output delivery (GOD) in the honest-majority setting. To the best of our knowledge, SWIFT is the first robust and efficient PPML framework in the 3PC setting. SWIFT is as fast as the best-known 3PC framework BLAZE (Patra et al. NDSS'20) which only achieves fairness. We extend our 3PC framework for four parties (4PC). In this regime, SWIFT is as fast as the best known fair 4PC framework Trident (Chaudhari et al. NDSS'20) and twice faster than the best-known robust 4PC framework FLASH (Byali et al. PETS'20).

We demonstrate the practical relevance of our framework by benchmarking two important applications-- i) ML algorithms: Logistic Regression and Neural Network, and ii) Biometric matching, both over a 64-bit ring in WAN setting. Our readings reflect our claims as above.

Since Keccak was selected as the SHA-3 standard, more and more permutation-based primitives have been proposed. Different from block ciphers, there is no round key in the underlying permutation for permutation-based primitives. Therefore, there is a higher risk for a differential characteristic of the underlying permutation to become incompatible when considering the dependency of difference transitions over different rounds. However, in most of the MILP or SAT based models to search for differential characteristics, only the difference transitions are involved and are treated as independent in different rounds, which may cause that an invalid one is found for the underlying permutation. To overcome this obstacle, we are motivated to design a model which automatically avoids the inconsistency in the search for differential characteristics. Our technique is to involve both the difference transitions and value transitions in the constructed model. Such an idea is inspired by the algorithm to find SHA-2 characteristics as proposed by Mendel et al. in ASIACRYPT 2011, where the differential characteristic and the conforming message pair are simultaneously searched. As a first attempt, our new technique will be applied to the Gimli permutation, which was proposed in CHES 2017. As a result, we reveal that some existing differential characteristics of reduced Gimli are indeed incompatible, one of which is found in the Gimli document. In addition, since only the permutation is analyzed in the Gimli document, we are lead to carry out a comprehensive study, covering the proposed hash scheme and the authenticated encryption (AE) scheme specified for Gimli, which has become a second round candidate of the NIST lightweight cryptography standardization process. For the hash scheme, a semi-free-start (SFS) collision attack can reach up to 8 rounds starting from an intermediate round. For the AE scheme, a state recovery attack is demonstrated to achieve up to 9 rounds. It should be emphasized that our analysis does not threaten the security of Gimli.

Byzantine Broadcast (BB) is a central question in distributed systems, and an important challenge is to understand its round complexity. Under the honest majority setting, it is long known that there exist randomized protocols that can achieve BB in expected constant rounds, regardless of the number of nodes $n$. However, whether we can match the expected constant round complexity in the corrupt majority setting --- or more precisely, when $f \geq n/2 + \omega(1)$ --- remains unknown, where $f$ denotes the number of corrupt nodes.

In this paper, we are the first to resolve this long-standing question. We show how to achieve BB in expected $O((n/(n-f))^2)$ rounds. In particular, even when 99\% of the nodes are corrupt we can achieve expected constant rounds.Our results hold under both a static adversary and a weakly adaptive adversary who cannot perform ``after-the-fact removal'' of messages already sent by a node before it becomes corrupt.

This paper proposes new symmetric cryptoalgorithms of Residue Number System and its Modified Perfect Form. According to the first method, ciphertext is regarded as a set of residues to the corresponding sets of modules (keys) and decryption or decimal number recovery from its residues takes place according to the Chinese remainder theorem. To simplify the calculations, it is proposed to use a Modified Perfect Form of Residue Number System, which leads to a decrease in the number of arithmetic operations (in particular, finding the inverse and multiplying by it) during the decryption process. Another method of symmetric encryption based on the Chinese remainder theorem can be applied when fast decryption is required. In this algorithm, the plaintext block is divided into sub-blocks that are smaller than the corresponding module and serve as remainders on dividing some number, which is a ciphertext, by these modules. Plaintext recovery is based on finding the ciphertext remainders to the corresponding modules. Examples of cryptoalgorithms implementation and their encryption schemes are given. Cryptosecurity of the proposed methods is estimated on the basis of the Prime number theorem and the Euler function. It is investigated which bitness and a number of modules are required for the developed symmetric security systems to ensure the same security level as the largest length key of the AES algorithm does. It is found that as the number of modules increases, their bitness decreases. Graphical dependencies of cryptoanalysis complexity on bitness and a number of modules are built. It is shown that with the increase of specified parameters, the cryptosecurity of the developed methods also increases.