## IACR News

Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:

#### 27 November 2019

###### Megha Byali, Harsh Chaudhari, Arpita Patra, Ajith Suresh

ePrint Report
Privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) via Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) has gained momentum in the recent past. Assuming a minimal network of pair-wise private channels, we propose an efficient four-party PPML framework over rings, FLASH, the first of its kind in the regime of PPML framework, that achieves the strongest security notion of Guaranteed Output Delivery (all parties obtain the output irrespective of adversary's behaviour). The state of the art ML frameworks such as ABY3 by {\em Mohassel et.al} (ACM CCS'18) and SecureNN by {\em Wagh et.al} (PETS'19) operate in the setting of $3$ parties with one malicious corruption but achieve the {\em weaker} security guarantee of {\em abort}. We demonstrate PPML with real-time efficiency, using the following custom-made tools that overcome the limitations of the aforementioned state-of-the-art-- (a) {\em dot product}, which is independent of the vector size unlike the state-of-the-art ABY3, SecureNN and ASTRA by {\em Chaudhari et.al} (ACM CCSW'19), all of which have linear dependence on the vector size. (b) {\em Truncation} and {\em MSB Extraction}, which are constant round and free of circuits like Parallel Prefix Adder (PPA) and Ripple Carry Adder (RCA), unlike ABY3 which uses these circuits and has round complexity of the order of depth of these circuits. We then exhibit the application of our FLASH framework in the secure server-aided prediction of vital algorithms-- Linear Regression, Logistic Regression, Deep Neural Networks, and Binarized Neural Networks. We substantiate our theoretical claims through improvement in benchmarks of the aforementioned algorithms when compared with the current best framework ABY3. All the protocols are implemented over a 64-bit ring in LAN and WAN. Our experiments demonstrate that, for MNIST dataset, the improvement (in terms of throughput) ranges from $24\times$ to $1390\times$ over LAN and WAN together.

###### Cagdas Calik, Meltem Sonmez Turan, Rene Peralta

ePrint Report
Multiplicative complexity (MC) is defined as the minimum number of AND gates required to implement a function with a circuit over the basis (AND, XOR, NOT). Boolean functions with MC 1 and 2 have been characterized in Fischer and Peralta ( 2002) and Find et al. (2017), respectively. In this work, we identify the affine equivalence classes for functions with MC 3 and 4. In order to achieve this, we utilize the notion of the dimension $dim(f)$ of a Boolean function in relation to its linearity dimension, and provide a new lower bound suggesting that multiplicative complexity of $f$ is at least $\ceil{dim(f)/2}$. For MC 3, this implies that there are no equivalence classes other than those $24$ identified in Calik et al (2018). Using the techniques from Calik et al. (2018) and the new relation between dimension and MC, we identify the 1277 equivalence classes having MC 4. We also provide a closed formula for the number of $n$-variable functions with MC 3 and 4. The techniques allow us to construct MC-optimal circuits for Boolean functions that have MC 4 or less, independent of the number of variables they are defined on.

###### Sébastien Campion, Julien Devigne, Céline Duguey, Pierre-Alain Fouque

ePrint Report
Nowadays, we spend our life juggling with many devices such as smartphones, tablets or laptops, and we expect to easily and efficiently switch between them without losing time or security. However, most applications have been designed for single device usage. This is the case for secure instant messaging (SIM) services based on the Signal protocol, that implements the Double Ratchet key exchange algorithm. While some adaptations, like the Sesame protocol released by the developers of Signal, have been proposed to fix this usability issue, they have not been designed as specific multi-device solutions and no security model has been formally defined either. In addition, even though the group key exchange problematic appears related to the multi-device case, group solutions are too generic and do not take into account some properties of the multi-device setting.Indeed, the fact that all devices belong to a single user can be exploited to build more efficient solutions.
In this paper, we propose a Multi-Device Instant Messaging protocol based on Signal, ensuring all the security properties of the original Signal.

###### Colin Boyd, Kai Gellert

ePrint Report
Forward security ensures that compromise of entities today does not impact the security of cryptographic primtitives employed in the past. Such a form of security is regarded as increasingly important in the modern world due to the existence of adversaries with mass storage capabilites and powerful infiltration abilities. Although the idea of forward security has been known for over 30 years, current understanding of what it really should mean is limited due to the prevalence of new techniques and inconsistent terminology. We survey existing methods for achieving forward security for different cryptographic primitives and propose new definitions and terminology aimed at a unified treatment of the notion.

###### Kaushik Nath, Palash Sarkar

ePrint Report
In this paper we introduce new Montgomery and Edwards form elliptic curve targeted at the 256-bit security level.
To this end, we work with three primes, namely $p_1:=2^{506}-45$, $p_2=2^{510}-75$ and $p_3:=2^{521}-1$. While $p_3$ has been considered earlier in the literature, $p_1$ and $p_2$ are new. We define a pair of birationally equivalent Montgomery and Edwards form curves over all the three primes. Efficient 64-bit assembly implementations targeted at Skylake and later generation Intel processors have been made for the shared secret computation phase of the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol for the new Montgomery curves. Curve448 of the Transport Layer Security, Version 1.3 is a Montgomery curve which provides security at the 224-bit security level. Compared to the best publicly available 64-bit implementation of Curve448, the new Montgomery curve over $p_1$ leads to a $3\%$-$4\%$ slowdown and the new Montgomery curve over $p_2$ leads to a $4.5\%$-$5\%$ slowdown; on the other hand, 29 and 30.5 extra bits of security respectively are gained. For designers aiming for the 256-bit security level, the new curves over $p_1$ and $p_2$ provide an acceptable trade-off between security and efficiency.

###### Daniele Cozzo, Nigel P. smart

ePrint Report
We present the first actively secure variant of a distributed signature scheme based on isogenies. The protocol produces signatures from the recent CSI-FiSh signature scheme. Our scheme works for any access structure, as we use a replicated secret sharing scheme to define the underlying secret sharing; as such it is only practical when the number of maximally unqualified sets is relatively small. This, however, includes the important case of full threshold, and $(n,t)$-threshold schemes when $n$ is small.

###### Yanbin Li, Gaëtan Leurent, Meiqin Wang, Wei Wang, Guoyan Zhang , Yu Liu

ePrint Report
Authenticated encryption (AE) schemes are widely used to secure communications because they can guarantee both confidentiality and authenticity of a message. In addition to the standard AE security notion, some recent schemes offer extra robustness, i.e. they maintain security in some misuse scenarios. In particular, Ashur, Dunkelman and Luykx proposed a generic AE construction at CRYPTO'17 that is secure even when releasing unverified plaintext (the RUP setting), and a concrete instantiation, GCM-RUP. The designers proved that GCM-RUP is secure up to the birthday bound in the nonce-respecting model.

In this paper, we perform a birthday-bound universal forgery attack against GCM-RUP, matching the bound of the proof. While there are simple distinguishing attacks with birthday complexity on GCM-RUP, our attack is much stronger: we have a partial key recovery leading to universal forgeries. For reference, the best known universal forgery attack against GCM requires $2^{2n/3}$ operations, and many schemes do not have any known universal forgery attacks faster than $2^n$. This suggests that GCM-RUP offers a different security trade-off than GCM: stronger protection in the RUP setting, but more fragile when the data complexity reaches the birthday bound. In order to avoid this attack, we suggest a minor modification of GCM-RUP that seems to offer better robustness at the birthday bound.

In this paper, we perform a birthday-bound universal forgery attack against GCM-RUP, matching the bound of the proof. While there are simple distinguishing attacks with birthday complexity on GCM-RUP, our attack is much stronger: we have a partial key recovery leading to universal forgeries. For reference, the best known universal forgery attack against GCM requires $2^{2n/3}$ operations, and many schemes do not have any known universal forgery attacks faster than $2^n$. This suggests that GCM-RUP offers a different security trade-off than GCM: stronger protection in the RUP setting, but more fragile when the data complexity reaches the birthday bound. In order to avoid this attack, we suggest a minor modification of GCM-RUP that seems to offer better robustness at the birthday bound.

###### Xuan Thanh Do, Duong Hieu Phan, David Pointcheval

ePrint Report
Functional Encryption (FE) has been widely studied in the last decade, as it provides a very useful tool for restricted access to sensitive data: from a ciphertext, it allows specific users to learn a function of the underlying plaintext. In practice, many users may be interested in the same function on the data, say the mean value of the inputs, for example. The conventional definition of FE associates each function to a secret decryption functional key and therefore all the users get the same secret key for the same function. This induces an important problem: if one of these users (called a traitor) leaks or sells the decryption functional key to be included in a pirate decryption tool, then there is no way to trace back its identity. Our objective is to solve this issue by introducing a new primitive, called Traceable Functional Encryption: the functional decryption key will not only be specific to a function, but to a user too, in such a way that if some users collude to produce a pirate decoder that successfully evaluates a function on the plaintext, from the ciphertext only, one can trace back at least one of them.

We propose a concrete solution for Inner Product Functional Encryption (IPFE). We first remark that the ElGamal-based IPFE from Abdalla et. al. in PKC '15 shares many similarities with the Boneh-Franklin traitor tracing from CRYPTO '99. Then, we can combine these two schemes in a very efficient way, with the help of pairings, to obtain a Traceable IPFE with black-box confirmation.

We propose a concrete solution for Inner Product Functional Encryption (IPFE). We first remark that the ElGamal-based IPFE from Abdalla et. al. in PKC '15 shares many similarities with the Boneh-Franklin traitor tracing from CRYPTO '99. Then, we can combine these two schemes in a very efficient way, with the help of pairings, to obtain a Traceable IPFE with black-box confirmation.

###### Ward Beullens, Tim Beyne, Aleksei Udovenko, Giuseppe Vitto

ePrint Report
The Legendre PRF relies on the conjectured pseudorandomness properties of the Legendre symbol with a hidden shift. Originally proposed as a PRG by Damgård at CRYPTO 1988, it was recently suggested as an efficient PRF for multiparty computation purposes by Grassi et al. at CCS 2016. Moreover, the Legendre PRF is being considered for usage in the Ethereum 2.0 blockchain.

This paper improves previous attacks on the Legendre PRF and its higher-degree variant due to Khovratovich by reducing the time complexity from $\mathcal{O}(p\log{p}/M)$ to $\mathcal{O}(p\log^2{p}/M^2)$ Legendre symbol evaluations when $M \le \sqrt[4]{p}$ queries are available. The practical relevance of our improved attack is demonstrated by breaking two concrete instances of the PRF proposed by the Ethereum foundation. Furthermore, we generalize our attack in a nontrivial way to the higher-degree variant of the Legendre PRF and we point out a large class of weak keys for this construction.

Lastly, we provide the first security analysis of two additional generalizations of the Legendre PRF originally proposed by Damgård in the PRG setting, namely the Jacobi PRF and the power residue PRF.

This paper improves previous attacks on the Legendre PRF and its higher-degree variant due to Khovratovich by reducing the time complexity from $\mathcal{O}(p\log{p}/M)$ to $\mathcal{O}(p\log^2{p}/M^2)$ Legendre symbol evaluations when $M \le \sqrt[4]{p}$ queries are available. The practical relevance of our improved attack is demonstrated by breaking two concrete instances of the PRF proposed by the Ethereum foundation. Furthermore, we generalize our attack in a nontrivial way to the higher-degree variant of the Legendre PRF and we point out a large class of weak keys for this construction.

Lastly, we provide the first security analysis of two additional generalizations of the Legendre PRF originally proposed by Damgård in the PRG setting, namely the Jacobi PRF and the power residue PRF.

###### Jacqueline Brendel, Marc Fischlin, Felix Günther, Christian Janson, Douglas Stebila

ePrint Report
Modern key exchange protocols are usually based on the Diffie–Hellman (DH) primitive. The beauty
of this primitive, among other things, is its potential reusage of key shares: DH shares can be either
used once as an ephemeral key or used in multiple runs as a (semi-)static key. Since DH-based protocols
are insecure against quantum adversaries, alternative solutions have to be found when moving to the
post-quantum setting. However, most post-quantum candidates, including schemes based on lattices
and even supersingular isogeny DH, are not known to be secure under key reuse. In particular, this
means that they cannot be necessarily deployed as an immediate DH substitute in protocols.

In this paper, we introduce the notion of a split key encapsulation mechanism (split KEM) to translate the desired properties of a DH-based protocol, namely contributiveness and key-reusability, to a KEM-based protocol flow. We provide the relevant security notions of split KEMs and show that the formalism lends itself to lift Signal’s X3DH to the post-quantum KEM setting. While the proposed framework conceptually solves the raised issues, we did not succeed in providing a strongly-secure, post- quantum instantiation of a split KEM yet. The intention of this paper hence is to raise further awareness of the challenges arising when moving to KEM-based key exchange protocols with contributiveness and key-resusability, and to enable others to start investigating potential solutions.

In this paper, we introduce the notion of a split key encapsulation mechanism (split KEM) to translate the desired properties of a DH-based protocol, namely contributiveness and key-reusability, to a KEM-based protocol flow. We provide the relevant security notions of split KEMs and show that the formalism lends itself to lift Signal’s X3DH to the post-quantum KEM setting. While the proposed framework conceptually solves the raised issues, we did not succeed in providing a strongly-secure, post- quantum instantiation of a split KEM yet. The intention of this paper hence is to raise further awareness of the challenges arising when moving to KEM-based key exchange protocols with contributiveness and key-resusability, and to enable others to start investigating potential solutions.

###### Daniel Smith-Tone, Cristina Tone

ePrint Report
We introduce a new technique for building multivariate encryption schemes based on random linear codes. The construction is versatile, naturally admitting multiple modifications. Among these modifications is an interesting embedding modifier--- any efficiently invertible multivariate system can be embedded and used as part of the inversion process. In particular, even small scale secure multivariate signature schemes can be embedded producing reasonably efficient encryption schemes. Thus this technique offers a bridge between multivariate signatures, many of which have remained stable and functional for many years, and multivariate encryption, a historically more troubling area.

###### Zhangshuang Guan, Zhiguo Wan, Yang Yang, Yan Zhou, Butian Huang

ePrint Report
The disruptive blockchain technology is expected to have broad applications in many areas due to its advantages of transparency, fault tolerance, and decentralization, but the open nature of blockchain also introduces severe privacy issues. Since anyone can deduce private information about relevant accounts, different privacy-preserving techniques have been proposed for cryptocurrencies under the UTXO model, e.g., Zerocash and Monero. However, it is more challenging to protect privacy for account-model blockchains (e.g., Ethereum) since it is much easier to link accounts in the account-model blockchain. In this paper, we propose BlockMaze, an efficient privacy-preserving account-model blockchain based on zk-SNARKs. Along with dual-balance model, BlockMaze achieves strong privacy guaran- tees by hiding account balances, transaction amounts, and linkage between senders and recipients. Moreover, we provide formal security definitions and prove the security of BlockMaze. Finally, we implement a prototype of BlockMaze based on Libsnark and Go-Ethereum, and conduct extensive experiments to evaluate its performance. The experiment results demonstrate BlockMaze has high efficiency in computation and transaction throughput.

###### Nico Döttling, Sanjam Garg, Vipul Goyal, Giulio Malavolta

ePrint Report
In a Conditional Disclosure of Secrets (CDS) a verifier V wants to reveal a message m to a prover P conditioned on the fact that x is an accepting instance of some NP-language L. An honest prover (holding the corresponding witness w) always obtains the message m at the end of the interaction. On the other hand, if x is not in L we require that no PPT P* can learn the message m. We introduce laconic CDS, a two round CDS protocol with optimal computational cost for the verifier V and optimal communication cost. More specifically, the verifier's computation and overall communication grows with poly(|x|,\lambda,log(T)), where \lambda is the security parameter and T is the verification time for checking that x is in L (given w). We obtain constructions of laconic CDS under standard assumptions, such as CDH or LWE.
Laconic CDS serves as a powerful tool for "maliciousifying" semi-honest protocols while preserving their computational and communication complexities. To substantiate this claim, we consider the setting of non-interactive secure computation: Alice wants to publish a short digest corresponding to a private large input x on her web page such that (possibly many) Bob, with a private input y, can send a short message to Alice allowing her to learn C(x,y) (where C is a public circuit). The protocol must be reusable in the sense that Bob can engage in arbitrarily many executions on the same digest. In this context we obtain the following new implications.

(1) UC Secure Bob-optimized 2PC: We obtain a UC secure protocol where Bob's computational cost and the communication cost of the protocol grows with poly(|x|,|y|,\lambda, d), where d is the depth of the computed circuit C.

(2) Malicious Laconic Function Evaluation: Next, we move on to the setting where Alice's input x is large. For this case, UC secure protocols must have communication cost growing with x. Thus, with the goal of achieving better efficiency, we consider a weaker notion of malicious security. For this setting, we obtain a protocol for which Bob's computational cost and the communication cost of the protocol grows with poly(|y|,\lambda, d), where d is the depth of the computed circuit C.

(1) UC Secure Bob-optimized 2PC: We obtain a UC secure protocol where Bob's computational cost and the communication cost of the protocol grows with poly(|x|,|y|,\lambda, d), where d is the depth of the computed circuit C.

(2) Malicious Laconic Function Evaluation: Next, we move on to the setting where Alice's input x is large. For this case, UC secure protocols must have communication cost growing with x. Thus, with the goal of achieving better efficiency, we consider a weaker notion of malicious security. For this setting, we obtain a protocol for which Bob's computational cost and the communication cost of the protocol grows with poly(|y|,\lambda, d), where d is the depth of the computed circuit C.

###### Jing Yang, Thomas Johansson, Alexander Maximov

ePrint Report
In this paper we develop a number of generic techniques and algorithms in spectral analysis of large linear approximations for use in cryptanalysis. We apply the developed tools for cryptanalysis of ZUC-256 and give a distinguishing attack with complexity around $2^{236}$. Although the attack is only $2^{20}$ times faster than exhaustive key search, the result indicates that ZUC-256 does not provide a source with full 256-bit entropy in the generated keystream, which would be expected from a 256-bit key. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first known academic attack on full ZUC-256 with a computational complexity that is below exhaustive key search.

###### Diana Maimut, Alexandru Stefan Mega

ePrint Report
Particular instantiations of the Offset Merkle Damgaard authenticated encryption scheme (OMD) represent highly secure alternatives for AES-GCM. It is already a fact that OMD can be efficiently implemented in software. Given this, in our paper we focus on speeding-up OMD in hardware, more precisely on FPGA platforms. Thus, we propose a new OMD instantiation based on the compression function of BLAKE2b. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, we present the first FPGA implementation results for the SHA-512 instantiation of OMD as well as the first architecture of an online authenticated encryption system based on OMD.

###### Patrick Leu, Mridula Singh, Marc Roeschlin, Kenneth G. Paterson, Srdjan Capkun

ePrint Report
Secure distance measurement and therefore secure Time-of-Arrival (ToA) measurement is critical for applications such as contactless payments, passive-keyless entry and start systems, and navigation systems. This paper initiates the study of Message Time of Arrival Codes (MTACs) and their security. MTACs represent a core primitive in the construction of systems for secure ToA measurement. By surfacing MTACs in this way, we are able for the first time to formally define the security requirements of physical-layer measures that protect ToA measurement systems against attacks. Our viewpoint also enables us to provide a unified presentation of existing MTACs (such as those proposed in distance-bounding protocols and in a secure distance measurement standard) and to propose basic principles for protecting ToA measurement systems against attacks that remain unaddressed by existing mechanisms. We also use our perspective to systematically explore the tradeoffs between security and performance that apply to all signal modulation techniques enabling ToA measurements.

###### Mridula Singh, Patrick Leu, AbdelRahman Abdou, Srdjan Capkun

ePrint Report
Mobile autonomous systems, robots, and cyber-physical systems rely on accurate positioning information. To conduct distance-measurement, two devices exchange signals and, knowing these signals propagate at the speed of light, the time of arrival is used for distance estimations. Existing distance- measurement techniques are incapable of protecting against adversarial distance enlargement—a highly devastating tactic in which the adversary reissues a delayed version of the signals transmitted between devices, after distorting the authentic signal to prevent the receiver from identifying it. The adversary need not break crypto, nor compromise any upper- layer security protocols for mounting this attack. No known solution currently exists to protect against distance enlargement. We present Ultra-Wideband Enlargement Detection (UWB-ED), a new modulation technique to detect distance enlargement attacks, and securely verify distances between two mutually trusted devices. We analyze UWB-ED under an adversary that injects signals to block/modify authentic signals. We show how UWB-ED is a good candidate for 802.15.4z Low Rate Pulse and the 5G standard.

#### 25 November 2019

###### Gandhinagar, India, 3 December - 7 December 2019

Event Calendar
Event date: 3 December to 7 December 2019

Submission deadline: 10 July 2019

Notification: 7 August 2019

Submission deadline: 10 July 2019

Notification: 7 August 2019

###### Bochum, Germany, 2 December - 4 December 2019

Event Calendar
Event date: 2 December to 4 December 2019

###### Waitemata, New Zealand, 30 June - 4 July 2020

Event Calendar
Event date: 30 June to 4 July 2020

Submission deadline: 25 February 2020

Notification: 27 April 2020

Submission deadline: 25 February 2020

Notification: 27 April 2020