CryptoDB
Vishakha
Publications and invited talks
    Year
  
  
    Venue
  
  
    Title
  
    2021
  
  
    EUROCRYPT
  
  
    The Nested Subset Differential Attack: A Practical Direct Attack Against LUOV which Forges a Signature within 210 Minutes
 📺            
      Abstract    
    
In 2017, Ward Beullenset al.submitted Lifted Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar [4], which is a modification to the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Schemeby Patarin. Previously, Ding et al.proposed the Subfield Differential Attack [20]which prompted a change of parameters by the authors of LUOV for the second round of the NIST post quantum standardization competition [3].In this paper we propose a  modification to the  Subfield  Differential  Attackcalled the Nested Subset Differential Attack which fully breaks half of the parameter sets put forward. We also show by experimentation that this attack is practically possible to do in under 210 minutes for the level I security parameters and not just a theoretical attack. The Nested Subset Differential attack is a large improvement of the Subfield differential attack which can be used in real world circumstances. Moreover, we will only use what is called the "lifted" structure of LUOV, and our attack can be thought as a development of solving"lifted" quadratic systems.
  
    2020
  
  
    CRYPTO
  
  
    Cryptanalysis of The Lifted Unbalanced Oil Vinegar Signature Scheme
 📺            
      Abstract    
    
In 2017, Ward Beullens et al. submitted Lifted Unbalanced Oil and
Vinegar (LUOV), a signature scheme based on the famous multivariate public-key cryptosystem (MPKC) called Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV), to
NIST for the competition for post-quantum public-key scheme standardization. The defining feature of LUOV is that, though the public key P works in
the extension field of degree r of F2, the coefficients of P come from F2. This
is done to significantly reduce the size of P. The LUOV scheme is now in the
second round of the NIST PQC standardization process.
In this paper, we introduce a new attack on LUOV. It exploits the "lifted" structure of LUOV to reduce direct attacks on it to those over a subfield. We show
that this reduces the complexity below the targeted security for the NIST postquantum standardization competition.
  Coauthors
- Joshua Deaton (2)
 - Jintai Ding (2)
 - Kurt Schmidt (1)
 - Vishakha (2)
 - Bo-Yin Yang (1)
 - Zheng Zhang (1)