International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Event date: 14 July to 19 July 2024

Salary: 36,024 to 41,732 GBP
Closing Date: 13th May 2024

We are looking for a postdoc with expertise on electronic-voting or related topics. The successful post holder is expected to start 1 July 2024 or as soon as possible thereafter and will run until 31st October 2026. The position will be based in the Department of Computer Science and its highly regarded Surrey Centre for Cyber Security (SCCS), working with Dr. Cătălin Drăgan.

The Surrey Centre for Cyber Security (SCCS) is a widely recognized centre of excellence for cyber security research and teaching. There are approximately 17 permanent academic members and 15 non-academic researchers with expertise on voting, formal modelling and verification, applied cryptography, trust systems, social media, communication and networks, and blockchain and distributed ledger technologies over key sectors such as government, finance, communications, transport and cross-sector technologies.

Qualifications:

• We are looking for applicants that demonstrate strong research and analytical skills, have strong communication skills and enthusiasm for developing their own research ideas.
• Applicants should have expertise in one of the following areas: e-voting, or formal verification of cryptographic protocols, or provable security.
• A PhD in Computer Science, Mathematics, or other closely related area (or be on course of getting one very soon at the time of application).

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Cătălin Drăgan c.dragan@surrey.ac.uk

More information: https://jobs.surrey.ac.uk/Vacancy.aspx?id=13834&forced=2

Bosch Research is developing an open source cloud platform (https://carbynestack.io) for computing on encrypted data using Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC). Potential use cases include, but are not limited to, Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning and Privacy-Preserving Data Analytics. For such large computations on big data, active secure MPC becomes quite expensive. Bosch Research is therefore trying to reduce the computational and communication costs of MPC by optimizing the underlying cryptographic primitives and protocols.

Thus, we are looking for a highly motivated PhD candidate with a strong background in applied cryptography and preferably also MPC. The candidates should meet the following requirements:

• Education: Hold an M.Sc. degree (or equivalent) with excellent grades in IT security or computer science.
• Experience and Knowledge: Strong background in (applied) cryptography with a particular focus on cryptographic protocols/MPC, including security models and basic security proof techniques. Good software development/programming skills.
• Personality and Working Practice: Self-motivated and enthusiastic, independent, reliable, creative, and able to work in an international team with diverse background.
• Language: Fluent English language skills

If the above requirements apply to you, you are welcome to read on. The successful candidate will:

• become a part of the team and advance research on MPC,
• develop novel approaches to improve the practical efficiency of actively secure MPC protocols,
• design efficient MPC protocols for diverse use-cases, and
• publish and present your results in top-tier journals and at conferences.

The position is based at the Bosch Research Campus in Renningen, Germany, fully funded for three years, no teaching duties, with 30 days annual leave, and the usual benefits.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Please submit your application, including your CV, transcripts of records from your Master studies, and a cover letter including your research background and research interest, via: https://smrtr.io/hmG3C

More information: https://youtu.be/OctvCi2pHJY

Event date: 3 December to 4 December 2024
Submission deadline: 30 July 2024
Notification: 5 September 2024

Event date: 7 March to 9 March 2026

Event date: 26 March to 28 March 2025

Event date: 18 December to 21 December 2024
Submission deadline: 8 September 2024
Notification: 18 October 2024

Event date: 4 September 2024
Submission deadline: 15 June 2024
Notification: 15 July 2024

Event date: 2 September to 6 September 2024
Submission deadline: 14 June 2024

I am looking for Ph.D. students in the area of analysing and preventing physical side channels in embedded devices. Two positions are available, which, as usual in the UK, enable the post holder to cover their tuition fees as well as enable them to cover their living expenses.

The research topics that I am recruiting for are:

• Pre-silicon modelling and analysis: you should be familiar with utilising a typical HW design flow, power simulation tools, and you should have an interest in developing skills in leakage modelling as well as analysis.
• Statistical detection and analysis methods: you should be comfortable with probability theory and statistics, and you should have an interest in exploring sophisticated statistical approaches in the context of exploiting and detecting leakage. This research may also touch on statistical learning methods.
• Implementation and analysis of post-quantum schemes: you should be familiar with low level software implementations (aka Assembly programming), and have an interest in exploring implementation options (potentially also considering dedicated hardware, e.g. the impact of dedicated instructions) to develop secure and reasonably efficient post-quantum implementations.

If you feel that you fit with one (or several) of the three topics, or, if you believe that you can make a good case for another topic, then please get in touch (see contact info below). Please send me a transcript of records, and a short (1 page) statement explaining why you want to do a PhD with me). If I think that you are a viable candidate, I will guide you through the application process.

I am now a faculty member and thus part of the Birmingham Centre for Security and Privacy. You can find information about this research group here: https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/centre-for-cyber-security-and-privacy. This is a sizeable research group, which offers companionship via other PhD students and staff members, as well as opportunities via many good relationships with industry.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Prof. Elisabeth Oswald (sca-research@pm.me, or m.e.oswald@bham.ac.uk).

Hadamard product is a point-wise product for two vectors. This paper presents a new scheme to prove Hadamard-product relation as a sub-protocol for SNARKs based on univariate polynomials. Prover uses linear cryptographic operations to generate the proof containing logarithmic field elements. The verification takes logarithmic cryptographic operations with constant numbers of pairings in bilinear group. The construction of the scheme is based on the Lagrange-based KZG commitments (Kate, Zaverucha, and Goldberg at Asiacrypt 2010) and the folding technique. We construct an inner-product protocol from folding technique on univariate polynomials in Lagrange form, and by carefully choosing the random polynomials suitable for folding technique, we construct a Hadamard-product protocol from the inner-product protocol, giving an alternative to prove linear algebra relations in linear time, and the protocol has a better concrete proof size than previous works.

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a powerful Privacy-Enhancing Technology (PET) that enables computations on encrypted data without having access to the secret key. While FHE holds immense potential for enhancing data privacy and security, creating its practical applications is associated with many difficulties. A significant barrier is the absence of easy-to-use, standardized components that developers can utilize as foundational building blocks. Addressing this gap requires constructing a comprehensive library of FHE components, a complex endeavor due to multiple inherent problems. We propose a competition-based approach for building such a library. More concretely, we present FHERMA, a new challenge platform that introduces black-box and white-box challenges, and fully automated evaluation of submitted FHE solutions. The initial challenges on the FHERMA platform are motivated by practical problems in machine learning and blockchain. The winning solutions get integrated into an open-source library of FHE components, which is available to all members of the PETs community under the Apache 2.0 license.

Restricted syndrome decoding problems (R-SDP and R-SDP($G$)) provide an interesting basis for post-quantum cryptography. Indeed, they feature in CROSS, a submission in the ongoing process for standardizing post-quantum signatures.

This work improves our understanding of the security of both problems. Firstly, we propose and implement a novel collision attack on R-SDP($G$) that provides the best attack under realistic restrictions on memory. Secondly, we derive precise complexity estimates for algebraic attacks on R-SDP that are shown to be accurate by our experiments. We note that neither of these improvements threatens the updated parameters of CROSS.

Delegatable Anonymous Credentials (DAC) are an enhanced Anonymous Credentials (AC) system that allows credential owners to use credentials anonymously, as well as anonymously delegate them to other users. In this work, we introduce a new concept called Delegatable Attribute-based Anonymous Credentials with Chainable Revocation (DAAC-CR), which extends the functionality of DAC by allowing 1) fine-grained attribute delegation, 2) issuers to restrict the delegation capabilities of the delegated users at a fine-grained level, including the depth of delegation and the sets of delegable attributes, and 3) chainable revocation, meaning if a credential within the delegation chain is revoked, all subsequent credentials derived from it are also invalid.

We provide a practical DAAC-CR instance based on a novel primitive that we identify as structure-preserving signatures on equivalence classes on vector commitments (SPSEQ-VC). This primitive may be of independent interest, and we detail an efficient construction. Compared to traditional DAC systems that rely on non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs, the credential size in our DAAC-CR instance is constant, independent of the length of delegation chain and the number of attributes. We formally prove the security of our scheme in the generic group model and demonstrate its practicality through performance benchmarks.

Hash-and-Sign with Retry is a popular technique to design efficient signature schemes from code-based or multivariate assumptions. Contrary to Hash-and-Sign signatures based on preimage-sampleable functions as defined by Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan (STOC 2008), trapdoor functions in code-based and multivariate schemes are not surjective. Therefore, the standard approach uses random trials. Kosuge and Xagawa (PKC 2024) coined it the Hash-and-Sign with Retry paradigm.

As many attacks have appeared on code-based and multivariate schemes, we think it is important for the ongoing NIST competition to look at the security proofs of these schemes. The original proof of Sakumoto, Shirai, and Hiwatari (PQCrypto 2011) was flawed, then corrected by Chatterjee, Das and Pandit (INDOCRYPT 2022). The fix is still not sufficient, as it only works for very large finite fields. A new proof in the Quantum ROM model was proposed by Kosuge and Xagawa (PKC 2024), but it is rather loose, even when restricted to the classical setting.

In this paper, we introduce several tools that yield tighter security bounds for Hash-and-Sign with Retry signatures in the classical setting. These include the Hellinger distance, stochastic dominance arguments, and a new combinatorial tool to transform a proof in the non-adaptative setting to the adaptative setting. Ultimately, we obtain a sharp bound for the security of Hash-and-Sign with Retry signatures, applicable to various code-based and multivariate schemes. Focusing on NIST candidates, we apply these results to the MAYO, PROV, and modified UOV signature schemes. In most cases, our bounds are tight enough to apply with the real parameters of those schemes; in some cases, smaller parameters would suffice.

The coexistence of RSA and elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) had continued over forty years. It is well-known that ECC has the advantage of shorter key than RSA, which often leads a newcomer to assume that ECC runs faster. In this report, we generate the Mathematica codes for RSA-2048 and ECC-256, which visually show that RSA-2048 runs three times faster than ECC-256. It is also estimated that RSA-2048 runs 48,000 times faster than Weil pairing with 2 embedding degree and a fixed point.

This paper considers an information theoretic model of secure integrated sensing and communication, represented as a wiretap channel with action dependent states. This model allows one to secure a part of the transmitted message against a sensed target that eavesdrops the communication, while allowing transmitter actions to change the channel statistics. An exact secrecy-distortion region is given for a physically-degraded channel. Moreover, a finite-length achievability region is established for the model using an output statistics of random binning method, giving an achievable bound for low-latency applications.

We define the notion of a classical commitment scheme to quantum states, which allows a quantum prover to compute a classical commitment to a quantum state, and later open each qubit of the state in either the standard or the Hadamard basis. Our notion is a strengthening of the measurement protocol from Mahadev (STOC 2018). We construct such a commitment scheme from the post-quantum Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption, and more generally from any noisy trapdoor claw-free function family that has the distributional strong adaptive hardcore bit property (a property that we define in this work). Our scheme is succinct in the sense that the running time of the verifier in the commitment phase depends only on the security parameter (independent of the size of the committed state), and its running time in the opening phase grows only with the number of qubits that are being opened (and the security parameter). As a corollary we obtain a classical succinct argument system for QMA under the post-quantum LWE assumption. Previously, this was only known assuming post-quantum secure indistinguishability obfuscation. As an additional corollary we obtain a generic way of converting any X/Z quantum PCP into a succinct argument system under the quantum hardness of LWE.

We have investigated both the padding scheme and the applicability of algebraic attacks to both XHash8 and XHash12. The only vulnerability of the padding scheme we can find is plausibly applicable only in the multi-rate setting---for which the authors make no claim---and is safe otherwise.

For algebraic attack relying on the computation and exploitation of a Gröbner basis, our survey of the literature suggests to base a security argument on the complexity of the variable elimination step rather than that of the computation of the Gröbner basis itself. Indeed, it turns out that the latter complexity is hard to estimate---and is sometimes litteraly non-existent. Focusing on the elimination step, we propose a generalization of the "FreeLunch" approach which, under a reasonable conjecture about the behaviour of the degree of polynomial ideals of dimension 0, is sufficient for us to argue that both XHash8 and XHash12 are safe against such attacks.

We implemented a simplified version of the generation (and resolution) of the corresponding set of equations in SAGE, which allowed us to validate our conjecture at least experimentally, and in fact to show that the lower bound it provides on the ideal degree is not tight---meaning we are a priori understimating the security of these permutations against the algebraic attacks we consider.

At this stage, if used as specified, these hash functions seem safe from Gröbner bases-based algebraic attacks.

This paper proposes general meet-in-the-middle (MitM) attack frameworks for preimage and collision attacks on hash functions based on (generalized) sponge construction. As the first contribution, our MitM preimage attack framework covers a wide range of sponge-based hash functions, especially those with lower claimed security level for preimage compared to their output size. Those hash functions have been very widely standardized (e.g., Ascon-Hash, PHOTON, etc.), but are rarely studied against preimage attacks. Even the recent MitM attack framework on sponge construction by Qin et al. (EUROCRYPT 2023) cannot attack those hash functions. As the second contribution, our MitM collision attack framework shows a different tool for the collision cryptanalysis on sponge construction, while previous collision attacks on sponge construction are mainly based on differential attacks. Most of the results in this paper are the first third-party cryptanalysis results. If cryptanalysis previously existed, our new results significantly improve the previous results, such as improving the previous 2-round collision attack on Ascon-Hash to the current 4 rounds, improving the previous 3.5-round quantum preimage attack on SPHINCS$^+$-Haraka to our 4-round classical preimage attack, etc.