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Collisions for Round-Reduced LAKE
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Abstract: | LAKE is a family of cryptographic hash functions presented at FSE 2008. It is an iterated hash function and defines two main instances with a 256 bit and 512 bit hash value. In this paper, we present the first security analysis of LAKE. We show how collision attacks, exploiting the non-bijectiveness of the internal compression function of LAKE, can be mounted on reduced variants of LAKE. We show an efficient attack on the 256 bit hash function LAKE-256 reduced to 3 rounds and present an actual colliding message pair. Furthermore, we present a theoretical attack on LAKE-256 reduced to 4 rounds with a complexity of $2^{109}$. By using more sophisticated message modification techniques we expect that the attack can be extended to 5 rounds. However, for the moment our approach does not appear to be applicable to the full LAKE-256 hash function (with all 8 rounds). |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2008-17786, title={Collisions for Round-Reduced LAKE}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={cryptanalysis, hash functions, collision attack}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/109}, note={The final version of this paper has been published at ACISP 2008. martin.schlaeffer@iaik.tugraz.at 14105 received 11 Mar 2008, last revised 14 Aug 2008}, author={Florian Mendel and Martin Schläffer}, year=2008 }