CryptoDB
Block ciphers sensitive to Groebner Basis Attacks
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Abstract: | We construct and analyze Feistel and SPN ciphers that have a sound design strategy against linear and differential attacks but for which the encryption process can be described by very simple polynomial equations. For a block and key size of 128 bits, we present ciphers for which practical Groebner basis attacks can recover the full cipher key requiring only a minimal number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs. We show how Groebner bases for a subset of these ciphers can be constructed with neglegible computational effort. This reduces the key recovery problem to a Groebner basis conversion problem. By bounding the running time of a Groebner basis conversion algorithm, FGLM, we demonstrate the existence of block ciphers resistant against differential and linear cryptanalysis but vulnerable against Groebner basis attacks. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2005-12536, title={Block ciphers sensitive to Groebner Basis Attacks}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={secret-key cryptography / cryptanalysis, block ciphers, algebraic attacks, Groebner bases}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/200}, note={ weinmann@cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de 12961 received 27 Jun 2005}, author={Johannes Buchmann and Andrei Pychkine and Ralf-Philipp Weinmann}, year=2005 }