CryptoDB
A Unified Methodology For Constructing Public-Key Encryption Schemes Secure Against Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack
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| Abstract: | We introduce a new methodology for achieving security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) for public-key encryption schemes, which we call the {\em oblivious decryptors model}. The oblivious decryptors model generalizes both the two-key model of Naor and Yung, as well the Cramer--Shoup encryption schemes. The key ingredient in our new paradigm is Sahai's notion of Simulation-Sound NIZK proofs. Our methodology is easy to use: First, construct an encryption scheme which satisfies the ``bare'' oblivious-decryptors model: This can be done quite easily, with simple proofs of security. Then, by adding a Simulation-Sound NIZK proof, the scheme becomes provably CCA-secure. Note that this paradigm allows for the use of {\em efficient} special-purpose Simulation-Sound NIZK proofs, such as those recently put forward by Cramer and Shoup. We also show how to present all known efficient (provably secure) CCA-secure public-key encryption schemes as special cases of our model. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2002-11566,
title={A Unified Methodology For Constructing Public-Key Encryption Schemes Secure Against Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack},
booktitle={IACR Eprint archive},
keywords={public-key cryptography / chosen-ciphertext security,},
url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/042},
note={ elkind@cs.princeton.edu 11782 received 4 Apr 2002, last revised 5 Apr 2002},
author={Edith Elkind and Amit Sahai},
year=2002
}