International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Group actions are becoming a viable option for post-quantum cryptography assumptions. Indeed, in recent years some works have shown how to construct primitives from assumptions based on isogenies of elliptic curves, such as CSIDH, on tensors or on code equivalence problems. This paper presents a bit commitment scheme, built on non-transitive group actions, which is shown to be secure in the standard model, under the decisional Group Action Inversion Problem. In particular, the commitment is computationally hiding and perfectly binding, and is obtained from a novel and general framework that exploits the properties of some orbit-invariant functions, together with group actions. Previous constructions depend on an interaction between the sender and the receiver in the commitment phase, which results in an interactive bit commitment. We instead propose the first non-interactive bit commitment based on group actions. Then we show that, when the sender is honest, the constructed commitment enjoys an additional feature, i.e., it is possible to tell whether two commitments were obtained from the same input, without revealing the input. We define the security properties that such a construction must satisfy, and we call this primitive linkable commitment. Finally, as an example, an instantiation of the scheme using tensors with coefficients in a finite field is provided. In this case, the invariant function is the computation of the rank of a tensor, and the cryptographic assumption is related to the Tensor Isomorphism problem.