We investigate the natural question of what is possible if an adversary can reset a token at most a bounded number of times (e.g., because each resetting attempt imposes a significant risk to trigger a self-destruction mechanism of the token). Somewhat surprisingly, our results come close to the known positive results with respect to non-resettable stateful tokens. In particular, we construct polynomially many instances of statistically secure and universally composable oblivious transfer, using only a constant number of tokens. Our techniques have some abstract similarities to previous solutions, which we grasp by defining a new security property for protocols that use oracle access. Additionally, we apply our techniques to zero-knowledge proofs and obtain a protocol that achieves the same properties as bounded-query zero-knowledge PCPs (Kilian, Petrank, Tardos; STOC 1997), even if a malicious prover may issue stateful PCP oracles.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / resettable tamper-proof hardware, universal composability, statistical security, commitments, oblivious transfer, zero-knowledge Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-TCC-2015 Date: received 16 Jul 2014, last revised 12 Jan 2015 Contact author: kraschew at ira uka de Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20150112:212629 (All versions of this report) Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion