

SCAPI: The Secure Computation API

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Implementation of Secure Computation

The SCAPI Project: **S**ecure **C**omputation **API**

- ▶ Most implementation projects are aimed at solving a **specific problem** more efficiently or with better security
- ▶ SCAPI is an implementation project with no specific problem in mind (it is a **general-purpose** secure computation library)
- ▶ SCAPI is **open source**; we have a long-term commitment (as long as we have money) to the project (bug fixes, additional functionality, improve existing implementations etc.)

- ▶ SCAPI is written in Java
 - ▶ Suitable for large projects, and quick implementation
 - ▶ Portability (e.g., secure computation between a mobile device and a server)
 - ▶ Existing libraries (e.g., Bouncy Castle)
 - ▶ The **JNI framework**: can use libraries and primitives written in native code (and thus inherit their efficiency)

- ▶ **Flexibility:**

- ▶ Cryptographers write protocols in abstract terms (OT, commitment, PRF, etc.)
- ▶ SCAPI encourages implementation at this abstract level (work with any “DLOG group” and afterwards instantiate with concrete group and concrete library; e.g. EC-group from `Miracl`)
- ▶ Can work at many different levels of abstraction, as desired

- ▶ **Extendibility:** can add support for any new libraries and implementation by providing wrappers that implement the defined interfaces (we are now adding `openSSL`)


- ▶ **Efficiency:** via JNI can access fast low-level libraries like `Miracl`, but work at the level of Java and with abstract objects

- ▶ **Ease of use:** SCAPI uses terminology that cryptographers are used to; SCAPI is well documented and has been written explicitly with **other users** in mind

- ▶ Consider an oblivious transfer protocol that uses a group, a commitment scheme, and a hash function
- ▶ The theorem stating security of the protocol would say:
 - ▶ Assume that DDH is hard in the group, the commitment is perfectly binding, and the hash function is collision resistant.
 - ▶ Then, the OT protocol is secure.
- ▶ SCAPI differentiates between security levels by defining **hierarchies of interfaces**, and protocol constructors can check them

Security Levels

SCAPI defines **hierarchies of interfaces** for security levels



- ▶ The OT protocol receives a dlog group, commitment and hash function in its constructor
- ▶ It checks that:
 - ▶ The dlog group is an instance of DDH
 - ▶ The commitment is an instance of PerfectBinding
 - ▶ The hash function is an instance of CollisionResistant
- ▶ Security levels are also defined for protocols (semi-honest, covert, malicious, stand-alone, UC secure, and so on)

SCAPI has three layers

- ▶ Basic primitives (discrete log groups, PRFs, PRPs, hash, universal hash, etc.)
- ▶ Non-interactive schemes (symmetric and asymmetric encryption, MACs, signatures)
- ▶ Interactive protocols (oblivious transfer, garbled circuits, sigma protocols, ZK, ZKPOK, commitments, etc.)
 - ▶ We are continually adding: OT extensions for semi-honest (ACM CCS 13), JustGarble, wrapper for OpenSSL

Example Usage

The Cramer-Shoup Encryption Scheme

```
public interface CramerShoupDDHEnc extends AsymmetricEnc, Cca2 {  
}  
  
public CramerShoupAbs(DlogGroup dlogGroup, CryptographicHash hash, SecureRandom random){  
    //The Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme must work with a Dlog Group that has DDH security level  
    //and a Hash function that has CollisionResistant security level. If any of this conditions is not  
    //met then cannot construct an object of type Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme; therefore throw exception.  
  
    if(!(dlogGroup instanceof DDH)){  
        throw new IllegalArgumentException("The Dlog group has to have DDH security level");  
    }  
  
    if(!(hash instanceof CollisionResistant)){  
        throw new IllegalArgumentException("The hash function has to have CollisionResistant security level");  
    }  
  
    // Everything is correct, then sets the member variables and creates object.  
    this.dlogGroup = dlogGroup;  
    qMinusOne = dlogGroup.getOrder().subtract(BigInteger.ONE);  
    this.hash = hash;  
    this.random = random;  
}
```

Results – Average of 1000 Runs

The Cramer-Shoup Encryption Scheme

Dlog Group Type	Dlog Provider	Dlog Param	Hash Function	Hash Provider	Encrypt Time (ms)	Decrypt Time (ms)
DlogZpSafePrime	CryptoPP	1024	SHA-256	BC	6.072	3.665
DlogZpSafePrime	CryptoPP	2048	SHA-256	BC	43.818	26.289
DlogECFp	BC	P-224	SHA-1	BC	54.171	31.662
DlogECF2m	BC	B-233	SHA-1	BC	107.316	65.185
DlogECF2m	BC	K-233	SHA-1	BC	25.292	14.886
DlogECFp	Miracl	P-224	SHA-1	BC	6.571	3.929
DlogECF2m	Miracl	B-233	SHA-1	BC	5.819	3.652
DlogECF2m	Miracl	K-233	SHA-1	BC	2.753	1.787