On the Security of Tandem-DM

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Ewan Fleischmann, Michael Gorski, Stefan Lucks On the Security of Tandem-DM

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- Blockcipher Based Hashing
- Examples of DBL Hash Functions

2 Security of Tandem-DM

- Results on Collision Resistance
- Results on Preimage Resistance
- Model for the proof
- Proof Details



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Blockcipher Based Hashing Examples of DBL Hash Functions

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- From Scratch (MD4, MD5, SHA-0/1, SHA-256/512, RIPEMD, ...)
- From a blockcipher (MMO, DM, MDC-2/4, Tandem-DM, Abreast-DM, ...)
- From number-theoretic primitives or hard problems (lattices, modular arithmetic, ...)

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Blockcipher Based Hashing - Why?

- Several attacks on MD4-type functions in recent years (MD4/5, SHA family, RIPEMED, ...)
- Only one primitve for encryption and hashing
- Low cost hardware

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Blockcipher Based Hashing - Why not?

• Usually slower than dedicated hash function

- Weaknesses not relevant for encryption (e.g. DES weak keys)
- Output length too short (e.g. 128 bits for AES)
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Blockcipher Based Hashing - The Goal

• 'Secure' (ideal cipher model)

- e.g. birthday type collision resistance
- Long hash output (e.g. >> 128 bits = blocksize)

Efficient: efficiency = size of message input number of blockcipher calls needed to process this input

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
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Example: Hirose's FSE'06 proposal




• Rate 1/2, Output size: 2n (i.e. AES-256 256 bits)

- Collision Resistance: $> 2^{124.5}$ for CF
- (n, 2n)-blockchiffre, n-bit cipher/plaintext, 2n-bit key

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


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


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Tandem-DM - a DBL hash function



• Rate 1/2, Output: 2n (i.e. AES-256: 2n = 256-bit)


Proof of Collision Resistance: this presentation/paper

• (n, 2n)-blockchiffre, n-bit cipher/plaintext, 2n-bit key

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


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Results on Collision Resistance Results on Preimage Resistance Model for the proof Proof Details

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Security Bound

Theorem (Bound for Collision Resistance)

Let *F* be the Tandem-DM compression function and *n*, *q* be natural numbers with $q < 2^n$. Let $N' = 2^n - q$ and let α be any positive number with $eq/N' \leq \alpha$ and $\tau = \alpha N'/q$ (and e^x being the exponential function). Then

$$\mathsf{Adv}_F^{\mathrm{COLL}}(q) \le q 2^n e^{q \tau (1 - \ln \tau)/N'} + 4q \alpha/N' + 6q/(N')^2 + 2q/(N')^3.$$

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Security Bound

Corollary/Conjecture

For the compression function Tandem-DM, instantiated with AES-256, any adversary asking less than $2^{120.4}$ (backward or forward) oracle queries cannot find a collision with probability greater than 1/2. In this case, $\alpha = 24.0$.

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Theorem (Bound for Preimage Resistance)

Let $F := F^{TDM}$ be the Tandem-DM compression function. For every $N' = 2^n - q$ and q > 1


 $\operatorname{Adv}_{F}^{Inv}(q) \leq 2q/(N')^{2}.$

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Model for the proof (1)




Adversary

Query History \mathcal{Q} : {}

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Model for the proof (1)




Query History Q : {(X_1, K_1, Y_1)}

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


Query History $Q: \{(X_1, K_1, Y_1), (X_2, K_2, Y_2)\}$

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


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
Query History Q: {(X_1, K_1, Y_1), (X_2, K_2, Y_2), (X_3, K_3, Y_3),...}

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Model for the proof (2)

Query History Q: {(X_1, K_1, Y_1), (X_2, K_2, Y_2), (X_3, K_3, Y_3),...}




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
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Query History $Q: \{(X_1, K_1, Y_1), (X_2, K_2, Y_2), (X_3, K_3, Y_3), \ldots\}$



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
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


- Adversary A wins if queries can be assembled to hash two distinct colliding words
- Advantage(A) is the probability of A winning
- Adv(q) is the max of Advantage(A) taken over all adversaries making at most q queries.

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


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
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Main Idea

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Upper bound the probability of the adversary making a query that can be used as the *final* query to complete a collision.



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Analysis Details

- We examine the adversarys queries one at a time as they come in
- 2 The latest query made by the adversary is 'successful' if the adversary can use it to build a collision
- We upper bound the probability of a query being successful, and multiply this probability by q

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Some difficulties

- A query can be used in many different ways to complete a collision (in different positions of the diagram, or several different times in a diagram)
- 2 All cases require separate analysis
- The probability of success of a query will depend on the previous query history Q

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- Exhibit predicates LUCKY(Q), WIN1(Q), WIN2(Q) and WIN3(Q) such that
- ② COLL^{TDM}(Q) ⇒ LUCKY(Q) ∨ WIN1(Q) ∨ WIN2(Q) ∨ WIN3(Q)
- Upper bound separately the probabilities Pr[LUCKY(Q)], Pr[WIN1(Q)], Pr[WIN2(Q)] and Pr[WIN3(Q)]
- Then $\Pr[COLL(Q)] \leq \Pr[LUCKY(Q)] + \Pr[WIN1(Q)] + \Pr[WIN2(Q)] + \Pr[WIN3(Q)].$

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
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Results on Collision Resistance Results on Preimage Resistance Model for the proof **Proof Details**

Example Case: $Win1(\mathcal{Q}) = \neg LUCKY(\mathcal{Q}) \land Fit1(\mathcal{Q})$

Fit1(Q): The last query is used only once in position TL. Note that this is equal to the case where the last query is used only once in position TR.

FIT1a(Q) all queries used in the collision are pairwise different, FIT1b(Q) BL = TR and BR is different to TL, BL, TR, FIT1c(Q) BL = BR and TR is different to TL, BL, BR, FIT1d(Q) TR = BR and BL is different to TL, TR, BR,



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Concluding Remarks

- Only two rate 1/2 DBL compression functions with birthday type collision resistance known: Hirose FSE'06 and Tandem-DM
- Tandem-DM (Eurocrypt'92) took > 15 years for a security proof
- Still missing tight proofs for e.g. MDC-2, MDC-4, ...
- essentially no generic results known in this field
- Ineeds to be a lot more research done

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