Side-Channel Attack against RSA Key Generation Algorithms

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Outline

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SCA: Principle

- SCA consist in measuring a physical leakage of a device when it handles sensitive information
  - e.g. cryptographic keys
- Handled info. is correlated with the physical leakage
  - e.g. a register leaking as the Hamming Weight of its value
- The attacker can then apply statistical methods to extract the secret from the measurements
  - Simple Side-Channel Attacks (SSCA)
  - Differential Side-Channel Attacks (DSCA)
  - Template Attacks (TA)
  - Collision-based Side-Channel Attacks
  - ...

RSA (Rivest - Shamir - Adelman)

- RSA: the most used public-key cryptosystem

- Key Generation
  - Generate p, q two prime numbers of same size
  - Compute $n = p \cdot q$, and $\phi(n) = (p-1) \cdot (q-1)$
  - Choose an integer e such that e and $\phi(n)$ are coprime
  - Compute d, the multiplicative inverse of e modulo $\phi(n)$

  $\Rightarrow$ Public Key: (e, n) / Private Key: d

- Encryption-Decryption / Signature-Verification
  - Encryption / Verification: $c = m^e \ (mod \ n)$
  - Decryption / Signature: $m = c^d \ (mod \ n)$

SCA on RSA 1/2

- Attacking during the Key Generation

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SCA on RSA 2/2

- Attacking during the Decryption / Signature

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RSA Key Generation exposed ?

- Most of the works about Physical Cryptanalysis on RSA focus on attacking during Decryption / Signature
- Until recent years, RSA Key Generation was performed during device personalisation
- This is no longer the case, due to new security services (mobile payment, e-ticketing, OTP generations, ...)
- Some devices can perform RSA Key generation during their life cycle

This Work $\Rightarrow$ case 1/2

- Attacking during the Prime Number Generation

- Key Generation
  - Generate p, q two prime numbers of same size
  - Compute $n = p \cdot q$, and $\phi(n) = (p-1) \cdot (q-1)$
  - Choose an integer e such that e and $\phi(n)$ are coprime
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  $\Rightarrow$ Public Key: (e, n) / Private Key: d

- Encryption-Decryption / Signature-Verification
  - Encryption / Verification: $c = m^e \ (mod \ n)$
  - Decryption / Signature: $m = c^d \ (mod \ n)$

Outline

How to generate a prime number ?

- Two methods to generate a prime number:
  - Provable prime generation algorithms
    1. pick up a random odd value
    2. perform a provable primality test
    3. if test fails, increment the random value and go to step 2
  - Probable prime generation algorithms
    1. pick up a random odd value
    2. perform a probable primality test
    3. if test fails, increment the random value and go to step 2
- Probable algorithms generally used for embedded systems due to timing constraints

Algorithm: Probable Prime Generation Algorithm v1

Input : A bit-length ℓ, the set $\mathcal{S} = \{s_0, \cdots, s_{52}\}$ of all odd primes lower than 256
Output: A probable prime p

/* Generate a seed */
1 Randomly generate an odd ℓ-bit integer v_0
/* Prime Sieve */
2 $v \leftarrow v_0$
3 $s \leftarrow s_0$
4 $i = 0$
5 **while** $(v \mod s \neq 0)$ and $(i < 53)$ **do**
6 $\quad i = i + 1$
7 $\quad s \leftarrow s_i$
8 **if** $(i \neq 53)$ **then**
9 $\quad v = v + 2$
10 $\quad$ **goto** Step 3
/* Probabilistic primality tests */
11 **else**
12 $\quad i = 0$
$\quad$ /* Process t Miller-Rabin's tests (stop if one fails) */
13 $\quad$ **while** (Miller-Rabin$(v) =$ ok) and $(i < t)$ **do**
14 $\quad\quad i = i + 1$
/* Process one Lucas' test */
15 **if** $(i = t)$ and (Lucas$(v) =$ ok) **then**
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Attack on Probable Prime Generation Algorithm v1

- Attack of [Finke+09]:
  - Each prime sieve execution ends as soon as $v \bmod s_i = 0$
  - Each prime sieve execution leaks through SPA
  - Allows to construct equation system with v_0 as unknown:

$$\left.\begin{array}{rl} v_0 & \bmod s_{i_0} = 0 \\ v_0 + 2 & \bmod s_{i_1} = 0 \\ \vdots & \\ v_0 + k \times 2 & \bmod s_{i_k} = 0 \end{array}\right\} \iff v_0 = x \bmod s_{i_0} \times s_{i_1} \times \ldots \times s_{i_k} \quad (1)$$

  - Chinese Reminder Theorem allows to deduce equation (1)
    $\Rightarrow v_0 \bmod s_{i_0} \times s_{i_1} \times \ldots \times s_{i_k}$
    $\Rightarrow p \bmod s_{i_0} \times s_{i_1} \times \ldots \times s_{i_k}$
  - Coppersmith technique $\Rightarrow p$

Algorithm: Probable Prime Generation Algorithm v2

Input : A bit-length ℓ, the set $\mathcal{S} = \{s_0, \cdots, s_{52}\}$ of all odd primes lower than 256
Output: A probable prime p

/* Generate a seed */
1 Randomly generate an odd ℓ-bit integer v_0

/* Costly Prime Sieve for v_0 */
2 **for** $j = 0$ **to** 52 **do**
3 $\quad R[j] \leftarrow v_0 \mod s_j$ /* costly modular reduction over ℓ-bit integers */
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/* Efficient Prime Sieve for v_i with $i > 0$ */
5 $v \leftarrow v_0$
6 **while** (R contains a null remainder) **do**
7 $\quad v = v + 2$
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9 $\quad\quad R[j] \leftarrow R[j] + 2 \mod s_j$ /* efficient modular reduction over 8-bit integers */
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12 **while** (Miller-Rabin(v) $=$ ok) and ($i < t$) **do**
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Probable Prime Generation Algorithm v2

- Prime sieve of algorithm v2 is regular
- Attack of [Finke+09] becomes ineffective
- Algorithm v2 is more efficient than algorithm v1
- Algorithm v2 recommended in:
  - ANSI X9.31
  - FIPS 186-4

Outline

Attack on Probable Prime Generation Algorithm v2

- Attacker records side-channels of following computations:
  (each line corresponds to a prime sieve execution)

$$\begin{cases} r_{0,0} = v_0 \bmod 3 & r_{0,1} = v_0 \bmod 5 & \dots & r_{0,52} = v_0 \bmod 251 \\ r_{1,0} = v_1 \bmod 3 & r_{1,1} = v_1 \bmod 5 & \dots & r_{1,52} = v_1 \bmod 251 \\ \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ r_{n,0} = v_n \bmod 3 & r_{n,1} = v_n \bmod 5 & \dots & r_{n,52} = v_n \bmod 251 \end{cases}$$

Attack on Probable Prime Generation Algorithm v2

- As $v_i = v_0 + i \times 2$, one gets:

$$\begin{cases} r_{0,0} = v_0 \bmod 3 & r_{0,1} = v_0 \bmod 5 & \dots & r_{0,52} = v_0 \bmod 251 \\ r_{1,0} = v_0 + 2 \bmod 3 & r_{1,1} = v_0 + 2 \bmod 5 & \dots & r_{1,52} = v_0 + 2 \bmod 251 \\ \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ r_{n,0} = v_0 + n \times 2 \bmod 3 & r_{n,1} = v_0 + n \times 2 \bmod 5 & \dots & r_{n,52} = v_0 + n \times 2 \bmod 251 \end{cases}$$

Attack on Probable Prime Generation Algorithm v2

- As n can be guessed by SPA, the attacker can then perform partial DPA for each small prime number:

$$\begin{cases} r_{0,0} = v_0 \bmod 3 & r_{0,1} = v_0 \bmod 5 & \dots & r_{0,52} = v_0 \bmod 251 \\ r_{1,0} = v_0 + 2 \bmod 3 & r_{1,1} = v_0 + 2 \bmod 5 & \dots & r_{1,52} = v_0 + 2 \bmod 251 \\ \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ r_{n,0} = v_0 + n \times 2 \bmod 3 & r_{n,1} = v_0 + n \times 2 \bmod 5 & \dots & r_{n,52} = v_0 + n \times 2 \bmod 251 \end{cases}$$

$\Rightarrow$ allows to get $v_0 \bmod 3$

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$\Rightarrow$ allows to get $v_0 \bmod 5$

Attack on Probable Prime Generation Algorithm v2

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$\Rightarrow \dots$

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$\Rightarrow$ allows to get $v_0 \bmod 251$

Attack on Probable Prime Generation Algorithm v2

- Similarly to [Finke+09], one constructs an equation system with v_0 as unknown:

$$\left.\begin{array}{ll} v_0 & \bmod 3 \\ v_0 & \bmod 5 \\ \vdots & \\ v_0 & \bmod 251 \end{array}\right\} \Longleftrightarrow v_0 = x \bmod 3 \times 5 \times \ldots \times 251 \quad (2)$$

- Chinese Reminder Theorem allows to deduce equation (2)
  $\Rightarrow v_0 \bmod 3 \times 5 \times \ldots \times 251$
  $\Rightarrow p \bmod 3 \times 5 \times \ldots \times 251$

- Coppersmith technique $\Rightarrow p$

Attack Analysis

- Attack success depends on number n of prime sieve executions
- Unlike classical SCA, n cannot be chosen by attacker
- In the sequel, we focus on 512-bit case
- When all the 53 partial DPA succeed, one gets roughly 350 bits of p
- If at least 256 consecutive bits of p are retrived, Coppersmith technique can allow to get the others

Attack Analysis



Figure : Cumulative distrib. fct. of n for diff. prime bit-lengths ℓ

- 512-bit prime number generation imply at least:
  (estimations over 2000 generations)
  - 53 prime sieve executions in 75% of the cases (Q_1)
  - 126 prime sieve executions in 50% of the cases (Q_2)
  - 246 prime sieve executions in 25% of the cases (Q_3)

Attack Analysis

σ	Q_1	Q_2	Q_3
0	1	1	1
1	1	1	1
2	0.46	1	1
3	0	0.99	1
4	0	0.08	1
5	0	0	0.7

Figure : Success rates for different noise levels to recover 256 bits of p depending on the number of prime sieve executions

Toy Implementation

- 8-bit ATMega128 micro-controller at 8MHz
- Implementation of 300 prime sieve executions from a random seed v_0
- EM measurements with sampling rate at 1GSa/s
- Partial DPA performed with Pearson correlation as distinguisher
- Experiment repeated 200 times

Attacking the Toy Implementation



Figure : Success rates for each prime sieve elements

Attacking the Toy Implementation



Figure : Success rates for recovering x bits of information on the generated prime

Improving the Attack Success

- Unsuccessful partial DPA can be discarded thanks to Key Enumeration Algorithm
- The attacker can attack both p and q generations and use the RSA public modulus n to increase the success of the attack
- The initial costly prime sieve can also be used to get more information on p

Practical Issues

- Record long side-channel trace corr. to full prime generation
  - use high-end oscilloscope w. huge memory depth
  - use several cascaded oscilloscopes
- Find patterns corr. to n prime sieve executions
  - located between patterns corr. to Miller-Rabin tests
  - once one is found, use pattern matching techniques
- Find sub-patterns corr. to trial divisions
  - use classical peak extraction techniques used in SCA

Attack Flow in Practice



Figure : EM radiations measured during a prime number generation computation on a commercial smartcard

- Pattern 1 $\Rightarrow$ initial costly prime sieve
- Patterns 2 to 28 $\Rightarrow$ Miller-Rabin tests

Attack Flow in Practice



Figure : Zoom on the two first patterns of previous figure

- Pattern 1 $\Rightarrow$ initial costly prime sieve
- Pattern 2 $\Rightarrow$ efficient prime sieve executions
- Pattern 3 $\Rightarrow$ first Miller-Rabin test

Outline

Possible Countermeasures

- Our attack exploits two features:
  - use of a prime sieve
  - deterministic candidate generation
- Approaches to thwart our attack:
  - Add randomly dummy trial divisions in each prime sieve computation
  - Perform prime sieve computation in pseudo-random order
  - Prime generation w. non-deterministic generation
    $\Rightarrow$ [Fouque+11]
  - Efficient provable prime generation algorithm
    $\Rightarrow$ [Clavier+12]

Thanks for your attention !

Questions ?