

# The Glitch PUF: A New Delay-PUF Architecture Exploiting Glitch Shapes

Daisuke Suzuki<sup>1,2</sup> and Koichi Shimizu<sup>1</sup>

- 1. Mitsubishi Electric Corporation*
- 2. Yokohama National University*

# Outline

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## **1. Introduction**

## **2. Simulating Behavior of Delay-PUFs**


## **3. Glitch PUF**

## **4. Experimental Results**

## **5. Conclusions**

## ■ Background


- ✓ Security chips and modules need to provide not only cryptographic functions but also tampering countermeasures.
- ✓ **Physical Unclonable Function** (PUF) is a technique to counter tampering.
- ✓ PUFs return responses to given challenges according to innate **physical characteristics** of artificial objects.




## ■ PUFs known well

- ✓ SRAM-PUF exploits start-up values of SRAM cells.
- ✓ The values are a 'physical fingerprint' of a chip.
- ✓ Delay-PUF (e.g. Arbiter-PUF, Ring-oscillator PUF) exploits random variation in delays of wires and gates.
- ✓ Response data are produced by racing of gate delays.

**SRAM-PUF**  
[CHES07]



**Arbiter-PUF**  
[VLSI04]



## ■ Motivation

(M1) Need to evaluate information **entropy** and **error rate** of PUFs at design stage.

☹ It is usually difficult to obtain the physical characteristic of SRAM cells.

(M2) Need to generate unpredictable response data.

☹ Challenge-response pairs can be predicted in some delay-PUFs by machine learning attack after a decent number of pairs are collected.

## ■ Our contributions

- (C1) We present a simple scheme to evaluate the characteristics of Delay-PUF with simulation at the design stage.
- (C2) We propose a new Delay-PUF architecture: **Glitch PUF**
  - ✓ The proposed architecture exploits glitch waveforms that behave non-linearly from delay variation between gates.
  - ✓ We also present the results of the evaluation on randomness and statistical properties of Glitch PUF performed on FPGA and simulation

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
## ■ Delay variation in CMOS process

- ✓ The timing analysis with delay variation, Statistical Static Timing Analysis (SSTA), has become popular over the past few years because random variation has increased with miniaturization in CMOS process.
- ✓ It is anticipated from these facts that logic circuit designers will be able to access information about delay variation in a near future.
- ✓ Delay-PUF is advantageous in that delay information utilized by it has affinity with logic simulation, which is performed at the design stage.



## ■ Delay-PUF simulation with variation

- Systematic delay variation between chips:  $\sigma_{\text{sys}}^2$
- Random delay variation within chips:  $\sigma_{\text{rand}}^2$
- Environmental random delay variation such as from dynamic IR-drop:  $\sigma_{\text{noise}}^2$
- Average fraction of designed delays under 0 °C:  $\tau_0$
- Delay temperature coefficient:  $\mu_T$



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
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
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
## ■ Glitch PUF: basic idea



Depending greatly on temperature and voltage



The relation between CRPs and path delays is almost linear.



**The relation between glitch waveforms and path delays is non-linear.**


Can we use this phenomenon for PUF?

## ■ Glitch PUF: overall sequence

**STEP 1:**  
Data input to a  
random logic

STEP 2:  
Acquisition of glitch  
waveforms at  
the output

STEP 3:  
Conversion of the  
waveforms into  
response bits




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## ■ Glitch PUF: overall sequence

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
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


$$r = (\text{count}(\text{posedge})) \bmod 2$$

## ■ Glitch PUF: solution for main problems

✓ How to acquire glitch waveforms correctly


1. Re-order the results of the sampling FFs based on trial sampling of a "ping" signal



# ■ Glitch PUF: solution for main problems

- ✓ How to acquire glitch waveforms correctly

Before re-order






## ■ Glitch PUF: solution for main problems

- ✓ How to acquire glitch waveforms correctly

After re-order



## ■ Glitch PUF: solution for main problems

- ✓ How to acquire glitch waveforms correctly
  1. Re-order the results of the sampling FFs based on the trial sampling of a "ping" signal
  2. Eliminate transitions with very small pulse width

## ■ Glitch PUF: solution for main problems

✓ How to acquire glitch waveforms correctly

1. Re-order the results of the sampling FFs based on the trial sampling of a "ping" signal
2. Eliminate transitions with very small pulse width
3. Repeat acquisition for the same input and revoke unstable CRPs (masking) in enrollment phase.

$R^{(0)}$	0	0	1	1	<div style="display: inline-block; border: 2px solid blue; border-radius: 50%; width: 20px; height: 20px; margin-right: 5px;"></div> stable
$R^{(1)}$	0	1	1	1	<div style="display: inline-block; border: 2px solid red; border-radius: 50%; width: 20px; height: 20px; margin-right: 5px;"></div> unstable
$R^{(2)}$	0	1	1	0	<b>MASK 1 0 1 0</b>

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


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# Experimental environment

- ✓ We evaluate delay characteristics,  $H_{\infty}$  and  $P_e$  using 16 FPGA boards





SLICES used 891/3,584 (Whole SoC 3,186/3,584)



# Process for extracting delay parameters


- ✓ Delay variation is measured by using 1000 layouts for each FPGA.
- ✓ Simulation parameters are calculated as fractions of corresponding worst-case delays defined in SDF generated by the EDA tool after the layout.



Systematic delay variation $\sigma_{\text{sys}}^2 (\% ^2)$	2.5037
Random delay variation $\sigma_{\text{rand}}^2 (\% ^2)$	5.3091
Environmental random delay variation $\sigma_{\text{noise}}^2 (\% ^2)$	0.0310
Average fraction of designed delays $\tau_0 (\%)$	56.9727
Delay temperature coefficient $\mu_T (\% / ^\circ\text{C})$	0.1401



## ■ Histogram of inter-class

- ✓ 2048bit response bits with mask  
at normal temperature and voltage (24°C, 1.20V)




## ■ Histogram of intra-class

- ✓ 2048bit response bits with mask  
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# Change of error rate with change of temperature



## ■ Change of information amount against change of variations

- ✓ Fixed random delay variation within chips:  $\sigma_{\text{rand}}^2$

$$\left(\frac{1}{2}\sigma_{\text{sys}}\right)^2 \longrightarrow H_{\infty}(R/\text{Mask}) \doteq 34\%$$

$$\sigma_{\text{sys}}^2 \longrightarrow H_{\infty}(R/\text{Mask}) \doteq 34\%$$

$$(2 \cdot \sigma_{\text{sys}})^2 \longrightarrow H_{\infty}(R/\text{Mask}) \doteq 35\%$$

- ✓ Minor influence by Systematic variation between chips

## ■ Change of information amount against change of variations

✓ Fixed systematic delay variation between chips:  $\sigma_{\text{sys}}^2$

$$\left(\frac{1}{2}\sigma_{\text{rand}}\right)^2 \longrightarrow H_{\infty}(R/\text{Mask}) \doteq 26\%$$

$$\sigma_{\text{rand}}^2 \longrightarrow H_{\infty}(R/\text{Mask}) \doteq 34\%$$

$$(2 \cdot \sigma_{\text{rand}})^2 \longrightarrow H_{\infty}(R/\text{Mask}) \doteq 40\%$$

✓ Major influence by Random variation within a chip

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## ■ Conclusions

- ✓ We proposed a concrete structure of Delay-PUF exploiting glitch waveforms.

Secrecy rate  $I(R,R')$ : 26% (SRAM-PUF 76% [CHES2007])

☹ This is about 1/3 that of SRAM-PUF.

☺ We can evaluate the secrecy rate by logic simulation.

In the future (many problems remain...)

- Construct a glitch generator that brings high amount of information and low error rate.
- Model machine learning attacks to Glitch PUF.
- Model logic simulation for voltage change and aging degradation through acceleration test, and evaluate them on real chips

*Thanks for listening*