In this work, we investigate the security of interactive comput actions. The main emphasis is on the mathematical methodology that is needed to formalise and analyse various security properties. Differently from many classical treatments of secure multi-party comput ations, we always quantify security in exact terms. Although working with concrete time bounds and success probabilities is technically more demanding, it also has several advant ages. As all security guarantees are quantitative, we can always compare different protocol designs. Moreover, these security guarantees also have a clear economical interpretation and it is possible to compare cryptographic and non-cryptographic solutions. The latter is extremely import ant in practice, since cryptographic techniques are just one possibility to achieve practical security. Also, working with exact bounds makes reasoning errors more apparent, as security proofs are less abstract and it is easier to locate false claims.
The choice of topics covered in this thesis was guided by two principles. Firstly, we wanted to give a coherent overview of the secure multi-party comput ation that is based on exact quanti?cation of security guarantees. Secondly, we focused on topics that emerged from the author’s own research. In that sense, the thesis generalises many methodological discoveries made by the author.
As surprising as it may seem, security definitions and proofs mostly utilise principles of hypothesis testing and analysis of stochastic algorithms. Thus, we start our treatment with hypothesis testing and its generalisations. In particular, we show how to quantify various security properties, using security games as tools.
Next, we review basic proof techniques and explain how to structure complex proofs so they become easily veri?able. In a nutshell, we describe how to repre-
sent a proof as a game tree, where each edge corresponds to an element ary proof step. As a result, one can ?rst verify the overall structure of a proof by looking at
the syntactic changes in the game tree and only then verify all individual proof steps corresponding to the edges.
The remaining part of the thesis is dedicated to various aspects of protocol design. Firstly, we discuss how to formalise various security goals, such as input-
privacy, output-consistency and complete security, and how to choose a security goal that is appropriate for a specific setting. Secondly, we also explore alternatives to exact security. More precisely, we analyse connections between exact and asymptotic security models and rigorously formalise a notion of subjective security. Thirdly, we study in which conditions protocols preserve their security guarantees and how to safely combine several protocols. Although composability results are common knowledge, we look at them from a slightly different angle. Namely, it is irrational to design universally composable protocols at any cost; instead, we should design comput ationally efficient protocols with minimal usage restrictions. Thus, we propose a three-stage design procedure that leads to modular security proofs and minimises usage restrictions.