Get an update on changes of the IACR web-page here. For questions, contact newsletter (at) iacr.org. You can also receive updates via:
To receive your credentials via mail again, please click here.
You can also access the full news archive.
There were 110 registered participants; 50 of them were students. Most of the participants stayed in hotels in downtown Providence; a block of rooms was arranged for TCC at the Hampton Inn and at the Biltmore. Although the conference venue was only a 20-minute walk from the hotels, the conference provided a shuttle to and from the venue that made several roundtrips in the morning and then several more after the talks ended.
The full registration amount was $272, while the student rate was $136. The IACR membership fee was an additional $70 full and $35 student, but it only applied to those participants who had not attended another IACR meeting this year. Each participant received a copy of the proceedings.
The program consisted of 35 papers, selected from 108 submissions; two invited talks, by Luca Trevisan and Rafael Pass; and the rump session, chaired by Tal Malkin.
After four successful Africacrypt conferences (Dakar Senegal 2011; Stellenbosch, South Africa 2010 ; Gammarth, Tunis, Tunisia, 2009; and Casablanca, Morocco 2008), the fifth edition of Africacrypt (http://www.aui.ma/africacrypt2012) will take place at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco, 10-12 July 2012, whereby establishing a tradition in the science of cryptology and related disciplines in the African continent. Beyond providing an international forum for practitioners and researchers from industry, academia, and government from all over the world, the conference aims at the promotion of cryptography research in Africa, especially among your African researchers. Located in the middle of the Atlas mountains, and at the cross road of major imperial cities, the venue for this edition, that is Ifrane, Morocco, is synonymous of a social program as rich as the scientific program.
Papers must be submitted electronically through https://africacrypt2012.epfl.ch/iChair More instructions are available in the call for papers. Important dates:
The 2011 election was held to fill three of nine IACR Director positions. The term of the following three directors expires by the end of 2011: Josh Benaloh, Stuart Haber, and Antoine Joux. This year, we had six candidates: Josh Benaloh, Alexandra Boldyreva, Shai Halevi, Phong Nguyen, Tom Shrimpton, and Nigel Smart
Voting IACR members were invited to cast their votes between October 1 and November 15, 2011. The vote was run electronically by the heliosvoting.org service. This year, IACR switched to "approval voting", meaning that each voter could vote for as many candidates as they desire (but only once for each candidate).
We had 1484 eligible voters. We collected 621 ballots, giving a record participation rate of 41.8%. The tallies are
The election committee would like to thank all candidates for their participation, to congratulate the three elected directors, and to warmly thank Ben Adida for his help in running the helios system.
The election committee: Serge Vaudenay (Chair), Greg Rose, and Martijn Stam.
Key establishment is the process whereby two or more parties derive a shared secret, typically used for subsequent confidential communication. However, identifying the exact security requirements for key establishment protocols is a non-trivial task. This thesis compares, extends and merges existing security definitions and models for key establishment protocols.\r\n\r\n
The primary focus is on two-party key agreement schemes in the public-key setting. On one hand new protocols are proposed and analyzed in the existing Canetti-Krawzcyk model. On the other hand the thesis develops a security model and novel definition that capture the essential security attributes of the standardized Unified Model key agreement protocol. These analyses lead to the development of a new security model and related definitions that combine and extend the Canetti-Krawzcyk pre- and post- specified peer models in terms of provided security assurances.\r\n\r\n
The thesis also provides a complete analysis of a one-pass key establishment scheme. There are security goals that no one-pass key establishment scheme can achieve, and hence the two-pass security models and definitions need to be adapted for one-pass protocols. The analysis provided here includes the description of the required modification to the underlying security model. Finally, a complete security argument meeting these altered conditions is presented as evidence supporting the security of the one-pass scheme.\r\n\r\n
Lastly, validation and reusing short lived key pairs are related to efficiency, which is a major objective in practice. The thesis considers the formal implication of omitting validation steps and reusing short lived key pairs. The conclusions reached support the generally accepted cryptographic conventions that incoming messages should not be blindly trusted and extra care should be taken when key pairs are reused.[...]