Report on Theory of Cryptography Conference 2011 (TCC), March 28-30, 2011, Providence, RI, USA
TCC 2011 took place from March 28 to March 30, 2011, at Brown University, Providence, RI, USA.
The general chair was Anna Lysyanskaya and the program chair was Yuval Ishai. This was the eighth edition of TCC.
There were 110 registered participants; 50 of them were students.
Most of the participants stayed in hotels in downtown Providence; a block of rooms was arranged for
TCC at the Hampton Inn and at the Biltmore. Although the conference venue was only a 20-minute walk
from the hotels, the conference provided a shuttle to and from the venue that made several roundtrips in the
morning and then several more after the talks ended.
The full registration amount was $272, while the student rate was $136. The IACR membership fee was an
additional $70 full and $35 student, but it only applied to those participants who had not attended another
IACR meeting this year. Each participant received a copy of the proceedings.
The program consisted of 35 papers, selected from 108 submissions; two invited talks, by Luca Trevisan
and Rafael Pass; and the rump session, chaired by Tal Malkin.
After four successful Africacrypt conferences (Dakar Senegal 2011;
Stellenbosch, South Africa 2010 ; Gammarth, Tunis, Tunisia, 2009; and
Casablanca, Morocco 2008), the fifth edition of Africacrypt
(http://www.aui.ma/africacrypt2012) will take place at Al Akhawayn
University in Ifrane, Morocco, 10-12 July 2012, whereby establishing a
tradition in the science of cryptology and related disciplines in the
African continent. Beyond providing an international forum for
practitioners and researchers from industry, academia, and government
from all over the world, the conference aims at the promotion of
cryptography research in Africa, especially among your African
researchers. Located in the middle of the Atlas mountains, and at the
cross road of major imperial cities, the venue for this edition, that is
Ifrane, Morocco, is synonymous of a social program as rich as the
Papers must be submitted electronically through
More instructions are available in the call for papers.
- Submission: Jan. 5, 2012, 1pm UTC
- Notification: Apr. 2, 2012
The 2011 election was held to fill three of nine IACR Director
positions. The term of the following three directors expires by the end
of 2011: Josh Benaloh, Stuart Haber, and Antoine Joux. This year, we had
six candidates: Josh Benaloh, Alexandra Boldyreva, Shai Halevi, Phong
Nguyen, Tom Shrimpton, and Nigel Smart
Voting IACR members were invited to cast their votes between October 1
and November 15, 2011. The vote was run electronically by the
heliosvoting.org service. This year, IACR switched to "approval voting",
meaning that each voter could vote for as many candidates as they desire
(but only once for each candidate).
We had 1484 eligible voters.
We collected 621 ballots, giving a record participation rate of 41.8%.
The tallies are
The three elected directors are Shai Halevi, Nigel Smart, and Josh
Benaloh. Their term will run until 2014.
- 339: Shai Halevi
- 328: Nigel Smart
- 291: Josh Benaloh
- 266: Phong Nguyen
- 234: Alexandra Boldyreva
- 188: Tom Shrimpton
The election committee would like to thank all candidates for their
participation, to congratulate the three elected directors, and to
warmly thank Ben Adida for his help in running the helios system.
The election committee: Serge Vaudenay (Chair), Greg Rose, and Martijn Stam.
Berkant Ustaoglu: Key establishment - security models, protocols and usage
Name: Berkant Ustaoglu
Topic: Key establishment - security models, protocols and usage
Category: cryptographic protocols
Key establishment is the process whereby two or more parties derive a shared secret, typically used for subsequent confidential communication. However, identifying the exact security requirements for key establishment protocols is a non-trivial task. This thesis compares, extends and merges existing security definitions and models for key establishment protocols.\r\n\r\n
The primary focus is on two-party key agreement schemes in the public-key setting. On one hand new protocols are proposed and analyzed in the existing Canetti-Krawzcyk model. On the other hand the thesis develops a security model and novel definition that capture the essential security attributes of the standardized Unified Model key agreement protocol. These analyses lead to the development of a new security model and related definitions that combine and extend the Canetti-Krawzcyk pre- and post- specified peer models in terms of provided security assurances.\r\n\r\n
The thesis also provides a complete analysis of a one-pass key establishment scheme. There are security goals that no one-pass key establishment scheme can achieve, and hence the two-pass security models and definitions need to be adapted for one-pass protocols. The analysis provided here includes the description of the required modification to the underlying security model. Finally, a complete security argument meeting these altered conditions is presented as evidence supporting the security of the one-pass scheme.\r\n\r\n
Lastly, validation and reusing short lived key pairs are related to efficiency, which is a major objective in practice. The thesis considers the formal implication of omitting validation steps and reusing short lived key pairs. The conclusions reached support the generally accepted cryptographic conventions that incoming messages should not be blindly trusted and extra care should be taken when key pairs are reused.[...]
Experienced Researchers in Cryptology, Galician Research and Development Center in Advanced Telecommunications (Gradiant), Vigo, Spain
We are looking for a senior researcher with a strong background on cryptology and its mathematical foundations, with a strong motivation for carrying out applied research in this field and leading projects focused on practical applications.
Research experience is required in at least one of the following topics: secure identity management, privacy by design, trusted computing and secure computation outsourcing, network security, design of efficient cryptosystems, digital rights management, security and usability.
Experienced researcher or 4-10 yrs (Post-Doc)
Nr. Job Positions : 1
IT Hardware Security Engineer – Smartcards, APPLUS - LGAI DIVISION Barcelona
Applus+ is seeking an IT Hardware Security Engineer to participate in security evaluations in smartcards and Integrated Circuits.
This is a long term contract position working at the headquarters ITC security laboratory of Applus+ based in Bellaterra (Barcelona). It is important to note that some projects will be in collaboration with one of the site security laboratories that Applus+ has in Shanghai (China), so for this job position is also required travel availability.
We are hiring hardware security analyst with the aim of widen our hardware security team. He/She will be in charge of evaluations related to secure applications/platforms (as banking or identification) using the testing as a tool to investigate possible bugs or security warnings that can be exploited using Side-Channel or Fault analysis attacks. The candidate should have the following skills and knowledge:
- Strong background in Cryptography algorithms. (AES, DES, RSA, ECDSA…)
- Expertise in Side-Channel attacks (SPA, DPA, DEMA, SEMA, CPA, Timing…)
- Expertise in DFA attacks(Laser, glitches...)
- Knowledge in Smart Cards and HSM (Hardware Security Modules), specially hardware architecture design.
- Experience in programming (C, C++, Java..).
- Knowledge in banking security and related specifications.
- ISO 7816 and ISO14443.
- Knowledge in Common Criteria specifications.
- Knowledge in analog and digital signal processing and circuitry development experience for tools development.
High level of written and spoken English is required.