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Secure two-party computation, called Secure Function Evaluation (SFE), enables two mutually mistrusting parties (client & server) to evaluate an arbitrary function $f$ on their respective private inputs $x,y$ while revealing nothing but the result $z=f(x,y)$. Although such generic techniques were widely believed to be inefficient, the rapidly growing speed of computers and communication networks, algorithmic improvements, automatic generation and optimizations of SFE protocols have made them usable in practical application scenarios.
This thesis presents the following advances in the design, optimization and applications of efficient SFE protocols.
Circuit Optimizations and Constructions.
The complexity of today's most efficient SFE protocols depends linearly on the size of the boolean circuit representation of the evaluated function. Further, recent techniques for SFE based on improved Garbled Circuits (GCs) allow for very efficient secure evaluation of XOR gates.
We give transformations that substantially reduce the size of boolean circuits if the costs for evaluating XOR gates are lower than for other types of gates. Our optimizations provide more efficient circuits for standard functionalities such as integer comparison and fast multiplication.
Applications that benefit from our improvements are secure first-price auctions.
Hardware-Assisted GC Protocols.
We improve the deployability of SFE protocols by using tamper-proof Hardware (HW) tokens.
In particular, GCs can be generated by a tamper-proof HW token which is provided by the server to a client but not trusted by the client. The presented HW-assisted SFE protocol makes the communication between client and server independent of the size of the evaluated function. Further, we show how GCs can be evaluated in HW in a leakage resilient way, so-called One-Time Programs.
As application we show how the combination of GCs and tamper-proof HW allows to[...]
**Call for applications**
Expected funding duration: 24 Months
Starting date: Immediate
This project aims to investigate innovative approaches to protecting the integrity and confidentiality of a piece of software against an attacker (the man-at-the-end, MATE) who has physical access to the software and so is able to inspect, modify, and execute it. One important goal of the project is to derive a fundamental basis of MATE defense principles and metrics.
**Key tasks to be performed**
Develop MATE attack models that formally characterize the process of device compromise. Design novel MATE defense algorithms. Provide attack tools to allow easy testing of these defenses. Devise community standards for defense evaluation. Investigate different approaches to constructing and validating metrics for obfuscation, tamper-proofing, and software watermarking.
The applicant must have a PhD in Computer Science or other strongly related field. A successful candidate should have a technical background in one or more of computer security, cryptography, and programming languages/compilers.
The work will be carried out at the University of Arizona, under the supervision of a team of researchers from the Computer Science and Electrical and Computer Engineering departments.