*12:17* [Pub][ePrint]
The Norwegian Internet Voting Protocol: A new Instantiation, by Kristian Gjøsteen and Anders Smedstuen Lund
The Norwegian government ran trials of internet remote voting during the 2011 municipal elections and the 2013 parliamentary elections. From a simplified version of the voting protocol used there, the essential cryptographic operations of the voting protocol has been put together into a cryptosystem in which one can build the voting protocol on top of.This paper proposes a new instantiation of the underlying cryp- tosystem, improving our confidence in the security of the cryptosys- tem. The new instantiation is mostly similar to a previously defined instantiation, but allows parts of the security proof to be significantly improved.

*21:56* [Job][New]
Intern Software Developer (Cryptography), *CloudFlare Inc.*
CloudFlare is looking for a cryptography intern!

CloudFlare is expanding its global footprint. In order to keep our network secure we are investing in technologies to improve the security of our key management infrastructure. We are looking for an ambitious intern to help kickstart one of our cryptographic projects.

Requirements:

Experience in the theory and implementation of standard cryptographic primitives (AES, RSA, ECC)Extensive development experience in C and/or GoA deep understanding of reverse engineering techniquesAn unquenchable thirst for understanding and mitigating cryptographic attack vectorsOutside-the-box thinking and self-starter attitude

Bonus requirements:

Experience with the cryptol programming languageExperience with LLVM or other compiler technologyKnowledge of the theory and implementation of white-box cryptography

Internship length: 4-6 months.

Sound like somewhere you’d thrive? If so, then we’d love to hear from you. Send us your resume and a short paragraph introducing yourself. Please include a brief description of how you solved a customer problem or enhanced a customer\'s understanding of a technical service.

CloudFlare is a security company. All prospective employees will be subject to an extensive background check.

CloudFlare is an equal opportunity employer and does not discriminate against any employee or applicant on the basis of age, color, disability, gender, national origin, race, religion, sexual orientation, veteran status, or any classification protected by federal, state, or local law.

*15:17* [Pub][ePrint]
Algebraic partitioning: Fully compact and (almost) tightly secure cryptography, by Dennis Hofheinz
We describe a new technique for conducting ``partitioning arguments\'\'. Partitioning arguments are a popular way to prove the security of a cryptographic scheme. For instance, to prove the security of a signature scheme, a partitioning argument could divide the set of messages into ``signable\'\' messages for which a signature can be simulated during the proof, and ``unsignable\'\' ones for which any signature would allow to solve a computational problem. During the security proof, we would then hope that an adversary only requests signatures for signable messages, and later forges a signature for an unsignable one.In this work, we develop a new class of partitioning arguments from simple assumptions. Unlike previous partitioning strategies, ours is based upon an algebraic property of the partitioned elements (e.g., the signed messages), and not on their bit structure. This allows to perform the partitioning efficiently in a ``hidden\'\' way, such that already a single ``slot\'\' for a partitioning operation in the scheme can be used to implement many different partitionings sequentially, one after the other. As a consequence, we can construct complex partitionings out of simple basic (but algebraic) partitionings in a very space-efficient way.

As a demonstration of our technique, we provide the first signature and public-key encryption schemes that achieve the following properties simultaneously: they are (almost) tightly secure under a simple assumption, and they are fully compact (in the sense that parameters, keys, and signatures, resp.~ciphertexts only comprise a constant number of group elements).

*15:17* [Pub][ePrint]
Multi-Prover Commitments Against Non-Signaling Attacks, by Serge Fehr and Max Fillinger
We reconsider the concept of two-prover (and more generally: multi-prover) commitments, as introduced in the late eighties in the seminal work by Ben-Or et al. As was recently shown by Cr{\\\'e}peau et al., the security of known two-prover commitment schemes not only relies on the explicit assumption that the two provers cannot communicate, but also depends on what their information processing capabilities are. For instance, there exist schemes that are secure against classical provers but insecure if the provers have quantum information processing capabilities, and there are schemes that resist such quantum attacks but become insecure when considering general so-called non-signaling provers, which are restricted solely by the requirement that no communication takes place.This poses the natural question whether there exists a two-prover commitment scheme that is secure under the sole assumption that no communication takes place, and that does not rely on any further restriction of the information processing capabilities of the dishonest provers; no such scheme is known.

In this work, we give strong evidence for a negative answer: we show that any single-round two-prover commitment scheme can be broken by a non-signaling attack. Our negative result is as bad as it can get: for any candidate scheme that is (almost) perfectly hiding, there exists a strategy that allows the dishonest provers to open a commitment to an arbitrary bit (almost) as successfully as the honest provers can open an honestly prepared commitment, i.e., with probability (almost) $1$ in case of a perfectly sound scheme. In the case of multi-round schemes, our impossibility result is restricted to perfectly hiding schemes.

On the positive side, we show that the impossibility result can be circumvented by considering {\\em three} provers instead: there exists a three-prover commitment scheme that is secure against arbitrary non-signaling attacks.