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One open position is at NXP Semiconductors in Leuven, Belgium for research on cryptography for passively powered devices. New methods (like threshold implementations) and design approaches (e.g., leakage resilient crypto) will be investigated. Since the goal is to target efficiency in dedicated hardware and/or embedded software, interest and expertise in these areas and ideally a degree in electrical engineering is of advantage for applicants.
NXP Semiconductors is one of the market leaders in providing High Performance Mixed Signal and Standard Product solutions that leverage its leading RF, Analog, PM, Interface, Security, Digital Processing and Manufacturing expertise. NXP’s strong drive for innovation ensures secure identification in a smart connected world. Headquartered in Europe, the company has about 23,000 employees working in more than 25 countries.
The PhD student will, in addition to a supervisor from NXP, be supervised by a member of the Computer Security and Industrial Cryptography group (COSIC) at KU Leuven and closely collaborate with PhD students there; COSIC is within biking distance of the NXP site in Leuven. The research of COSIC has led to important cryptographic advances such as the Rijndael algorithm. The goal of the student is to receive a PhD from the KU Leuven after three years.
1. Static UC secure computation. Designing the first static UC secure oblivious transfer protocol based on public-key encryption and stand-alone semi-honest oblivious transfer. As a corollary we obtain the first black-box constructions of UC secure computation assuming only two-round semi-honest oblivious transfer.
2. One-sided UC secure computation. Designing adaptive UC secure two-party computation with single corruptions assuming public-key encryption with oblivious ciphertext generation.
3. Adaptive UC secure computation. Designing adaptively secure UC commitment scheme assuming only public-key encryption with oblivious ciphertext generation. As a corollary we obtain the first black-box constructions of adaptive UC secure computation assuming only (trapdoor) simulatable public-key encryption (as well as a variety of concrete assumptions). We remark that such a result was not known even under non-black-box constructions.
probability distributions. We show that it can often be used as an alternative
to the statistical distance in security proofs for lattice-based
cryptography. Using the R\\\'enyi divergence is particularly suited
for security proofs of primitives in which the attacker is required
to solve a search problem (e.g., forging a signature). We show that
it may also be used in the case of distinguishing problems (e.g.,
semantic security of encryption schemes), when they enjoy a public
sampleability property. The techniques lead to security proofs for
schemes with smaller parameters, and sometimes to simpler security
proofs than the existing ones.
achieving full cipher security, based on applying an online cipher and reordering blocks.
Explicitly, we show that with just two calls to the online cipher, security up to the birthday bound is both attainable and maximal. Moreover, we demonstrate that three calls to the online cipher suffice to obtain beyond birthday bound security, and (for suitably long messages) arbitrarily strong security. As part of our investigation, we extend an observation by Rogaway and Zhang, highlighting the close relationship between online ciphers and tweakable blockciphers with variable-length tweaks.
We develop a new protocol concept that allows the device owner to detect if another party is using the device\'s long-term key. We achieve this by making it necessary for uses of the key to be inserted in an append-only log, which the device owner can interrogate. We propose a multi-device messaging protocol that exploits our concept to allow users to detect unauthorised usage of their device keys. We prove the main properties of our protocol using the Tamarin prover.
The methods we introduce are not intended to replace existing methods used to keep keys safe (such as hardware devices or careful procedures). Rather, our methods provide a useful and effective additional layer of security.
Applications are invited from researchers whose interests are related to, or complement, current strengths of the ISG. We are particularly interested in applicants who will be able to interact with our research groups in cryptography and systems security. However, applications from strong candidates working in other cyber security fields will also be given serious consideration.
Applicants should have a Ph.D. in a relevant subject or equivalent, be a self-motivated researcher, and have a strong publication record. Applicants should be able to demonstrate an enthusiasm for teaching and communicating with diverse audiences, as well as show an awareness of contemporary issues relating to cyber security.
This is a full time and permanent post, available from 1st September, 2015, or as soon as possible thereafter. This post is based in Egham, Surrey, where the College is situated in a beautiful, leafy campus near to Windsor Great Park and within commuting distance from London.