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In this paper, we introduce a new primitive called extractable IBE, which is a hybrid of one-bit IBE and identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (IB-KEM), and define its IND-ID-CCA security notion. We present a generic construction of SO-CCA secure IBE from an IND-ID-CCA secure extractable IBE with ``One-Sided Public Openability\'\'(1SPO), a collision-resistant hash function and a strengthened cross-authentication code. Finally, we propose two concrete constructions of extractable 1SPO-IBE schemes, resulting in the first simulation-based SO-CCA secure IBE schemes without random oracles.
and linear codes based encryption schemes
have received extensive attention in recent years.
Though LLL reduction algorithm has been one of the major cryptanalysis techniques
for lattice based cryptographic systems, cryptanalysis techniques for linear codes
based cryptographic systems are generally scheme specific. In recent years,
several important techniques such as
Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack and filtration attacks have been
developed to crypt-analyze linear codes based encryption schemes.
Though most of these cryptanalysis techniques
are relatively new, they prove to be very powerful and many systems have been broken
using these techniques. Thus it is important to systematically investigate and
design linear code based cryptographic systems that are immune against these attacks.
This paper proposes linear code based encryption schemes RLCE which share
many characteristics with random linear codes. Our analysis shows
that the scheme RLCE is secure against existing attacks and we expect that
the security of the RLCE scheme is equivalent to the hardness of decoding random linear codes.
We also remark that there is a very simple method to achieve the same purpose of private shuffle. When a user wants to privately query the search engine with a word, he can choose another n-1 padding words to form a group of $n$ words and permute these words randomly. Finally, he queries the search engine with these words.
Our approach follows the classical tree representation for the divisible coin. However we manage to build the values on the nodes in such a way that the elements necessary to recover the serial numbers are common to all the nodes of the same level: this leads to strong unlinkability and anonymity, the strongest security level for divisible E-cash.
Los Angeles, CA, United States
What would you do: Oblong is looking for a Security Software Engineer responsible for keeping our core product, Mezzanine, secure. This is a high-impact role in charge of enhancing our existing PKI, writing new security related code, auditing existing code and architectures for security flaws, and reviewing new features for security and privacy. You will work closely with many parts of the organization and interact with customers occasionally. Clear communications skills are crucial for this role.
• Develop production-quality code
• Architect and develop security requirements for Mezzanine
• Take responsibility for current PKI and code
• Improve and maintain current Mezzanine security policies and communicate them to other parts of the company
• Keep up-to-date with software vulnerabilities and provide and implement recommendations
• Evaluate third-party security updates
• Substantial experience delivering production-quality, security-related code
• Fluency in C and C++ programming and at least one scripting language
• Proven ability to design security policies and specifications
• Excellent written and verbal communications
• Good understanding of cryptography (symmetric and asymmetric ciphers) and secure protocols (TLS, SRTP)
• Experience with at least one crypto library (e.g. OpenSSL, GnuTLS)
• Good knowledge of PKI and certificate standards
Nice to have:
• Experience working with Open Source projects
• DOD 8570 compliant certification such as CISSP, CISM, CISA or equivalent
Benefits and perks:
• Competitive compensation package of salary and stock options?
• Medical, dental, and vision insurance ?
• 401K plan
• Gourmet lunches 3 days/week
ECRYPT-NET is a research network of six universities and two companies that intends to develop advanced cryptographic techniques for the Internet of Things and the Cloud, and to create efficient and secure implementations of those techniques on a broad range of platforms. ECRYPT-NET is funded by a prestigious Marie Sklodowska-Curie ITN (Integrated Training Network) grant. The network will educate a group of 15 PhD students with a set of interdisciplinary skills in the areas of mathematics, computer science and electrical engineering. The training will be provided in an international context that include Summer Schools, workshops and internships. Participants are expected to spend at least six months abroad in a network partner or in one of the seven associated companies. We are looking for highly motivated candidates, ideally with background on cryptology and with proven research abilities.
Two of the ECRYPT-NET ESR (Early Stage Researcher) positions will be based at the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, to work on the following projects:
(1) Design and analysis of efficient and lightweight authenticated encryption schemes.
(2) Secure outsourcing of computation.
Marie Curie ITN eligibility criteria apply to both of these positions.
Founded in 1990, the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway is a world-leading interdisciplinary research group dedicated to research and education in the area of cyber security, with an extensive and long-standing record of research in cryptography. It has 16 established academics, 11 RAs, and over 50 PhD students. It gained the status of UK Academic Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security Research by EPSRC and GCHQ, and hosts one of the
We improve previously published linear trail bias estimations by presenting a novel method to calculate the bias of short linear hulls in Simon and use them to construct longer linear approximations. By using these linear approximations we present key recovery attacks of up to 25 rounds for Simon64/128, 24 rounds for Simon32/64, Simon48/96, and Simon64/96, and 23 rounds for Simon48/72. The attacks on Simon32 and Simon48 are currently the best attacks on these versions. The attacks on Simon64 do not cover as many rounds as attacks using differential cryptanalysis but they work in the more natural setting of known plaintexts rather than chosen plaintexts.