International Association for Cryptologic Research

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19:17 [Pub][ePrint] Private Computation on Encrypted Genomic Data, by Kristin Lauter and Adriana Lopez-Alt and Michael Naehrig

  A number of databases around the world currently host a wealth of genomic data that is invaluable to researchers conducting a variety of genomic studies. However, patients who volunteer their genomic data run the risk of privacy invasion. In this work, we give a cryptographic solution to this problem: to maintain patient privacy, we propose encrypting all genomic data in the database. To allow meaningful computation on the encrypted data, we propose using a homomorphic encryption scheme.

Specifically, we take basic genomic algorithms which are commonly used in genetic association studies and show how they can be made to work on encrypted genotype and phenotype data. In particular, we consider the Pearson Goodness-of-Fit test, the D\' and r^2-measures of linkage disequilibrium, the Estimation Maximization (EM) algorithm for haplotyping, and the Cochran-Armitage Test for Trend. We also provide performance numbers for running these algorithms on encrypted data.

19:17 [Pub][ePrint] From Related-Key Distinguishers to Related-Key-Recovery on Even-Mansour Constructions, by Pierre Karpman

  We show that the distinguishing attacks on Even-Mansour block ciphers

in the related key model can easily be converted into extremely efficient key recovery attacks.

This includes in particular all iterated Even-Mansour constructions with independent keys.

We apply this observation to the Caesar candidate Prøst-OTR and are able to recover the whole key with a number of requests linear in its size. This improves on recent forgery attacks in a similar setting.

17:12 [Event][New] FSE: Fast Software Encryption

  From March 20 to March 23
Location: Bochum, Germany
More Information: http://

13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Making Masking Security Proofs Concrete Or How to Evaluate the Security of any Leaking Device, by Alexandre Duc and Sebastian Faust and Fran\\c{c}ois-Xavier Standaert

  We investigate the relationships between theoretical studies of leaking cryptographic devices and concrete security evaluations with standard side-channel attacks. Our contributions are in four parts.

First, we connect the formal analysis of the masking countermeasure proposed by Duc et al. (Eurocrypt 2014) with the Eurocrypt 2009 evaluation framework for side-channel key recovery attacks. In particular, we re-state their main proof for the masking countermeasure based on a mutual information metric, which is frequently used in concrete physical security evaluations.

Second, we discuss the tightness of the Eurocrypt 2014 bounds based on experimental case studies. This allows us to conjecture a simplified link between the mutual information metric and the success rate of a side-channel adversary, ignoring technical parameters and proof artifacts.

Third, we introduce heuristic (yet well-motivated) tools for the evaluation of the masking countermeasure when its independent leakage assumption is not perfectly fulfilled, as it is frequently encountered in practice.

Thanks to these tools, we argue that masking with non-independent leakages may provide improved security levels in certain scenarios. Eventually, we consider the tradeoff between measurement complexity and key enumeration in divide-and-conquer side-channel attacks, and show that it can be predicted based on the mutual information metric, by solving a non-linear integer programming problem for which efficient solutions exist.

The combination of these observations enables significant reductions of the evaluation costs for certification bodies.

13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Reconfigurable LUT: Boon or Bane for Secure Applications, by Debapriya Basu Roy and Shivam Bhasin and Sylvain Guilley and Jean-Luc Danger and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay

  Modern FPGAs offer various new features for enhanced re-configurability and better performance. One of such feature

is a dynamically Re-configurable LUT (RLUT) whose content can be updated internally, even during run-time. There

are many scenarios like pattern matching where this feature

has been shown to enhance performance of the system. In

this paper, we study RLUT in the context of secure applications. Next, we design several case-studies to apply this feature on security critical scenarios. These case-studies vary

from destructive scenarios like stealthy hardware Trojans to

constructive scenarios like implementation of secret ciphers

with custom Sboxes and masking countermeasure.

13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Multi-User Oblivious RAM Secure Against Malicious Servers, by Travis Mayberry and Erik-Oliver Blass and Guevara Noubir

  It has been an open question whether Oblivious RAM stored on a malicious server can be securely shared among multiple users. ORAMs are stateful, and users need to exchange updated state to maintain security. This is a challenge, as the motivation for using ORAM is that the users may not have a way to directly communicate. A malicious server can potentially tamper with state information and thus break security. We answer the question of multi-user ORAM on malicious servers affirmatively by providing several new, efficient multi-user ORAM constructions. We first show how to make the original square-root solution by Goldreich and the hierarchical one by Goldreich and Ostrovsky multi-user secure. We accomplish this by separating the \\emph{critical} parts of the access, which depends on the state of the ORAM, from the non-critical parts that can be safely executed in any state. Our second and main contribution is a multi-user variant of Path ORAM. To enable secure meta-data update during evictions, we employ our first result, small multi-user secure classical ORAMs, as a building block. Depending on the block size, the overhead of our construction reaches a low $O(\\log n)$ communication complexity per user, similar to state-of-the-art single-user ORAMs.

13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Constructing Mixed-integer Programming Models whose Feasible Region is Exactly the Set of All Valid Differential Characteristics of SIMON, by Siwei Sun, Lei Hu, Meiqin Wang, Peng Wang, Kexin Qiao, Xia

  In IACR ePrint 2014/747, a method for constructing mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) models whose feasible regions are exactly the sets of all possible differential (or linear) characteristics for a wide range of block ciphers is presented. These models can be used to search for or enumerate differential and linear characteristics of a block cipher automatically. However, for the case of SIMON (a lightweight block cipher designed by the U.S. National Security Agency), the method proposed in IACR ePrint 2014/747 is not {\\it exact} anymore. That is, the feasible region of the MILP model constructed for SIMON contains invalid differential characteristics due to the dependent input bits of the AND operations, and these invalid characteristics must be filtered out by other methods. This is a very inconvenient process and reduces the level of automation of the framework of MILP-based automatic differential analysis. In this paper, by using quadratic constraints or constraints from the H-representation of a specific convex hull, we give a method for constructing mixed-integer (non)linear programming models whose feasible regions are exactly the sets of all valid differential characteristics for SIMON. The technique presented in this paper may be also useful for other ciphers. How to construct an MILP model whose feasible region is exactly the set of all linear characteristics of SIMON is still an open problem.

13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Identity-based encryption with (almost) tight security in the multi-instance, multi-ciphertext setting, by Dennis Hofheinz and Jessica Koch and Christoph Striecks

  We construct an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme that is tightly secure in a very strong sense. Specifically, we consider a setting with many instances of the scheme and many encryptions per instance. In this setting, we reduce the security of our scheme to a variant of a simple assumption used for a similar purpose by Chen and Wee (Crypto 2013). The security loss of our reduction is O(k) (where k is the security parameter). Our scheme is the first IBE scheme to achieve this strong flavor of tightness under a simple assumption.

Technically, our scheme is a variation of the IBE scheme by Chen and Wee. However, in order to \"lift\" their results to the multi-instance, multi-ciphertext case, we need to develop new ideas. In particular, while we build on (and extend) their high-level proof strategy, we deviate significantly in the low-level proof steps.

13:17 [Pub][ePrint] GliFreD: Glitch-Free Duplication - Towards Power-Equalized Circuits on FPGAs, by Alexander Wild and Amir Moradi and Tim Güneysu

  Designers of secure hardware are required to harden their implementations against physical threats, such as power analysis attacks. In particular, cryptographic hardware circuits are required to decorrelate their current consumption from the information inferred by processing (secret) data. A common technique to achieve this goal is the use of special logic styles that aim at equalizing the current consumption at each single processing step. However, since all hiding techniques like Dual-Rail Precharge (DRP) were originally developed for ASICs, the deployment of such countermeasures on FPGA devices with fixed and predefined logic structure poses a particular challenge.

In this work, we propose and practically evaluate a new DRP scheme (GliFreD) that has been exclusively designed for FPGA platforms. GliFreD overcomes the well-known early propagation issue, prevents glitches, uses an isolated dual-rail concept, and mitigates imbalanced routings. With all these features, GliFreD significantly exceeds the level of physical security achieved by any previously reported, related countermeasures for FPGAs.

13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Multilinear Pseudorandom Functions, by Aloni Cohen and Justin Holmgren

  We define the new notion of a multilinear pseudorandom function (PRF), and give a construction with a proof of security assuming the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. A direct application of our construction yields (non-multilinear) PRFs with aggregate security from the same assumption, resolving an open question of Cohen, Goldwasser, and Vaikuntanathan. Additionally, multilinear PRFs give a new way of viewing existing algebraic PRF constructions: our main theorem implies they too satisfy aggregate security.

13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Perfect Structure on the Edge of Chaos, by Nir Bitansky and Omer Paneth and Daniel Wichs

  We construct trapdoor permutations based on (sub-exponential) indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions, thereby providing the first candidate that is not based on the hardness of factoring.

Our construction shows that even highly structured primitives, such as trapdoor permutations, can be potentially based on hardness assumptions with noisy structures such as those used in candidate constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation. It also suggest a possible way to construct trapdoor permutations that resist quantum attacks, and that their hardness may be based on problems outside the complexity class SZK - indeed, while factoring-based candidates do not possess such security, future constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation might.

As a corollary, we eliminate the need to assume trapdoor permutations and injective one-way function in many recent constructions based on indistinguishability obfuscation.