International Association for Cryptologic Research

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2015-02-26
13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Reconfigurable LUT: Boon or Bane for Secure Applications, by Debapriya Basu Roy and Shivam Bhasin and Sylvain Guilley and Jean-Luc Danger and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay

  Modern FPGAs offer various new features for enhanced re-configurability and better performance. One of such feature

is a dynamically Re-configurable LUT (RLUT) whose content can be updated internally, even during run-time. There

are many scenarios like pattern matching where this feature

has been shown to enhance performance of the system. In

this paper, we study RLUT in the context of secure applications. Next, we design several case-studies to apply this feature on security critical scenarios. These case-studies vary

from destructive scenarios like stealthy hardware Trojans to

constructive scenarios like implementation of secret ciphers

with custom Sboxes and masking countermeasure.



13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Multi-User Oblivious RAM Secure Against Malicious Servers, by Travis Mayberry and Erik-Oliver Blass and Guevara Noubir

  It has been an open question whether Oblivious RAM stored on a malicious server can be securely shared among multiple users. ORAMs are stateful, and users need to exchange updated state to maintain security. This is a challenge, as the motivation for using ORAM is that the users may not have a way to directly communicate. A malicious server can potentially tamper with state information and thus break security. We answer the question of multi-user ORAM on malicious servers affirmatively by providing several new, efficient multi-user ORAM constructions. We first show how to make the original square-root solution by Goldreich and the hierarchical one by Goldreich and Ostrovsky multi-user secure. We accomplish this by separating the \\emph{critical} parts of the access, which depends on the state of the ORAM, from the non-critical parts that can be safely executed in any state. Our second and main contribution is a multi-user variant of Path ORAM. To enable secure meta-data update during evictions, we employ our first result, small multi-user secure classical ORAMs, as a building block. Depending on the block size, the overhead of our construction reaches a low $O(\\log n)$ communication complexity per user, similar to state-of-the-art single-user ORAMs.



13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Constructing Mixed-integer Programming Models whose Feasible Region is Exactly the Set of All Valid Differential Characteristics of SIMON, by Siwei Sun, Lei Hu, Meiqin Wang, Peng Wang, Kexin Qiao, Xia

  In IACR ePrint 2014/747, a method for constructing mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) models whose feasible regions are exactly the sets of all possible differential (or linear) characteristics for a wide range of block ciphers is presented. These models can be used to search for or enumerate differential and linear characteristics of a block cipher automatically. However, for the case of SIMON (a lightweight block cipher designed by the U.S. National Security Agency), the method proposed in IACR ePrint 2014/747 is not {\\it exact} anymore. That is, the feasible region of the MILP model constructed for SIMON contains invalid differential characteristics due to the dependent input bits of the AND operations, and these invalid characteristics must be filtered out by other methods. This is a very inconvenient process and reduces the level of automation of the framework of MILP-based automatic differential analysis. In this paper, by using quadratic constraints or constraints from the H-representation of a specific convex hull, we give a method for constructing mixed-integer (non)linear programming models whose feasible regions are exactly the sets of all valid differential characteristics for SIMON. The technique presented in this paper may be also useful for other ciphers. How to construct an MILP model whose feasible region is exactly the set of all linear characteristics of SIMON is still an open problem.



13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Identity-based encryption with (almost) tight security in the multi-instance, multi-ciphertext setting, by Dennis Hofheinz and Jessica Koch and Christoph Striecks

  We construct an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme that is tightly secure in a very strong sense. Specifically, we consider a setting with many instances of the scheme and many encryptions per instance. In this setting, we reduce the security of our scheme to a variant of a simple assumption used for a similar purpose by Chen and Wee (Crypto 2013). The security loss of our reduction is O(k) (where k is the security parameter). Our scheme is the first IBE scheme to achieve this strong flavor of tightness under a simple assumption.

Technically, our scheme is a variation of the IBE scheme by Chen and Wee. However, in order to \"lift\" their results to the multi-instance, multi-ciphertext case, we need to develop new ideas. In particular, while we build on (and extend) their high-level proof strategy, we deviate significantly in the low-level proof steps.



13:17 [Pub][ePrint] GliFreD: Glitch-Free Duplication - Towards Power-Equalized Circuits on FPGAs, by Alexander Wild and Amir Moradi and Tim Güneysu

  Designers of secure hardware are required to harden their implementations against physical threats, such as power analysis attacks. In particular, cryptographic hardware circuits are required to decorrelate their current consumption from the information inferred by processing (secret) data. A common technique to achieve this goal is the use of special logic styles that aim at equalizing the current consumption at each single processing step. However, since all hiding techniques like Dual-Rail Precharge (DRP) were originally developed for ASICs, the deployment of such countermeasures on FPGA devices with fixed and predefined logic structure poses a particular challenge.

In this work, we propose and practically evaluate a new DRP scheme (GliFreD) that has been exclusively designed for FPGA platforms. GliFreD overcomes the well-known early propagation issue, prevents glitches, uses an isolated dual-rail concept, and mitigates imbalanced routings. With all these features, GliFreD significantly exceeds the level of physical security achieved by any previously reported, related countermeasures for FPGAs.



13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Multilinear Pseudorandom Functions, by Aloni Cohen and Justin Holmgren

  We define the new notion of a multilinear pseudorandom function (PRF), and give a construction with a proof of security assuming the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. A direct application of our construction yields (non-multilinear) PRFs with aggregate security from the same assumption, resolving an open question of Cohen, Goldwasser, and Vaikuntanathan. Additionally, multilinear PRFs give a new way of viewing existing algebraic PRF constructions: our main theorem implies they too satisfy aggregate security.



13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Perfect Structure on the Edge of Chaos, by Nir Bitansky and Omer Paneth and Daniel Wichs

  We construct trapdoor permutations based on (sub-exponential) indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions, thereby providing the first candidate that is not based on the hardness of factoring.

Our construction shows that even highly structured primitives, such as trapdoor permutations, can be potentially based on hardness assumptions with noisy structures such as those used in candidate constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation. It also suggest a possible way to construct trapdoor permutations that resist quantum attacks, and that their hardness may be based on problems outside the complexity class SZK - indeed, while factoring-based candidates do not possess such security, future constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation might.

As a corollary, we eliminate the need to assume trapdoor permutations and injective one-way function in many recent constructions based on indistinguishability obfuscation.



13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Adaptive key recovery attacks on NTRU-based somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes, by Ricardo Dahab and Steven Galbraith and Eduardo Morais

  In this paper we present adaptive key recovery attacks on NTRU-based somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes. Among such schemes, we study the proposal by Bos et al [BLLN13] in 2013. Given access to a decryption oracle, the attack allows us to compute the private key for all parameter choices. Such attacks show that one must be very careful about the use of homomorphic encryption in practice. The existence of a key recovery attack means that the scheme is not CCA1-secure. Indeed, almost every somewhat homomorphic construction proposed till now in the literature is vulnerable to an attack of this type. Hence our result adds to a body of literature that shows that building CCA1-secure homomorphic schemes is not trivial.



13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Self-bilinear Map on Unknown Order Groups from Indistinguishability Obfuscation and Its Applications, by Takashi Yamakawa and Shota Yamada and Goichiro Hanaoka and Noboru Kunihiro

  A self-bilinear map is a bilinear map where the domain and target groups are identical. In this paper, we introduce a self-bilinear map with auxiliary information which is a weaker variant of a self-bilinear map, construct it based on indistinguishability obfuscation and prove that a useful hardness assumption holds with respect to our construction under the factoring assumption. From our construction, we obtain a multilinear map with interesting properties: the level of multilinearity is not bounded in the setup phase, and representations of group elements are compact, i.e., their size is independent of the level of multilinearity. This is the first construction of a multilinear map with these properties. Note, however, that to evaluate the multilinear map, auxiliary information is required. As applications of our multilinear map, we construct multiparty non-interactive key-exchange and distributed broadcast encryption schemes where the maximum number of users is not fixed in the setup phase. Besides direct applications of our self-bilinear map, we show that our technique can also be used for constructing somewhat homomorphic encryption based on indistinguishability obfuscation and the Phi-hiding assumption.



13:17 [Pub][ePrint] Block-wise Non-Malleable Codes, by Nishanth Chandran and Vipul Goyal and Pratyay Mukherjee and Omkant Pandey and Jalaj Upadhyay

  Non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (ICS \'10), provide the guarantee that if a codeword $c$ of a message $m$, is modified by a tampering function $f$ to $c\'$, then $c\'$ either decodes to $m$ or to ``something unrelated\" to $m$. It is known that non-malleable codes cannot exist for the class of all tampering functions and hence a lot of work has focused on explicitly constructing such codes against a large and natural class of tampering functions. One such popular, but restricted, class is the so-called \\emph{split-state} model in which the tampering function operates on different parts of the codeword \\emph{independently}.

In this work, we remove the above restriction by considering a stronger adversarial model that we call the {\\em block-wise tampering} model. In this model, the adversary can tamper every block of the codeword, with the only restriction being that he can tamper every block at most once. As an example, if a codeword $c = (c_1,c_2)$, then the first tampering function $f_1$ could produce a tampered part $c_1\'=f_1(c_1)$ and the second tampering function $f_2$ could produce $c_2\' = f_2(c_1,c_2)$ which can depend on {\\em both} $c_2$ and $c_1$. An example is when the blocks are being sent one by one and the adversary must temper and send the first block before the second block comes along.

- Surprisingly, defining non-malleability in the block-wise tampering model is challenging. Our first contribution is that of providing a relaxed, yet meaningful definition of non-malleability for this model. Unfortunately, we show, that even this notion is impossible to achieve in the information-theoretic setting (i.e., when the tampering functions can be unbounded) and we must turn our attention towards computationally bounded adversaries.

- Next, we provide an interesting connection between block-wise non-malleable codes and non-malleable commitments. We show that any block-wise non-malleable code can be converted into a non-malleable (wrt opening) commitment. In the other direction, we show that any non-interactive non-malleable (wrt opening) commitment can be used to construct a block-wise non-malleable code (with $2$ blocks).

- While the above transformation gives us a construction of a block-wise non-malleable code, it is based on the highly non-standard assumption of adaptive one-way functions (which can only be realized based on assumptions such as Oracle DDH). As our main result, we show, how to construct a block-wise non-malleable code from any sub-exponentially hard one-way permutations. Our techniques, quite surprisingly, also give rise to a non-malleable commitment scheme (secure against so-called synchronizing adversaries), in which {\\em only} the committer sends messages. We believe this result to be of independent interest.





2015-02-25
17:15 [Job][New] Full-time PhD or Postdoc positions in the area of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) Security , University of Mannheim, Germany

  The positions is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) in the project WSNSec (Wireless Sensor Network Security), being a collaboration with Universtiy of Erlangen-Nuremberg.

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This position ocuses on the theoretical aspects of WSNSec:

- Formalization of attacker models and security goals

- Cryptanalysis of existing cryptographic protocols

- Development of provably secure cryptographic protocols

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The candidate should have the following qualifications:

• Master degree (or an equivalent degree) in Mathematics, Computer Science or a related discipline

• Experience in cryptography

• Knowledge in the modeling and formal analysis of cryptographic protocols is helpful, but not required