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Applicants should have an expertise in one or more of the following research areas:
• Network Security, and network technologies and tools.
• Security of Critical infrastructure
• Malware analysis
The post-doc appointment is for one year and can be extended for up to three more years depending upon the availability of funding.
Applications will be considered until the available position is filled. To apply submit your CV via email to Dr. Natalia Stakhanova
The ideal candidate has experience in ITS security or vehicular networking, which is documented by high-quality publications, a Ph.D. degree in computer science or a closely related discipline from an internationally renowned university, and a strong motivation to become part of our team. Proficient knowledge of written and spoken English is required. Conversational German skills are an advantage.
middleware to protect databases deployed on semi-honest
cloud servers. While CryptDB provides sufficient protection
under Threat-1, here we demonstrate that when CryptDB is
deployed to secure the cloud hosted database of a realistic web
application, an attacker to database or a Malicious Database
Administrator (mDBA) can easily steal information, and even
escalate his privilege to become the administrator of the
web application. Our attacks, fall under a restricted form
of Threat-2 where we only assume that the attackers or the
mDBA tampers with the CryptDB protected database and is
opens an ordinary user account through the web application.
Our attacks, are carried out assuming perfectly secure proxy
and application servers. Therefore, the attacks work without
recovering the master key residing on the proxy server. At
the root of the attack lies the lack of any integrity checks
for the data in the CryptDB database. We propose a number
of practical countermeasures to mitigate attacks targeting the
integrity of the CryptDB database. We also demonstrate that
the data integrity is not sufficient to protect the databases,
when query integrity and frequency attacks are considered.
Our efficiency improvements result from a novel way to combine a recent technique of Lindell (Crypto 2013) with LEGO-based cut-and-choose techniques (TCC 2009, Eurocrypt 2013). In concrete terms, for 40-bit statistical security we obtain a 2x improvement (per execution) in communication and computation for as few as 7 executions, and require only 8 garbled circuits (i.e., a 5x improvement) per execution for as low as 3500 executions. Our results suggest the exciting possibility that secure two-party computation in the malicious setting can be less than an order of magnitude more expensive than in the semi-honest setting.
public keys, messages, and signatures are all collections of source group elements of
some bilinear groups. In this paper, we introduce fully structure-preserving signature
schemes, with the additional requirement that even secret keys should be group elements.
This new type of structure-preserving signatures allows for
efficient non-interactive proofs of knowledge of the secret key and is
useful in designing cryptographic protocols with strong security guarantees
based on the simulation paradigm where the simulator has to extract the
secret keys on-line.
To gain efficiency, we construct shrinking structure-preserving trapdoor
commitments. This is by itself an important primitive and of independent
interest as it appears to contradict a known impossibility result. We argue that a relaxed binding
property lets us circumvent the impossibility result while still retaining the
usefulness of the primitive in important applications as mentioned above.