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You will be mainly involved in a EU research project on cloud cryptography with tasks related to the design of cryptography for novel distributed information sharing systems.
Direct job posting: http://www.ait.ac.at/fileadmin/inserate/Scientist_for_Cryptography.pdf
Project homepage (avail. Feb. 2015): https://prismacloud.eu
AIT Safety&Security Department: http://www.ait.ac.at/departments/digital-safety-security
automated analysis techniques, which are mostly based on automated
theorem provers, are inadequate to deal with commonly used
cryptographic primitives, such as homomorphic encryption and mix-nets, as well as some fundamental security properties, such as
This work presents a novel approach based on refinement type systems
for the automated analysis of e-voting protocols. Specifically, we
design a generically applicable logical theory which, based on pre-
and post-conditions for security-critical code, captures and guides
the type-checker towards the verification of two fundamental
properties of e-voting protocols, namely, vote privacy and
verifiability. We further develop a code-based cryptographic
abstraction of the cryptographic primitives commonly used in
e-voting protocols, showing how to make the underlying algebraic
properties accessible to automated verification through logical
refinements. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our
approach by developing the first automated analysis of Helios, a
popular web-based e-voting protocol, using an off-the-shelf
the middle attack families.
belonging to an exponential-sized interval, or the sum of all function values on points for which a polynomial time predicate holds. We show how to use algebraic properties of underlying
classical pseudo random functions, to construct aggregatable pseudo random functions for a number of classes of aggregation queries under cryptographic hardness assumptions. On the flip side, we show that certain aggregate queries are impossible to support.
In the second part of this work, we show how various extensions of pseudo-random functions considered recently in the cryptographic literature, yield impossibility results for various extensions of machine learning models, continuing a line of investigation originated by Valiant and Kearns in the 1980s and 1990s. The extended pseudo-random functions we address include constrained pseudo random functions, aggregatable pseudo random functions, and pseudo random functions secure under related-key attacks.