International Association for Cryptologic Research

# IACR News Central

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2015-01-10
22:17 [Forum]

On behalf of the "Unpicking PLAID" research team, I would like to point out that our response to this report is available from: http://www.cryptoplexity.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/media/crypt/pdf/plaid-editorreport-response.pdf This response expresses our viewpoint on that report, rectifying some misrepresented facts and countering false allegations. In particular (but not limited to): 1) The author(s) of the report seem to consistently confuse the mere lack of known attacks with a proof of security. 2) They argue about a lack of a formal definition of privacy in our work and digress into musing about an Oxford dictionary definition of privacy. Our paper, however, allows the reader to easily infer what our attacks against the ISO standard achieve: tracing cards across executions, and identifying the supported key set of a card. None of these attacks should be possible according to PLAID\'s own claims of privacy. 3) They try to minimise the impact of our attacks, based on the availability of CPLC data, implying that CPLC data is anyway always available even in privacy-sensitive scenarios - which is incorrect. Furthermore, they completely ignore our fingerprinting attack on key sets, and focus only on the RSA fingerprinting attack. 4) They credit us for claims which we never made, and misrepresent the timeline and references in our paper. Finally, we wish to remark that the personal email correspondence with Professors Fischlin and Paterson, linked to in Annex A of the project editor\'s report, was published without their consent. We consider the situation to be self-explanatory, and encourage readers to draw their own conclusions. Sincerely, The "Unpicking PLAID" team. From: 2015-08-01 09:52:28 (UTC)

00:14 [Job][New]

• School of Computer Science and Software Engineering

• Full Time, Fixed Term (3 year) Appointment

• Level B

• Ref No: 25277

The School is one of leading computing schools in Australia. It conducts research in a number of thematic areas including Intelligent Systems, Software Engineering, Computer and Information Security, Visual Information Processing and Multimedia Content Management.

The School of Computer Science and Software Engineering is one of seven Schools with the Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences. It delivers a full range of quality courses, both onshore and offshore (Dubai, Singapore, Malaysia), ranging from undergraduate Bachelor’s degrees, through Coursework and Research Masters to PhD.

This position will teach and coordinate subjects in the School at undergraduate and postgraduate level; contribute to the research in information security and cryptography and supervise research students. You will work closely with the Head of School and other staff on the introduction, revision and maintenance of undergraduate and postgraduate subjects.

To apply for this position you will need to address the selection criteria as part of your application which is located within the position description below.

Apply online: http://uow.employment.com.au/jobs/Lecturer/1635

2015-01-08
11:48 [Event][New]

Submission: 4 April 2015
From September 23 to September 25
Location: Vienna, Austria

10:17 [Forum]

On behalf of the "Unpicking PLAID" research team, I would like to point out that our response to this report is available from: http://www.cryptoplexity.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/media/crypt/pdf/plaid-editorreport-response.pdf This response expresses our viewpoint on that report, rectifying some misrepresented facts and countering false allegations. In particular (but not limited to): 1) The author(s) of the report seem to consistently confuse the mere lack of known attacks with a proof of security. 2) They argue about a lack of a formal definition of privacy in our work and digress into musing about an Oxford dictionary definition of privacy. Our paper, however, allows the reader to easily infer what our attacks against the ISO standard achieve: tracing cards across executions, and identifying the supported key set of a card. None of these attacks should be possible according to PLAID\'s own claims of privacy. 3) They try to minimise the impact of our attacks, based on the availability of CPLC data, implying that CPLC data is anyway always available even in privacy-sensitive scenarios - which is incorrect. Furthermore, they completely ignore our fingerprinting attack on key sets, and focus only on the RSA fingerprinting attack. 4) They credit us for claims which we never made, and misrepresent the timeline and references in our paper. Finally, we wish to remark that the personal email correspondence with Professors Fischlin and Paterson, linked to in Annex A of the project editor\'s report, was published without their consent. We consider the situation to be self-explanatory, and encourage readers to draw their own conclusions. Sincerely, The "Unpicking PLAID" team. From: 2015-08-01 09:52:28 (UTC)

10:17 [Pub][ePrint]

Embedded microcontroller applications often experience multiple limiting constraints: memory, speed, and for a wide range of portable devices, power. Applications requiring encrypted data must simultaneously optimize the block cipher algorithm and implementation choice against these limitations. To this end we investigate block cipher implementations that are optimized for speed and energy efficiency, the primary metrics of devices such as the MSP430 where constrained memory resources nevertheless allow a range of implementation choices. The results set speed and energy efficiency records for the MSP430 device at 132 cycles/byte and 2.18 uJ/block for AES-128 and 103 cycles/byte and 1.44 uJ/block for equivalent block and key sizes using the lightweight block cipher SPECK. We provide a comprehensive analysis of size, speed, and energy consumption for 24 different variations of AES and 20 different variations of SPECK, to aid system designers of microcontroller platforms optimize the memory and energy usage of secure applications.

05:52 [Event][New]

Submission: 17 June 2015
From November 24 to November 26
Location: Kanazawa, Japan

2015-01-07
10:17 [Pub][ePrint]

Password Hashing, a technique commonly implemented by a server to protect passwords of clients, by performing a one-way transformation on the password, turning it into another string called the hashed password. In this paper, we introduce a secure password hashing framework Rig which is based on secure cryptographic hash functions. It provides the flexibility to choose different functions for different phases of the construction. The design of the scheme is very simple to implement in software and is flexible as the memory parameter is independent of time parameter (no actual time and memory trade-o) and is strictly sequential (difficult to parallelize) with comparatively huge memory consumption that provides strong resistance against attackers using multiple processing units. It supports client-independent updates, i.e., the server can increase the security parameters by updating the existing password hashes without knowing the password. Rig can also support the server relief protocol where the client bears the maximum effort to compute the password hash, while there is minimal effort at the server side. We analyze Rig and show that our proposal provides an exponential time complexity against the low-memory attack.

10:17 [Pub][ePrint]

We study simulation-based, selective opening security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (SIM-SO-CCA security) for public key encryption (PKE). In a selective opening, chosen-ciphertext attack (SO-CCA), an adversary has access to a decryption oracle, sees a vector of ciphertexts, adaptively chooses to open some of them, and obtains the corresponding plaintexts and random coins used in the creation of the ciphertexts. The SIM-SO-CCA notion captures the security of unopened ciphertexts with respect to probabilistic polynomial-time (ppt) SO-CCA adversaries in a semantic way: what a ppt SO-CCA adversary can compute can also be simulated by a ppt simulator with access only to the opened messages. Building on techniques used to achieve weak deniable encryption and non-committing encryption, Fehr \\emph{et al.} (Eurocrypt 2010) presented an approach to constructing SIM-SO-CCA secure PKE from extended hash proof systems (EHPSs), collision-resistant hash functions and an information-theoretic primitive called Cross Authentication Codes (XACs). We generalize their approach by introducing a special type of Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and using it to build SIM-SO-CCA secure PKE. We investigate what properties are needed from the KEM to achieve SIM-SO-CCA security. We also give three instantiations of our construction. The first uses hash proof systems, the second relies on the $\\nnn$-Linear assumption, and the third uses indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) in combination with extracting, puncturable Pseudo-Random Functions in a similar way to Sahai and Waters (STOC 2014). Our results establish the existence of SIM-SO-CCA secure PKE assuming only the existence of one-way functions and iO. This result further highlights the simplicity and power of iO in constructing different cryptographic primitives.

2015-01-06
13:17 [Pub][ePrint]

The onion routing (OR) network Tor provides anonymity to its users by routing their encrypted traffic through three proxies (or nodes). The key cryptographic challenge, here, is to establish symmetric session keys using a secure key exchange between the anonymous users and the selected nodes. The Tor network currently employs a one-way authenticated key exchange (1W-AKE) protocol \'ntor\' for this purpose. Nevertheless, ntor as well as other known 1W-AKE protocols rely solely on some classical Diffie-Hellman (DH) type assumptions for their (forward) security, and thus privacy of Today\'s anonymous communication could not be ensured once quantum computers arrive.

In this paper, we demonstrate utility of quantum-secure lattice-based cryptography towards solving this problem for onion routing. In particular, we present a novel hybrid 1W-AKE protocol (HybridOR) that is secure under the lattice-based ring learning with error (ring-LWE) assumption as well as the gap DH assumption. Due to its hybrid design, HybridOR is not only resilient against quantum attacks but also at the same time allows the OR nodes to use the current DH public keys and subsequently requires no modification to the the current Tor public key infrastructure. Moreover, thanks to the recent progress in lattice-based cryptography in the form of efficient ring-based constructions, our protocol is also computationally more efficient than the currently employed 1W-AKE protocol ntor, and it only introduces small and manageable communication overhead to the Tor protocol.

2015-01-05
19:17 [Pub][ePrint]

We present techniques to construct constant bandwidth, client storage and server storage blowup Oblivious RAM schemes in the (single-server) client-server setting.

Crucially, our constructions \\emph{do not rely on Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) or Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SWHE)}

but instead rely only on an public-key additive homomorphic encryption scheme such as the Paillier or Damg\\r{a}rd-Jurik Cryptosystem cryptosystem.

The key mechanism that we use to get constant bandwidth overhead is \\emph{layered encryption}: to perform an ORAM eviction operation, the server performs an oblivious permutation operation on the eviction candidate blocks \\emph{without sending any data blocks back to the client}.

After each permutation, each block that was involved in the permutation gets an additional layer of encryption.

Importantly, the bandwidth needed for this operation is independent of the data block size.

If layered encryption is combined with previous ORAM schemes na\\\"{i}vely, the number of layers grows unbounded (with the number of accesses made to the ORAM).

This blows up server storage and bandwidth (due to ciphertext blowup) as well as client computation (as the client must peel\'\' off all layers to get the underlying plaintext).

To address this challenge, we propose \\emph{Onion ORAM}, a new ORAM scheme that is designed and optimized to bound the number of encryption layers on each block to $\\tilde{O}(\\log N)$, where $N$ is the number of blocks in the ORAM---\\emph{i.e., independent of the number of ORAM accesses}.

Putting it together, with sufficiently large block size $B=\\Omega(k \\log^2 N \\log^2 \\log N)$~bits for a security parameter $k$, Onion ORAM achieves $O(B)$ bandwidth, $O(B)$ client storage and $O(BN)$ server storage--only a constant factor blowup in all the three metrics.

Using the Damg\\r{a}rd-Jurik cryptosystem as our underlying primitive, Onion ORAM achieves the aforementioned asymptotics for block sizes $B=\\Omega(\\log^5 N \\log^2 \\log N)$~bits and security against known attacks with complexity $O\\left(N^{\\omega(1)}\\right)$, superpolynomial in the security parameter.

19:17 [Pub][ePrint]

The most prevalent and probably also the most feasible approach to the latter is by username and password.

With password breaches through server compromise now reaching billions of affected passwords, distributing the password files and user data

over multiple servers is not just a good idea, it is a dearly needed solution to a topical problem.

Threshold password-authenticated secret sharing (TPASS) protocols enable users to share secret data among a set of servers so that they can later recover that data using a single password.

No coalition of servers up to a certain threshold can learn anything about the data or perform an offline dictionary attack on the password.

Several TPASS protocols have appeared in the literature and one is even available commercially.

Although designed to tolerate corrupted servers,

unfortunately none of these protocols provide details let alone security proofs about the steps that need to be taken when a compromise actually occurs

and how to proceed.

Indeed, they consider static corruptions only which for instance does not model real world attacks by hackers.

We provide the first TPASS protocol that is provably secure against adaptive server corruptions.

Moreover, our protocol contains an efficient recovery procedure allowing one to re-initialize servers to recover from corruption.

We prove our protocol secure in the universal composability model where servers can be corrupted adaptively at any time; the users\' passwords and secrets remain safe as long as both servers are not corrupted at the same time.

Our protocol does not require random oracles but does assume that servers have certified public keys.