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SCA are powerful and easy to mount but often need huge computation power, especially in the presence of countermeasures.
Few efforts have been done to reduce the computation complexity of SCA by selecting a small subset of points where leakage prevails.
In this paper, we propose a method to detect relevant leakage points in side-channel traces.
The method is based on Normalized Inter-Class Variance (NICV).
A key advantage of NICV over state-of-the-art is that NICV does neither need a clone device nor the knowledge of secret parameters of the crypto-system.
NICV has a low computation requirement and it detects leakage using public information like input plaintexts or output ciphertexts only.
It is shown that NICV can be related to Pearson correlation and signal to noise ratio (SNR) which are standard metrics.
NICV can be used to theoretically compute the minimum number of traces required to attack an implementation.
A theoretical rationale of NICV with some practical application on real crypto-systems are provided to support our claims.
Some of our signature schemes are also structure-preserving and can (using known techniques) be combined with Groth-Sahai proof methodology to yield tightly secure and efficient simulation-sound NIZK proofs of knowledge and CCA-secure encryption in the multi-user/-challenge setting under classical assumptions.
data. We start by proposing a novel sorting protocol that allows a user to outsource his data to a cloud server in an encrypted form and then request the server to perform computations on this data and sort the result. To perform the sorting the server is assisted by a secure coprocessor with minimal computational and memory resources. The server and the coprocessor are assumed to be honest but curious, i.e., they honestly follow the protocol but are interested in learning more about the user data. We refer to the new protocol as ``private outsourced sorting\'\' since it guarantees that neither the server
nor the coprocessor learn anything about user data as long as they are
non-colluding. We formally define private outsourced sorting and provide an efficient construction that is based on semi-homomorphic encryption.
As an application of our private sort, we present MSRE: the first scheme for outsourced search over encrypted data that efficiently answers multi-term queries with the result ranked using frequency of query terms in the data, while maintaining data privacy. To construct MSRE we use searchable encryption techniques combined with our new private sort framework. Finally, although not discussed in this work, we believe that our private sort framework can turn out to be an important tool for more applications that require outsourced sorting while maintaining data privacy, e.g., database queries.
According to our analysis, some tweaks introduced by BLAKE2 have increased its resistance against boomerang attacks to a certain extent.
But on the whole, BLAKE still has higher a secure margin than BLAKE2.
reward Tor relay operators. Tor clients do not pay Tor relays with
electronic cash directly but submit proof of work shares which the
relays can resubmit to a crypto-currency mining pool. Relays credit
users who submit shares with
tickets that can later be used to purchase improved service. Both shares
and tickets when sent over Tor circuits are anonymous. The analysis of
the crypto-currencies market prices shows that the proposed scheme can
compensate significant part of Tor relay operator\'s expenses.