*15:17* [Pub][ePrint]
Fast Evaluation of Polynomials over Binary Finite Fields and Application to Side-channel Countermeasures, by Jean-Sebastien Coron and Arnab Roy and Srinivas Vivek
We describe a new technique for evaluating polynomials over binary finite fields. This is useful in the context of anti-DPA countermeasures when an S-box is expressed as a polynomial over a binary finite field. For $n$-bit S-boxes our new technique has heuristic complexity ${\\cal O}(2^{n/2}/\\sqrt{n})$ instead of ${\\cal O}(2^{n/2})$ proven complexity for the Parity-Split method. We also prove a lower bound of ${\\Omega}(2^{n/2}/\\sqrt{n})$ on the complexity of any method to evaluate $n$-bit S-boxes; this shows that our method is asymptotically optimal. Here, complexity refers to the number of non-linear multiplications required to evaluate the polynomial corresponding to an S-box.In practice we can evaluate any $8$-bit S-box in $10$ non-linear multiplications instead of $16$ in the Roy-Vivek paper from CHES 2013, and the DES S-boxes in $4$ non-linear multiplications instead of $7$. We also evaluate any $4$-bit S-box in $2$ non-linear multiplications instead of $3$. Hence our method achieves optimal complexity for the PRESENT S-box.

*15:17* [Pub][ePrint]
Conversion from Arithmetic to Boolean Masking with Logarithmic Complexity, by Jean-Sebastien Coron and Johann Groszschaedl and Praveen Kumar Vadnala and Mehdi Tibouchi
A general method to protect a cryptographic algorithm against side-channel attacks consists in masking all intermediate variables with a random value. For cryptographic algorithms combining Boolean operations with arithmetic operations, one must then perform conversions between Boolean masking and arithmetic masking. At CHES 2001, Goubin described a very elegant algorithm for converting from Boolean masking to arithmetic masking, with only a constant number of operations. Goubin also described an algorithm for converting from arithmetic to Boolean masking, but with O(k) operations where k is the addition bit size. In this paper we describe an improved algorithm with time complexity O(log k) only. Our new algorithm is based on the Kogge-Stone carry look-ahead adder, which computes the carry signal in O(log k) instead of O(k) for the classical ripple carry adder. We also describe an algorithm for performing arithmetic addition modulo 2^k directly on Boolean shares, with the same complexity O(log k) instead of O(k). We prove the security of ournew algorithms against first-order attacks.

*15:17* [Pub][ePrint]
Advanced Algebraic Attack on Trivium, by Frank Quedenfeld and Christopher Wolf
This paper presents an algebraic attack against Triviumthat breaks 625 rounds using only $4096$ bits of output

in an overall time complexity of $2^{42.2}$ Trivium computations.

While other attacks can do better in terms of rounds ($799$), this is a practical attack with a very low data usage (down from $2^{40}$ output bits) and low computation time (down from $2^{62}$).

From another angle, our attack can be seen as a proof of concept,

how far algebraic attacks can be pushed when several known

techniques are combined into one implementation.

All attacks have been fully implemented and tested; our figures

are therefore not the result of any potentially error-prone extrapolation.

*15:17* [Pub][ePrint]
THE UBERCRYPT FRAMEWORK: A NEW APPROACH IN CRYPTOSYSTEMS, by Joe Chiarella and Greg Mosher and Dr. J. Robert Buchanan
This article describes a novel and unique cryptosystem making use of a small set of private security parameters and public initialization values to produce a pseudorandom byte stream with large period. The byte stream can be used as a one-time stream cipher for securing communication between parties and for data archival. The cryptosystem makes use of geometry and number theory to generate a set of large prime integers and then from the primes a column-periodic matrix of bytes from which further calculation produces a pseudorandom, long period byte stream. The cryptosystem is extensible

in that additional private user-supplied security parameters can supplement the private geometric security parameters while adding strength in the process. The article discusses the design and operation of the system and lists many potential questions of interest to the community of mathematical and cryptological researchers. Foremost among these questions are determining the most appropriate method for assessing the cryptographic strength of the algorithm and determining any weaknesses in the security of the algorithm.

*15:17* [Pub][ePrint]
Analysis of ARX Functions: Pseudo-linear Methods for Approximation, Differentials, and Evaluating Diffusion, by Kerry A. McKay and Poorvi L. Vora
This paper explores the approximation of addition mod $2^n$ by addition mod $2^w$, where $1 \\le w \\le n$, in ARX functions that use large words (e.g., 32-bit words or 64-bit words).Three main areas are explored.

First, \\emph{pseudo-linear approximations} aim to approximate the bits of a $w$-bit window of the state after some rounds.

Second, the methods used in these approximations are also used to construct truncated differentials.

Third, branch number metrics for diffusion are examined for ARX functions with large words, and variants of the differential and linear branch number characteristics based on pseudo-linear methods are introduced.

These variants are called \\emph{effective differential branch number} and \\emph{effective linear branch number}, respectively.

Applications of these approximation, differential, and diffusion evaluation techniques are demonstrated on Threefish-256 and Threefish-512.

*15:17* [Pub][ePrint]
Efficiently Making Secure Two-Party Computation Fair, by Handan Kılınç and Alptekin Küpçü
Secure two-party computation cannot be fair in general against malicious adversaries, unless a trusted third party (TTP) is involved, or gradual-release type of costly protocols with super-constant rounds are employed. Existing optimistic fair two-party computation protocols with constant rounds are either too costly to arbitrate (e.g., the TTP may need to re-do almost the whole computation), or require the use of electronic payments. Furthermore, most of the existing solutions were proven secure and fair separately, which, we show, may lead to insecurity overall.We propose a new framework for fair and secure two-party computation that can be applied on top of any secure two party computation protocol based on Yao\'s garbled circuits. We show that our fairness overhead is minimal, compared to all known existing work. Furthermore, our protocol is fair even in terms of the work performed by Alice and Bob. We also prove our protocol is fair and secure simultaneously, through one simulator, which guarantees that our fairness extensions do not leak any private information. Lastly, we ensure that the TTP never learns the inputs or outputs of the computation. Therefore even if the TTP becomes malicious and causes unfairness, the security of the underlying protocol is still preserved.

*15:17* [Pub][ePrint]
Leveled Fully Homomorphic Signatures from Standard Lattices, by Sergey Gorbunov and Vinod Vaikuntanathan and Daniel Wichs
In a homomorphic signature scheme, a user Alice signs some large dataset $x$ using her secret signing key and uploads the signed data to an untrusted remote server. The server can then run some computation $y=f(x)$ over the signed data and homomorphically derive a short signature $\\sigma_{f,y}$ certifying that $y$ is the correct output of the computation $f$. Anybody can verify the tuple $(f, y, \\sigma_{f,y})$ using Alice\'s public verification key and become convinced of this fact without having to retrieve the entire underlying data.In this work, we construct the first (leveled) fully homomorphic signature schemes that can evaluate arbitrary circuits over signed data. Only the maximal depth $d$ of the circuits needs to be fixed a-priori at setup, and the size of the evaluated signature grows polynomially in $d$, but is otherwise independent of the circuit size or the data size. Our solution is based on the (sub-exponential) hardness of the small integer solution (SIS) problem in standard lattices and satisfies full (adaptive) security. In the standard model, we get a scheme with large public parameters whose size exceeds the total size of a data-set. In the random-oracle model, we get a scheme with short public parameters. In both cases, the schemes can be used to sign many different data-sets. The complexity of verifying a signature for a computation $f$ is at least as large as that of computing $f$, but can be amortized when verifying the same computation over many different data-sets. Furthermore, the signatures can be made context-hiding so as not to reveal anything about the data beyond the outcome of the computation.

These results offer a significant improvement in capabilities and assumptions over the best prior homomorphic signature schemes, which were limited to evaluating polynomials of constant degree.

As a building block of independent interest, we introduce a new notion called homomorphic trapdoor functions (HTDF) which conceptually unites homomorphic encryption and signatures. We construct HTDFs by relying on the techniques developed by Gentry et al. (CRYPTO \'13) and Boneh et al. (EUROCRYPT \'14) in the contexts of fully homomorphic and attribute-based encryptions.

*15:17* [Pub][ePrint]
A key recovery attack to the scale-invariant NTRU-based somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, by Eduardo Morais and Ricardo Dahab
In this paper we present a key recovery attack to the scale-invariant NTRU-based somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Bos et al~\\cite{NTRUbasedFHE} in 2013. The attack allows us to compute the private key for $t>2$ and when the private key is chosen with coefficients in $\\{-1,0,1\\}$. The efficiency of the attack is optimal since it requires just one decryption oracle query, showing that if we don\'t look for this kind of vulnerabilities in homomorphic encryption constructions we are likely to choose insecure parameters. The existence of a key recovery attack means that the scheme is not CCA1-secure. Indeed, almost every somewhat homomorphic construction proposed till now in the literature is vulnerable to this kind of attack, hence our result indicates that building CCA1-secure homomorphic schemes is not trivial.We also provide tables showing how the multiplicative depth is affected when the critical parameter $\\Bkey$ is chosen in order to mitigatte the attack.

*15:17* [Pub][ePrint]
Side Channel Power Analysis of an AES-256 Bootloader, by Colin O\'Flynn and Zhizhang Chen
Side Channel Attacks (SCA) using power measurements are a known method of breaking cryptographic algorithms such as AES. Published research into attacks on AES frequently target only AES-128, and often target only the core Electronic Code-Book (ECB) version, without discussing surrounding issues such as triggering, along with breaking the initialization vector.This paper demonstrates a complete attack on a secure bootloader, where the firmware files have been encrypted with AES-256-CBC. A Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack is performed on AES-256 to recover the complete 32-byte key, and a CPA attack is also used to attempt recovery of the initialization vector (IV).

The attack on the IV demonstrates a CPA attack against a single XOR operation, which has relevance to cryptographic functions beyond AES.