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21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Pseudonymous Secure Computation from Time-Lock Puzzles, by Jonathan Katz and Andrew Miller and Elaine Shi

  In standard models of secure computation, point-to-point channels between parties are as-

sumed to be authenticated by some pre-existing means. In other cases, even stronger pre-existing

setup--e.g., a public-key infrastructure (PKI)--is assumed. These assumptions are too strong

for open, peer-to-peer networks, where parties do not necessarily have any prior relationships

and can come and go as they please. Nevertheless, these assumptions are made due to the

prevailing belief that nothing \"interesting\" can be achieved without them.

Taking inspiration from Bitcoin, we show that precise bounds on computational power can

be used in place of pre-existing setup to achieve weaker (but nontrivial) notions of security.

Specifically, under the assumptions that digital signatures exist and each party can solve cryp-

tographic \"time-lock\" puzzles only at a bounded rate, we show that without prior setup and

with no bound on the number of corruptions, a group of parties can agree on a PKI with which

they can then realize pseudonymous notions of authenticated communication, broadcast, and

secure computation. Roughly, \"pseudonymous\" here means that inputs/outputs are (effectively)

bound to pseudonyms rather than parties\' true identities.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Adaptively Secure, Universally Composable, Multi-Party Computation in Constant Rounds, by Dana Dachman-Soled and Jonathan Katz and Vanishree Rao

  Cryptographic protocols with adaptive security ensure that security holds against an adversary who can dynamically determine which parties to corrupt as the protocol progresses---or even after the protocol is finished. In the setting where all parties may potentially be corrupted, and secure erasure is not assumed, it has been a long-standing open question to design secure-computation protocols with adaptive security running in constant rounds.

Here, we show a constant-round, universally composable protocol for computing any functionality, tolerating a malicious, adaptive adversary corrupting any number of parties. Interestingly, our protocol can compute all functionalities, not just adaptively well-formed ones.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Provably secure pairing-free identity-based partially blind signature scheme and its application in online e-cash system, by SK Hafizul Islam, G. P. Biswas

  The blind signature scheme permits the user to acquire a signature

from the signer; however, the message and the final signature are

unknown to the signer. In a partially blind signature (PBS) scheme,

the signer can explicitly incorporate a common information in the

signature based on some agreement with the user and without

violating the blindness property. Many PBS schemes have been

proposed recently either by using certificate authority-based public

infrastructure (CA-PKI) or pairing along with map-to-point function.

The CA-PKI-based PBS scheme needs huge computation and storage to

keep public keys and certificates. On the other hand, pairing and

map-to-point function are costly operations. Thus, the ID-PBS scheme

without pairing is more appropriate for real environments, and an

efficient pairing-free ID-PBS scheme is proposed in this paper. In

the random oracle model, our scheme is analyzed to be provably

secure. The proposed scheme is used to design an online e-cash

system, in which a bank agrees on a common piece of information with

a customer and can blindly sign some messages. It may be noted that

our e-cash system has the properties of unforgeability,

unlinkability, and non-deniability and can prevent the

double-spending of e-cash.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Differential Factors: Improved Attacks on SERPENT, by Cihangir Tezcan and Ferruh Özbudak

  A differential attack tries to capture the round keys corresponding to the S-boxes activated by a differential. In this work, we show that for a fixed output difference of an S-box, it may not be possible to distinguish the guessed keys that have a specific difference. We introduce these differences as differential factors. Existence of differential factors can reduce the time complexity of differential attacks and as an example we show that the 10, 11, and 12-round differential-linear attacks of Dunkelman et al. on SERPENT can actually be performed with time complexities reduced by a factor of 4, 4, and 8, respectively.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Cats and Dogs An Integrity for Voting Systems Based on Paper Ballots, by İhsan Haluk Akın

  Abstract--Voting systems based on paper ballots has a long

history with various problems. Vote-selling and correct outcome

are two major problems among many. In this work, we propose

a new solution to these problems by using UltraViolet (UV)

fiber paper Physical Unclonable Function (PUF). When applied

this solution not only prevents vote-selling but also ensures the

correctness of the outcome. With these two problems eliminated,

the voting systems based on paper ballots will have complete


21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Low-Latency ECDSA Signature Verification - A Road Towards Safer Traffic -, by Miroslav Knezevic, Ventzislav Nikov, and Peter Rombouts

  Car-to-car and Car-to-Infrastructure messages exchanged in Intelligent Transportation Systems can reach reception rates up to and over 1000 messages per second. As these messages contain ECDSA signatures this puts a very heavy load onto the verification hardware. In fact the load is so high that currently it can only be achieved by implementations running on high end CPUs and FPGAs. These implementations are far from cost-effective nor energy efficient. In this paper we present an ASIC implementation of a dedicated ECDSA verification engine that can reach verification rates of up to 27.000 verifications per second using only 1.034 kGE.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] A Unified Approach to Idealized Model Separations via Indistinguishability Obfuscation, by Matthew D. Green and Jonathan Katz and Alex J. Malozemoff and Hong-Sheng Zhou

  It is well known that the random oracle model is not sound in the sense that there exist cryptographic systems that are secure in the random oracle model but when instantiated by any family of hash functions become insecure. However, all known separation results require the attacker to send an appropriately crafted message to the challenger in order to break security. Thus, this leaves open the possibility that some cryptographic schemes, such as bit-encryption, are still sound in the random oracle model.

In this work we refute this possibility, assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation. We do so in the following way. First, we present a random oracle separation for bit-encryption; namely, we show that there exists a bit-encryption protocol secure in the random oracle model but \\emph{completely insecure} when the random oracle is instantiated by any concrete function. Second, we show how to adapt this separation to work for most natural simulation-based and game-based definitions. Our techniques can easily be adapted to other idealized models, and thus we present a \\emph{unified approach} to showing separations for most protocols of interest in most idealized models.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] How to Choose Interesting Points for Template Attack More Effectively?, by Guangjun Fan, Yongbin Zhou, Hailong Zhang, Dengguo Feng

  Template Attacks are widely accepted to be the most powerful side-channel attacks from an information theoretic point of view. For Template Attacks to be practical, one needs to choose some special samples as the interesting points in actual power traces. Up to now, many different approaches were introduced for choosing interesting points for Template Attacks. However, it is unknown that whether or not the pervious approaches of choosing interesting points will lead to the best classification performance of Template Attacks. In this work, we give a negative answer to this important question by introducing a practical new approach which has completely different basic principle compared with all the pervious approaches. Our new approach chooses the point whose distribution of samples approximates to a normal distribution as the interesting point. Evaluation results exhibit that Template Attacks based on the interesting points chosen by our new approach can achieve obvious better classification performance compared with Template Attacks based on the interesting points chosen by the pervious approaches. Therefore, our new approach of choosing interesting points should be used in practice to better understand the practical threats of Template Attacks.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Impossibility Results for Leakage-Resilient Zero Knowledge and Multi-Party Computation, by Rafail Ostrovsky and Giuseppe Persiano and Ivan Visconti

  In [AGP14] Ananth et al. showed that continual leakage-resilient non-transferable interactive proofs exist when a leak-free input-encoding phase is allowed and a common reference string is available. They left open the problem of removing the need of a common reference string.

In [BGJK12] Boyle et al. showed that for some interesting functionalities continual leakage-resilient secure computation is possible when leak-free interactive preprocessing and input-encoding phases are allowed. They left open the problem of removing the interactive preprocessing.

In this work we study the above questions. Our main contribution shows that leakage-resilient black-box zero-knowledge is impossible when relying on a leak free input-encoding phase only (i.e., without CRS/preprocessing). Additionally, we also show that leakage-resilient multi-party computation for all functionalities is impossible (regardless of the number of players assuming just one corrupted player) when relying only on a leak-free input-encoding phase (i.e., without CRS/preprocessing).

Our results are achieved by means of a new technique to prove lower bounds for leakage-resilient security. We use leakage queries to run an execution of a communication-efficient insecure (i.e., non-simulatable) protocol in the head of the adversary. Moreover our work shows an interesting connection between leakage resilience and security against reset attacks.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Self-Destruct Non-Malleability, by Sandro Coretti and Yevgeniy Dodis and Bj\\\"orn Tackmann and Daniele Venturi

  We introduce a new security notion for public-key encryption (PKE) that we dub non-malleability under (chosen-ciphertext) self-destruct attacks (NM-SDA), which appears to be the strongest natural PKE security notion below full-blown chosen-ciphertext (IND-CCA) security. In this notion, the adversary is allowed to ask many adaptive ``parallel\'\' decryption queries (i.e., a query consists of many ciphertexts) up to the point when the first invalid ciphertext is submitted. As such, NM-SDA security generalizes non-malleability against chosen plaintext attacks (NM-CPA, where only one parallel decryption query is allowed) and recently introduced indistinguishability against (chosen-ciphertext) self-destruct attacks (IND-SDA, where each adaptive query consists of a single ciphertext). After showing that NM-SDA is a {\\em strict} strengthening of NM-CPA and IND-SDA and allows for more applications, we establish the following two results:

Domain Extension: For any $K > 1$, there is a black-box construction of a $K$-bit NM-SDA PKE scheme from a single-bit NM-SDA PKE scheme. Moreover, this can be done using only $O(\\lambda)$ calls to the underlying single-bit NM-SDA scheme, where $\\lambda$ is the security parameter. To achieve our goal, we define and construct a novel type of continuous non-malleable code (NMC), called secret-state NMC, as we show that standard continuous NMCs are not enough for the natural ``expand-then-encrypt-bit-by-bit\'\' approach to work.

Black-Box Construction from IND-CPA: Prior work showed that NM-CPA secure PKE can be constructed from any IND-CPA secure PKE in a black-box way. Here we show that the same construction actually achieves our strictly stronger notion of NM-SDA security. (This requires a non-trivial extension of the original security proof to handle multiple parallel decryption queries.) Hence, the notions of IND-CPA, NM-CPA, IND-SDA and NM-SDA security are all equivalent, lying (plausibly, strictly?) below IND-CCA security. We also show how to improve the rate of the resulting NM-SDA scheme from quadratic to linear.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Random Oracle Uninstantiability from Indistinguishability Obfuscation, by Christina Brzuska and Pooya Farshim and Arno Mittelbach

  Assuming the existence of an indistinguishability obfuscator (iO), we show that a number of prominent constructions in the random-oracle model are uninstantiable in the standard model. We first show that the Encrypt-with-Hash (EwH) transform of Bellare, Boldyreva, and O\'Neill (CRYPTO 2007) for converting randomized public-key encryption (PKE) to deterministic PKE is not instantiable in the standard model. The techniques that we use to establish this result are flexible and lend themselves easily to other transformations. These include the classical Fujisaki-Okamoto transform (CRYPTO 1998) for converting CPA to CCA security, a transformation akin to that by Bellare and Keelveedhi (CRYPTO 2011) for obtaining key-dependent security, as well as the convergent encryption transform for obtaining messaged-locked encryption by Bellare, Keelveedhi, and Ristenpart (EUROCRYPT 2013). Our techniques build on the recent work of Brzuska, Farshim, and Mittelbach (CRYPTO 2014) and rely on the existence of iO for Turing machines or circuits to derive two flavors of uninstantiability. Our results call for a re-assessment of scheme design in the random-oracle model and point out the need for new transforms which do not suffer from our attacks.