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This paper initiates the study of the practical efficiency of multiprover interactive proofs (MIPs). We present a new MIP for delegating computation that extends insights from a powerful IP protocol (Goldwasser et al., STOC, 2008). Without reductions or amplification, our protocol uses only two provers (departing from prior work on MIPs), and achieves both the efficiency of interactive proof-based protocols and the generality of argument system-based protocols. Also, this result, together with recently developed machinery, creates a potential avenue toward concretely efficient arguments without setup costs.
We describe Clover, a built system for verifiable computation, based on our protocol. Although Clover does not implement the full theory (it has setup costs), it applies to problems that existing IPs cannot efficiently handle, and achieves performance comparable to, or better than, the best argument systems.
In this work, using indistinguishability obfuscation, we construct a UC-secure two-round adaptively secure multiparty computation protocol.
A Byzantine version of the protocol, obtained by applying the Canetti et al. [STOC 02] compiler, achieves UC security with comparable efficiency parameters, but is no longer incoercible.
Applications are invited for a post-doctoral researcher position (Drone System Security). The selected applicant will be supported in making a submission to the Irish Research Council for a Post-Doctoral Fellowship award. Recipients of this award receive funding of approximately Euro31,000 per annum for two years. The offer is conditional on obtaining this award from the Irish Research Council. The position is open to applicants of any nationality or residency.
The project will consider system security issues in Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (UAV). The research will focus on platform vulnerabilities and the development of new security mechanisms.
Applicants should have a PhD in Computer Science or a closely related discipline with research interests in computer security, preferably at systems and/or networking level. Candidates are expected to have a high-quality publication record in the related field. Experience with embedded systems development will be an advantage.
The deadline for submitting an application to the Irish Research Council is November 27, 2014, with the successful applicant starting work at UCC in October 2015. Interested candidates should submit a Curriculum Vitae and the name of two referees to Dr. Simon Foley (s.foley (at) cs.ucc.ie) and Dr. Jonathan Petit (j.petit (at) cs.ucc.ie), not later than November 1, 2014.
We construct the first implementable encryption system supporting greater-than comparisons on encrypted data that provides the \"best-possible\" semantic security. In our scheme there is a public algorithm that given two ciphertexts as input, reveals the order of the corresponding plaintexts and nothing else. Our constructions are inspired by obfuscation techniques, but do not use obfuscation. For example, to compare two 16-bit encrypted values (e.g., salaries or age) we only need a 9-way multilinear map. More generally, comparing $k$-bit values requires only a $(k/2+1)$-way multilinear map. The required degree of multilinearity can be further reduced, but at the cost of increasing ciphertext size.
Beyond comparisons, our results give an implementable secret-key multi-input functional encryption scheme for functionalities that can be expressed as (generalized) branching programs of polynomial length and width. Comparisons are a special case of this class, where for $k$-bit inputs the branching program is of length $k+1$ and width $4$.
The notion of HILL Entropy appeared in the breakthrough construction of a PRG from any one-way function, and has become the most important and most widely used definition of computational entropy. In turn, Metric Entropy which is defined as a relaxation of HILL Entropy, has been proven to be much easier to handle, in particular in the context of computational generalizations of the Dense Model Theorem.
Fortunately, Metric Entropy can be converted, with some loss in quality, to HILL Entropy as shown by Barak, Shaltiel and Wigderson.
In this paper we improve their result, slightly reducing the loss in quality of entropy. Interestingly, our bound is independent of size of the probability space in comparison to the result of Barak et al. Our approach is based on the theory of convex approximation in $L^p$-spaces.
In this paper we improve the security analysis of this TRNG. Essentially, we significantly reduce the entropy loss and running time needed to obtain a required level of security and robustness.
Our approach is based on replacing the combination of union bounds and tail inequalities for $\\ell$-wise independent random variables in the original proof, by a more refined of the deviation of the probability that a randomly chosen item is hashed into a particular location.