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00:17 [Pub][ePrint] Orthogonal Direct Sum Masking: A Smartcard Friendly Computation Paradigm in a Code, with Builtin Protection against Side-Channel and Fault Attacks, by Julien Bringer and Claude Carlet and Hervé Chaba

  Secure elements, such as smartcards or trusted platform modules (TPMs), must be protected against implementation-level attacks.

Those include side-channel and fault injection attacks.

We introduce ODSM, Orthogonal Direct Sum Masking, a new computation paradigm that achieves protection against those two kinds of attacks.

A large vector space is structured as two supplementary orthogonal subspaces.

One subspace (called a code $\\mathcal{C}$) is used for the functional computation,

while the second subspace carries random numbers.

As the random numbers are entangled with the sensitive data, ODSM ensures a protection against (monovariate) side-channel attacks.

The random numbers can be checked either occasionally, or globally, thereby ensuring a fine or coarse detection capability.

The security level can be formally detailed:

it is proved that monovariate side-channel attacks of order up to $d_\\mathcal{C}-1$, where $d_\\mathcal{C}$ is the minimal distance of $\\mathcal{C}$, are impossible,

and that any fault of Hamming weight strictly less than $d_\\mathcal{C}$ is detected.

A complete instantiation of ODSM is given for AES.

In this case, all monovariate side-channel attacks of order strictly less than $5$ are impossible,

and all fault injections perturbing strictly less than $5$ bits are detected.

00:17 [Pub][ePrint] Fully Secure Functional Encryption without Obfuscation, by Sanjam Garg and Craig Gentry and Shai Halevi and Mark Zhandry

  Previously known functional encryption (FE) schemes for general circuits relied on indistinguishability obfuscation, which in turn either relies on an exponential number of assumptions (basically, one per circuit), or a polynomial set of assumptions, but with an exponential loss in the security reduction. Additionally these schemes are proved in an unrealistic selective security model, where the adversary is forced to specify its target before seeing the public parameters. For these constructions, full security can be obtained but at the cost of an exponential loss in the security reduction.

In this work, we overcome the above limitations and realize a fully secure functional encryption scheme without using indistinguishability obfuscation. Specifically the security of our scheme relies only on the polynomial hardness of simple assumptions on multilinear maps.

00:17 [Pub][ePrint] Cut-and-Choose Based Two-Party Computation in the Online/Offline and Batch Settings, by Yehuda Lindell and Ben Riva

  Protocols for secure two-party computation enable a pair of mistrusting parties to compute a joint function of their private inputs without revealing anything but the output. One of the fundamental techniques for obtaining secure computation is that of Yao\'s garbled circuits. In the setting of malicious adversaries, where the corrupted party can follow any arbitrary (polynomial-time) strategy in an attempt to breach security, the cut-and-choose technique is used to ensure that the garbled circuit is constructed correctly. The cost of this technique is the construction and transmission of multiple circuits; specifically, $s$ garbled circuits are used in order to obtain a maximum cheating probability of $2^{-s}$.

In this paper, we show how to reduce the amortized cost of cut-and-choose based secure two-party computation to ${\\cal O}\\(\\frac{s}{\\log N}\\)$ garbled circuits when $N$ secure computations are run. We use this method to construct a secure protocol in the batch setting. Next, we show how the cut-and-choose method on garbled circuits can be used in an online/offline setting in order to obtain a very fast online phase with very few exponentiations, and we apply our amortization method to this setting as well. Our online/offline protocols are competitive with the TinyOT and SPDZ protocols due to the minimal interaction in the online phase (previous protocols require only information-theoretic operations in the online phase and are therefore very efficient; however, they also require many rounds of communication which increases latency). Although ${\\cal O}(\\frac{s}{\\log N})$ may seem to be a mild efficiency improvement asymptotically, it is a \\emph{dramatic improvement} for concrete parameters since $s$ is a statistical security parameter and so is typically small. Specifically, instead of $40$ circuits to obtain an error of $2^{-40}$, when running $2^{10}$ executions we need only $7.06$ circuits on average per secure computation, and when running $2^{20}$ executions this is reduced to an average of just $4.08$. In addition, in the online/offline setting, the online phase per secure computation consists of evaluating only $6$ garbled circuits for $2^{10}$ executions and $4$ garbled circuits for $2^{20}$ executions (plus some small additional overhead). In practice, when using fast implementations (like the JustGarble framework of Bellare et al.), the resulting protocol is remarkably fast.

We present a number of variants of our protocols with different assumptions and efficiency levels. Our basic protocols rely on the DDH assumption alone, while our most efficient variants are proven secure in the random-oracle model. Interestingly, the variant in the random-oracle model of our protocol for the online/offline setting has online communication that is independent of the size of the circuit in use. None of the previous protocols in the online/offline setting achieves this property, which is very significant since communication is usually a dominant cost in practice.

00:17 [Pub][ePrint] Fairness Versus Guaranteed Output Delivery in Secure Multiparty Computation, by Ran Cohen and Yehuda Lindell

  In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of parties wish to compute a joint function of their private inputs. The computation should preserve security properties such as privacy, correctness, independence of inputs, fairness and guaranteed output delivery. In the case of no honest majority, fairness and guaranteed output delivery cannot always be obtained. Thus, protocols for secure multiparty computation are typically of two disparate types: protocols that assume an honest majority (and achieve all properties \\emph{including} fairness and guaranteed output delivery), and protocols that do not assume an honest majority (and achieve all properties \\emph{except for} fairness and guaranteed output delivery). In addition, in the two-party case, fairness and guaranteed output delivery are equivalent. As a result, the properties of fairness (which means that if corrupted parties receive output then so do the honest parties) and guaranteed output delivery (which means that corrupted parties cannot prevent the honest parties from receiving output in any case) have typically been considered to be the same.

In this paper, we initiate a study of the relation between fairness and guaranteed output delivery in secure multiparty computation. We show that in the multiparty setting these properties are distinct and proceed to study under what conditions fairness implies guaranteed output delivery (the opposite direction always holds). We also show the existence of non-trivial functions for which complete fairness is achievable (without an honest majority) but guaranteed output delivery is not, and the existence of non-trivial functions for which complete fairness and guaranteed output delivery are achievable. Our study sheds light on the role of broadcast in fairness and guaranteed output delivery, and shows that these properties should sometimes be considered separately.

00:17 [Pub][ePrint] On the Communication Complexity of Secure Function Evaluation with Long Output, by Pavel Hubacek and Daniel Wichs

  We study the communication complexity of secure function evaluation (SFE). Consider a setting where Alice has a short input $x_A$, Bob has an input $x_B$ and we want Bob to learn some function $y = f(x_A, x_B)$ with large output size. For example, Alice has a small secret decryption key, Bob has a large encrypted database and we want Bob to learn the decrypted data without learning anything else about Alice\'s key. In a trivial insecure protocol, Alice can just send her short input $x_A$ to Bob. However, all known SFE protocols have communication complexity that scales with size of the output $y$, which can potentially be much larger. Is such ``output-size dependence\'\' inherent in SFE?

Surprisingly, we show that output-size dependence can be avoided in the \\emph{honest-but-curious} setting. In particular, using indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), we construct the first honest-but-curious SFE protocol whose communication complexity only scales with that of the best insecure protocol for evaluating the desired function, independent of the output size. Our construction relies on a novel way of using iO via a new tool that we call a ``somewhere statistically binding (SSB) hash\'\', and which may be of independent interest.

On the negative side, we show that output-size dependence is inherent in the \\emph{fully malicious} setting, or even already in an \\emph{honest-but-deterministic} setting, where the corrupted party follows the protocol as specified but fixes its random tape to some deterministic value. Moreover, we show that even in an offline/online protocol, the communication of the online phase must have output-size dependence. This negative result uses an incompressibility argument and it generalizes several recent lower bounds for functional encryption and (reusable) garbled circuits, which follow as simple corollaries of our general theorem.

00:17 [Pub][ePrint] DoubleMod and SingleMod: Simple Randomized Secret-Key Encryption with Bounded Homomorphicity, by Dhananjay S. Phatak, Qiang Tang, Alan T. Sherman, Warren D. Smith, Peter Ryan, Kostas Kalpakis

  An encryption relation $f \\subseteq {\\mathbb Z} \\times {\\mathbb Z}$ with decryption function $f^{-1}$ is {\\it ``group-homomorphic\'\'} if, for any suitable plaintexts $x_1$ and $x_2$, $\\, x_1+x_2 = f^{-1} ( f(x_1) + f(x_2) )$. It is {\\it ``ring-homomorphic\'\'} if furthermore $x_1 x_2 = f^{-1} ( f(x_1) f(x_2) )$; it is {\\it ``field-homomorphic\'\'} if furthermore $1/x_1 = f^{-1} ( f(1/x_1) )$. Such relations would support oblivious processing of encrypted data.

We propose a simple randomized encryption relation~$f$ over the integers, called\\linebreak {\\it \\mbox{DoubleMod}}, which is ``bounded ring-homomorphic\'\' or what some call \"somewhat homomorphic.\" Here, ``bounded\'\' means that the number of additions and multiplications that can be performed, while not allowing the encrypted values to go out of range, is limited~(any pre-specified bound on the operation-count can be accommodated). Let $R$ be any large integer. For any plaintext $x \\in {\\mathbb Z}_R$, DoubleMod encrypts $x$ as $f(x) = x + au + bv$, where $a$ and $b$ are randomly chosen integers in some appropriate interval, while $(u,v)$ is the secret key. Here $u>R^2$ is a large prime and the smallest prime factor of $v$ exceeds $u$. With knowledge of the key, but not of $a$ and $b$, the receiver decrypts the ciphertext by computing $f^{-1}(y) =(y \\bmod v) \\bmod u$.

DoubleMod generalizes an independent idea of van Dijk {\\it et al.} 2010. We present and refine a new CCA1 chosen-ciphertext attack that finds the secret key of both systems (ours and van Dijk {\\it et al.}\'s) in linear time in the bit length of the security parameter. Under a known-plaintext attack, breaking DoubleMod is at most as hard as solving the {\\it Approximate GCD (AGCD)} problem. The complexity of AGCD is not known.

We also introduce the \\mbox{{\\it SingleMod}} {field}-homomorphic cryptosystems. The simplest\\linebreak \\mbox{SingleMod} system based on the integers can be broken trivially. We had hoped, that if SingleMod is implemented inside non-Euclidean quadratic or higher-order fields with large discriminants, where GCD computations appear difficult, it may be feasible to achieve a desired level of security. We show, however, that a variation of our chosen-ciphertext attack works against SingleMod even in non-Euclidean fields.

20:13 [Job][New] Cryptography Engineer, CloudFlare Inc.


CloudFlare is looking for a talented cryptography engineer to join our team. We are working on a number of ambitious projects to secure the web and protect our customers from threats of all sorts. At CloudFlare we deal with cryptography at scale, and tackle projects that shape the future of the Web.

The role of cryptography engineer at CloudFlare is more that of a builder than a breaker. You will have to approach problems with creativity and flexibility and be able to identify and use the best tools for the job or build better ones from scratch. At CloudFlare, we are serious about protecting our customers and advancing the state of the art in computer security.


  • Expertise in theory and implementation of white-box cryptography

  • Experience building code obfuscation tools

  • Experience writing cryptographic libraries and APIs

  • Experience implementing production-grade cryptographic algorithms

  • Expert in C/C++/Go and performance analysis

  • Familiarity with compilers or code generation tools

    Bonus Points:

  • Contributions to the open source community

  • Experience with cryptographic hardware (TPM, HSM, etc.)

  • Healthy sense of paranoia

  • 15:28 [Event][New] TOC2014: RISC Seminar on Theory of Cryptography

      From September 18 to September 19
    Location: Amsterdam, The Netherlands
    More Information:

    15:02 [Job][New] Post-Doc, LORIA-CNRS, University of Lorraine, Nancy, France

      Provably secure e-voting

    We are looking for one postdoctoral researcher to join the ProSecure project at Loria, Nancy, in the Cassis team, for 1 or 2 years.


    One important family of protocols is e-voting. Electronic voting protocols should offer the same guarantees than more traditional voting systems. In particular, they should offer both vote privacy and verifiability : anyone should be able to check that the result corresponds to the votes. Surprisingly, even defining a crucial property such as vote privacy has not yet reached a consensus in the scientific community. Moreover, existing voting systems should still be improved in terms of verifiability, coercion-resistance, or usability. To achieve a high level of trust, these systems should be proved secure rigorously.


    One objective is to propose well-founded definitions of crucial properties in e- voting such as privacy, receipt-freeness, coercion-resistance, and verifiability and apply them on various e-voting protocols including well-known schemes such as Helios or Civitas. In particular, our team is developing a variant of Helios named Belenios. This scheme has been proved to be ballot private and fully verifiable. More security properties are yet to be proved and several enhancement of the protocol are planned. Belenios benefits from the support of an engineer that develops and maintains it.

    The post-doc researcher is expected to contribute autonomously to the development of new results for defining and proving cryptographic security properties and for designing a both practical and secure voting scheme. The postdoc researcher should have a good publication record and a strong expertise in cryptography.

    14:33 [Job][Update] Doctoral Researcher in the collaborative research center CROSSING, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany

      Collaborative Research Centers are institutions funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and are established at universities to pursue a scientifically ambitious, complex, long?term research program. The goal of the center CROSSING is to provide cryptography-based security solutions enabling trust in new and next generation computing environments. In the center researchers from different areas such as Cryptography, IT-Security, Quantum Physics, and Software Engineering will collaborate. The available doctoral positions are distributed over the aforementioned areas, and will be affiliated with the research training school of the center.

    As part of its research program CROSSING will develop an open-source software called OpenCCE which will allow users to deploy the developed solutions in a secure and easy way.

    Applicants should upload their applications on including the usual documents and indicating the applicant’s area of interest. Applications will be considered until the positions are filled.

    For more information about CROSSING and the application process please visit

    TU Darmstadt has a large interest in increasing the number of female researchers, and hence particularly encourages female candidates to apply. Applicants with a degree of disability of 50% or more will be preferred in case they are otherwise equally qualified to the other candidates. It is generally possible to work part time.

    09:17 [Pub][ePrint] Revocation in Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation, by James Alderman and Carlos Cid and Jason Crampton and Christian Janson

      The combination of software-as-a-service and the increasing use of mobile devices gives rise to a considerable difference in computational power between servers and clients. Thus, there is a desire for clients to outsource the evaluation of complex functions to an external server. Servers providing such a service may be rewarded per computation, and as such have an incentive to cheat by returning garbage rather than devoting resources and time to compute a valid result.

    In this work, we introduce the notion of Revocable Publicly Verifiable Computation (RPVC), where a cheating server is revoked and may not perform future computations (thus incurring a financial penalty). We introduce a Key Distribution Center (KDC) to efficiently handle the generation and distribution of the keys required to support RPVC. The KDC is an authority over entities in the system and enables revocation. We also introduce a notion of blind verification such that results are verifiable (and hence servers can be rewarded or punished) without learning the value.

    We present a rigorous definitional framework, define a number of new security models and present a construction of such a scheme built upon Key-Policy Attribute-based Encryption.