Get an update on changes of the IACR web-page here. For questions, contact newsletter (at) iacr.org. You can also receive updates via:
To receive your credentials via mail again, please click here.
You can also access the full news archive.
Recent proposals using public logs have succeeded in making certificate management more transparent and verifiable. How- ever, those proposals involve a fixed set of authorities which create a monopoly, and they have heavy reliance on trusted parties that monitor the logs.
We propose a distributed transparent key infrastructure (DTKI), which greatly reduces the monopoly of service providers and removes the reliance on trusted parties. In addition, this paper formalises the public log data structure and provides a formal analysis of the security that DTKI guarantees.
target functionalities, static security implies adaptive security in the UC
model. Similar results were previously only known for models with
weaker security and/or composition guarantees. The result is, for
instance, applicable to a wide range of protocols based on secret
sharing. It ``explains\'\' why an often used proof technique for such
protocols works, namely where the simulator runs in its head a copy of
the honest players using dummy inputs and generates a protocol
execution by letting the dummy players interact with the
adversary. When a new player $P_i$ is corrupted, the simulator
adjusts the state of its dummy copy of $P_i$ to be consistent with
the real inputs and outputs of $P_i$ and gives the state to the
adversary. Our result gives a characterisation of the cases where this
idea will work to prove adaptive security. As a special case,
we use our framework to give the first proof of adaptive security
of the seminal BGW protocol in the UC framework.
some way to enable easy payments in future. Credit card data is a very sensitive information and theft of this data is a serious threat to any company. Any organization that stores credit card data needs to achieve payment card industry (PCI) compliance, which is an intricate process where the organization needs to demonstrate that the data it stores is safe. Recently there has been a paradigm shift in treatment of the problem of storage of payment card information. In this new paradigm instead of the real credit card data a token is stored, this process is called ``tokenization\". The token resembles the
credit/debit card number but is in no way related to it. This solution relieves the merchant from the burden of PCI compliance in several ways.
Though tokenization systems are heavily in use, to our knowledge, a formal cryptographic study of this problem has not yet been done. In this paper we initiate a study in this direction. We formally define the syntax of a tokenization system, and several notions of security for such systems. Finally, we provide some constructions of tokenizers and analyze their security in the light of our definitions.
- Implementation cryptographic primitives and protocols in C/C++/Python languages
- Definitions of related tests for validation
- Definition and implementation of dedicated tools to aid implementation and analysis of cryptographic algorithms
- Work closely with HW design and verification team
- Close collaboration with software teams for system validation
- Working closely with security architects and system architects for definition of requirements
- Follow-up of related academic literature and developments
- Deliver crypto specifications documents to internal teams
- Provide guidance and support to peers in tools and IP design
The research envisioned is on side-channel cryptanalysis, fault attacks and countermeasures and/or lightweight cryptography (protocols, crypto primitives and implementations).
The project has sufficient funds to support career development, conference visits, summer schools, and similar scientific activities.
For PhD students:
Successful candidates must hold an M.Sc. degree (or equivalent) from the university study of Computer Science, Mathematics or Engineering. Applications from students that are expected to finish their master thesis within 1 year will also be considered. Prior background/experience in cryptography and/or computer security is an asset.
Applicants should have a Ph.D. and expertise in at least one of the following research areas:
- applied cryptography
- embedded security
- hardware design for cryptography/cryptanalysis
- side-channel analysis and countermeasures
- machine learning and data mining
We expect proven expertise in your area of research by publications at top conferences and journals, some experience with EU projects, student supervision etc.
Conditions of employment
PhD positions are for 4 years, PostDoc positions are for up to 2 years, the expected starting dates are flexible.
Candidates moving to the Netherlands from abroad may qualify for a tax incentive scheme, where 30% of your income is tax-free.
For additional information, see http://www.ru.nl/ds, and for the positions contact:
Lejla Batina (http://www.cs.ru.nl/~lejla/), lejlaATcs.ru.nl