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defined by Bitanski, Canetti and Halevi (TCC 2012). Our contributions
can be summarized as follows:
For the purpose of secure message transmission, any encryption
protocol with message space $\\cM$ and secret key space $\\cSK$
tolerating poly-logarithmic leakage on the secret state of the
receiver must satisfy $|\\cSK| \\ge (1-\\epsilon)|\\cM|$, for every $0
Interested candidates are invited to submit their application by email to lacs.application AT gmail.com. The application material should contain a cover letter explaining the candidate\\\'s expertise, motivation and research interests, a CV (including photo, information about the obtained degrees, overall GPA in B.Sc. and M.Sc., transcript of grades for relevant courses). We expect proven expertise in your area of research by publications at top conferences, successful participation in competitions and challenges, etc.
obtained through physical attacks such as cold boot and side channel
attacks. Many studies have focused on recovering correct secret keys
from noisy binary data. Obtaining noisy binary keys typically involves
first observing the analog data and then obtaining the binary data
through quantization process that discards much information pertaining
to the correct keys. In this paper, we propose two algorithms for
recovering correct secret keys from noisy analog data, which are
generalized variants of Paterson et al.\'s algorithm. Our algorithms
fully exploit the analog information. More precisely, consider observed
data which follows the Gaussian distribution
with mean $(-1)^b$ and variance $\\sigma^2$ for a secret key bit $b$.
We propose a polynomial time algorithm based on
the maximum likelihood approach and show that it can recover secret keys
if $\\sigma < 1.767$. The first algorithm works only if the noise
distribution is explicitly known. The second algorithm does not need to
know the explicit form of the noise distribution. We implement the first
algorithm and verify its effectiveness.
can be easily parallelized.
v1 to the estream call for stream cipher proposals and it also became one estream nalists in the
hardware category. The output function of Grain v1 connects its 160 bits internal state divided
equally between an LFSR and an NFSR, using a non-linear lter function in a complex way. Over
the last years many cryptanalyst identied several weaknesses in Grain v1. As a result in 2011 the
inventors modied Grain v1 and published a new version of Grain named Grain-128a which has
a similar structure as Grain v1 but with a 256 bits internal state with an optional authentication
is the latest version of Grain family resisting all known attacks on Grain v1. However both these
ciphers are quite resistant against the classical algebraic attack due to the rapid growth of the degree
of the key-stream equations in subsequent clockings caused by the NFSR. This paper presents a
probabilistic algebraic attack on both these Grain versions. The basic idea of our attack is to
develop separate probabilistic equations for the LFSR and the NFSR bits from each key-stream
equations. Surprisingly it turns out that in case of Grain-128a our proposed equations hold with all
most sure probability, which makes the sure retrieval of the LFSR bits. We also outline a technique
to reduce the growth of degree of the equations involving the NFSR bits for Grain v1. Further
we high light that the concept of probabilistic algebraic attack as proposed in this paper can be
considered as a generic attack strategy against any stream cipher having similar structure of the
output function as in case of the Grain family.
trusted parameters for many schemes from just a single trusted setup. In such a scheme
a trusted setup process will produce universal parameters $U$. These parameters can
then be combined with the description, $d(\\cdot)$ of any particular cryptographic setup
algorithm to produce parameters $p_d$ that can be used by the cryptographic system associated
with $d$. We give a solution in the random oracle model based on indistinguishability obfuscation.