*19:25*[Event][New] ECC'14: 18th Workshop On Elliptic Curve Cryptography

From October 8 to October 10

Location: Chennai, India

More Information: http://www.imsc.res.in/~ecc14

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From October 8 to October 10

Location: Chennai, India

More Information: http://www.imsc.res.in/~ecc14

Secure two-party computation allows two mutually distrusting parties to jointly compute an arbitrary function on their private inputs without revealing anything but the result. An interesting target for deploying secure computation protocols are mobile devices as they contain a lot of sensitive user data. However, their resource restrictions make this a challenging task.

In this work, we optimize and implement the secure computation protocol by Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson~(GMW) on mobile phones. To increase performance, we extend the protocol by a trusted hardware token (i.e., a smartcard). The trusted hardware token allows to pre-compute most of the workload in an initialization phase, which is executed locally on one device and can be pre-computed independently of the later communication partner. We develop and analyze a proof-of-concept implementation of generic secure two-party computation on Android smart phones making use of a microSD smartcard. Our use cases include private set intersection for finding shared contacts and private scheduling of a meeting with location preferences. For private set intersection, our token-aided implementation on mobile phones is up to two orders of magnitude faster than previous generic secure two-party computation protocols on mobile phones and even as fast as previous work on desktop computers.

Certificateless public key cryptography eliminates inherent key escrow problem in identity-based cryptography, and does not yet requires certificates as in the traditional public key infrastructure. However, most of certificateless signature schemes without random oracles have been demonstrated to be insecure. In this paper, we propose a new certificateless signature scheme and prove that our new scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attack in the standard model. Performance analysis shows that our new scheme has shorter system parameters, shorter length of signature, and higher computational efficiency than the previous schemes in the standard model.

We propose an efficient Key-policy Attribute-based Encryption (KP-ABE)

scheme for general (monotone) Boolean circuits based on secret sharing and on a very particular and simple form of leveled multilinear maps,

called chained multilinear maps. The number of decryption key components is substantially reduced in comparison with the current scheme based on leveled multilinear maps, and the size of the multilinear map (in terms of bilinear map components) is less than the Boolean circuit depth, while it is quadratic in the Boolean circuit depth for the current scheme based on leveled multilinear map. Moreover, it is much easier to find chained multilinear maps than leveled multilinear maps. Selective security of the proposed schemes in the standard model is proved, under the decisional multilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.

In a homomorphic signature scheme, given a vector of signatures $\\vec{\\sigma}$ corresponding to a dataset of messages $\\vec{\\mu}$, there is a {\\it public} algorithm that allows to derive a signature $\\sigma\'$ for message $\\mu\'=f(\\vec{\\mu})$ for any function $f$.

Given the tuple $(\\sigma\', \\mu\', f)$ anyone can {\\it publicly}

verify the result of the computation of function $f$.

Along with the standard notion of unforgeability

for signatures, the security of homomorphic signatures guarantees that no adversary is able to make a forgery $\\sigma^*$ for $\\mu^* \\neq f(\\vec{\\mu})$.

We construct the first homomorphic signature scheme for evaluating arbitrary functions. In our scheme, the public parameters and the size of the resulting signature grows linearly

with the depth of the circuit representation of $f$. Our scheme is secure in the standard model assuming hardness of

finding {\\it Small Integer Solutions} in hard lattices.

Furthermore, our construction has asymptotically fast verification

which immediately leads to a new solution for verifiable outsourcing with pre-processing phase. Previous state of the art constructions were limited to evaluating polynomials of constant degree, secure in random oracle model

without asymptotically fast verification.

We present the design, implementation and evaluation of the root of trust for the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) provided by ARM TrustZone based on SRAM Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). We first implement a building block which provides the foundations for the root of trust: secure key storage and truly random source. The building block doesn\'t require on or off-chip secure non-volatile memory to store secrets, but provides a high-level security: resistance to physical attackers capable of controlling all external interfaces of the system on chip (SoC). Based on the building block, we build the root of trust consisting of seal/unseal primitives for secure services running in the TEE, and a software-only TPM service running in the TEE which provides rich TPM functionalities for the rich OS running in the normal world of TrustZone. The root of trust resists software attackers capable of compromising the entire rich OS. Besides, both the building block and the root of trust run on the powerful ARM processor. In one word, we leverage the SRAM PUF, commonly available on mobile devices, to achieve a low-cost, secure, and efficient design of the root of trust.

We consider *semi-adaptive* security for attribute-based encryption,

where the adversary specifies the challenge attribute vector after

it sees the public parameters but before it makes any secret key

queries. We present two constructions of semi-adaptive

attribute-based encryption under static assumptions with *short*

ciphertexts. Previous constructions with short ciphertexts either

achieve the weaker notion of selective security, or require

parameterized assumptions.

As an application, we obtain improved delegation schemes for Boolean

formula with *semi-adaptive* soundness, where correctness of the

computation is guaranteed even if the client\'s input is chosen

adaptively depending on its public key. Previous delegation schemes

for formula achieve one of adaptive soundness, constant

communication complexity, or security under static assumptions; we

show how to achieve semi-adaptive soundness and the last two

simultaneously.

In this paper, we introduce the concept of the derivative of sequence of numbers and define new statistical indices by which we discoverd new properties of randomly generated number sequences.

We also build a test for pseudo random generators based on these properties and use it to confirm the weakness of RC4 key scheduling algorithm that has been reported in the litterature.

In this rescpect we publish a new RC4\'s key scheduling algorithm that don\'t have this weakness.

2014-06-15

One-time memories (OTM\'s) are simple, tamper-resistant cryptographic devices, which can be used to implement sophisticated functionalities such as one-time programs. Can one construct OTM\'s whose security follows from some physical principle? This is not possible in a fully-classical world, or in a fully-quantum world, but there is evidence that OTM\'s can be built using \"isolated qubits\" -- qubits that cannot be entangled, but can be accessed using adaptive sequences of single-qubit measurements.

Here we present new constructions for OTM\'s using isolated qubits, which improve on previous work in several respects: they achieve a stronger \"single-shot\" security guarantee, which is stated in terms of the (smoothed) min-entropy; they are proven secure against adversaries who can perform arbitrary local operations and classical communication (LOCC); and they are efficiently implementable.

These results use Wiesner\'s idea of conjugate coding, combined with error-correcting codes that approach the capacity of the q-ary symmetric channel, and a high-order entropic uncertainty relation, which was originally developed for cryptography in the bounded quantum storage model.

Formal verification of the security of software systems is gradually moving from the traditional focus on idealized models, to the more ambitious goal of producing verified implementations. This trend is also present in recent work targeting the verification of cryptographic software, but the reach of existing tools has so far been limited to cryptographic primitives, such as RSA-OAEP encryption, or standalone protocols, such as SSH. This paper presents a scalable

approach to formally verifying implementations of higher-level cryptographic systems, directly in the computational model.

We consider circuit-based cloud-oriented cryptographic protocols for secure and verifiable computation over encrypted data. Our examples share as central component Yao\'s celebrated transformation of a boolean circuit into an equivalent garbled form that can be evaluated securely in an untrusted environment. We leverage the foundations of garbled circuits set forth by Bellare, Hoang, and Rogaway (CCS 2012, ASIACRYPT 2012) to build verified implementations of garbling schemes, a verified implementation of Yao\'s secure

function evaluation protocol, and a verified (albeit partial) implementation of the verifiable computation protocol by Gennaro, Gentry, and Parno (CRYPTO 2010). The implementations are formally verified using EasyCrypt, a tool-assisted framework for building high-confidence cryptographic proofs, and critically rely on two novel features: a module and theory system that supports compositional reasoning, and a code extraction mechanism for generating

implementations from formalizations.

We introduce the notion of a class of lattice-based digital signature schemes based on modular properties of the coordinates of lattice vectors. We also suggest a method of making such schemes transcript secure via a rejection sampling technique of Lyubashevsky (2009). A particular instantiation of this approach is given, using NTRU lattices. Although the scheme is not supported by a formal security reduction, we present arguments for its security and derive concrete parameters based on the performance of state-of-the-art lattice reduction and enumeration techniques.