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Applications are welcome particularly in the areas of Software Security, Web and Network Security, System Security, Applied Cryptography and Protocols, Privacy and Data Protection, Multimedia Security, Digital Forensics, and Human-Centred Security.
The Department is research-led with around 70 RAs and PhD students, and is attracting growing research support from funding bodies such as the UK Research Councils, UK Technology Strategy Board (TSB), the EU-IST, and also private foundations e.g. The Leverhulme Trust. Major IT, telecommunication, defence and security organisations are sponsoring research in the Department.
Applicants at the Lecturer level should have a relevant PhD, a developing track record in publication with demonstrable high potential in high-quality research and teaching. Applicants at the Senior Lecturer level will have an international research profile, a significant track record of high-quality publications in leading journals and conference proceedings, and experience in a leadership or development role in high quality teaching. A record in attracting research funding would be an advantage.
Closing date for applications is 30 June 2014. The post is to start in September 2014 or as soon as possible thereafter.
(1) It would appear to be a triviality, for any primitive, that security in the standard model implies security in the random-oracle model, and it is certainly true, and easily proven, for R-PKE. For D-PKE it is not clear and depends on details of the definition. In particular we can show it in the non-uniform case but not in the uniform case.
(2) The power of selective-opening attacks (SOA) comes from an adversary\'s ability, upon corrupting a sender, to learn not just the message but also the coins used for encryption. For R-PKE, security is achievable. For D-PKE, where there are no coins, one\'s first impression may be that SOAs are vacuous and security should be easily achievable. We show instead that SOA-security is impossible, meaning no D-PKE scheme can achieve it.
(3) For R-PKE, single-user security implies multi-user security, but we show that there are D-PKE schemes secure for a single user and insecure with two users.
can be proved secure against adaptive-identity attacks based on standard assumptions. The constructions are
obtained by extending the currently known most efficient identity-based encryption scheme proposed by Jutla
and Roy in 2013. Ciphertext size and user storage compare favourably to previously known constructions. The
new constructions fill both a practical and a theoretical gap in the literature on efficient IBBE schemes.
For many cryptographic primitives and in particular for correlation-secure hash functions all known constructions are in the random-oracle model. Indeed, recent negative results by Wichs (ITCS 2013) rule out a large class of techniques to prove the security of correlation-secure hash functions in the standard model. Our construction is based on puncturable PRFs (Sahai und Waters; STOC 2014) and indistinguishability obfuscation. However, our proof also relies on point obfuscation under auxiliary inputs (AIPO). This is crucial in light of Wichs\' impossibility result. Namely, Wichs proves that it is often hard to reduce two-stage games (such as UCEs) to a \"one-stage assumption\" such as DDH. In contrast, AIPOs and their underlying assumptions are inherently two-stage and, thus, allow us to circumvent Wichs\' impossibility result.
Our positive result is also noteworthy insofar as Brzuska, Farshim and Mittelbach (Crypto 2014) have shown recently, that iO and some variants of UCEs are mutually exclusive. Our results, hence, validate some of the new UCE notions that emerged as a response to the iO-attack.
We first address an important drawback of prior work, namely the lack of consideration of collusion attacks that are highly relevant for such multi-user settings. We explain why existing security models are insufficient and why previous protocols become insecure in the presence of colluding parties. We remedy this problem by providing new security and privacy definitions that guarantee meaningful forms of collusion resistance. We propose new collusion-resistant participatory sensing protocols satisfying our definitions: a generic construction that uses anonymous identity-based encryption (IBE) and its practical instantiation based on the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme.
We then extend the functionality of participatory sensing by adding the ability to perform aggregation on the data submitted by the users, without sacrificing their privacy. We realize this through an additively-homomorphic IBE scheme which in turn is constructed by slightly modifying the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme. From a practical point of view, the resulting scheme is suitable for calculations with small sensor readings/values such as temperature measurements, noise levels, or prices, which is sufficient for many applications of participatory sensing.