Ph.D. / M.Sc. Scholarships and Summer Internship, Cryptography, Security, and Privacy Research Group, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey
Cryptography, Security & Privacy Research Group at Koç University has multiple openings for both M.Sc. and Ph.D. level applications. All accepted applicants will receive competitive scholarships including tuition waiver, housing, monthly stipend, computer, travel support, etc.
For more information about our group and projects, visit
For questions, contact Asst. Prof. Alptekin Küpçü
For applying online, and questions about the application-process, visit
For summer internship opportunities, visit
Professor in Cryptography (W1 - non-tenured), Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany
The Ruhr-Universität Bochum (RUB) is one of Germany’s leading research universities with more than 50 scientists working in IT-security and cryptography. The Faculty of Mathematics invites applications for the position of a Junior Professor (W1) in Cryptography to start as soon as possible.
The future holder of the position will represent the subject in research and teaching.
We are seeking a candidate with an excellent research record in cryptography, in particular in theoretical cryptography, provable security, protocols, or secure multi-party computation.
The position is non-tenured with an initial appointment for 3 years, and renewable for another 3 years after a positive mid-term review.
Candidates for the professorship are expected to have strong leadership qualities, particularly
• excellent level of commitment in academic teaching
• willingness to participate in interdisciplinary research
• willingness and ability to attract externally funded research projects
• or to contribute to joint research projects of the department.
Private Predictive Analysis on Encrypted Medical Data, by Joppe W. Bos and Kristin Lauter and Michael Naehrig
Increasingly, confidential medical records are being stored in data centers hosted by hospitals or large companies. As sophisticated algorithms for predictive analysis on medical data continue to be developed, it is likely that, in the future, more and more computation will be done on private patient data. While encryption provides a tool for assuring the privacy of medical information, it limits the functionality for operating on such data. Conventional
encryption methods used today provide only very restricted possibilities or none at all to operate on encrypted data without decrypting it first. Homomorphic encryption provides a tool for
handling such computations on encrypted data, without decrypting the data, and without even needing the decryption key.
In this paper, we discuss possible application scenarios for homomorphic encryption in order to ensure privacy of sensitive medical data. We describe how to privately conduct predictive analysis tasks on encrypted data using homomorphic encryption. As a proof of concept, we present a working implementation of a prediction service running in the cloud (hosted on Microsoft\'s Windows Azure), which takes as input private encrypted health data, and returns the probability of suffering cardiovascular disease in encrypted form. Since the cloud service uses homomorphic encryption, it makes this prediction while handling only encrypted data, learning nothing about
the submitted confidential medical data.
A Tamper and Leakage Resilient Random Access Machine, by Sebastian Faust and Pratyay Mukherjee and Jesper Buus Nielsen and Daniele Venturi
We present a ``universal\'\' Random Access Machine (RAM in short) for tamper and leakage resilient computation. The RAM has one CPU that accesses three storages (called disks in the following), two of them are secret, while the other one is public. The CPU has constant size for each fixed value of security parameter $k$. We construct a compiler for this architecture which transforms any keyed primitive into a RAM program where the key is encoded and stored on the two secret disks and the instructions for evaluating the functionality are stored on the public disk.
The compiled program tolerates arbitrary independent tampering of the disks. That is, the adversary can tamper with the intermediate values produced by the CPU, and the program code of the compiled primitive on the public disk. In addition, it tolerates bounded independent leakage from the disks and continuous leakage from the communication channels between the disks and the CPU.
Although it is required that the circuit of the CPU is tamper and leakage proof, its design is independent of the actual primitive being computed and its internal storage is non-persistent, i.e., all secret registers are reset between invocations. Hence, our result can be interpreted as reducing the problem of shielding arbitrary complex computations to protecting a single, simple and ``universal\'\' component. As a main ingredient of our construction we use continuous
non-malleable codes that satisfy certain additional properties.
A Strong and Efficient Certificateless Digital Signature Scheme, by Mohammed Alfateh Hassouna and Mohsin Hashim
This paper extends the certificateless public key infrastructure model that was proposed by Hassouna et al by proposing new digital signature scheme to provide true non-repudiation,
the proposed signature scheme is short and efficient, it is also has strength point that the KGC has no contribution in signature generation/verification process, therefore any compromise
of the KGC does not affect the non-repudiation service of the system. Furthermore, even the KGC cannot do signature forgery by (temporary) replacing the user\'s public key.
Formal Analysis of Chaumian Mix Nets with Randomized Partial Checking, by Ralf Kuesters and Tomasz Truderung and Andreas Vogt
Mix nets with randomized partial checking (RPC mix nets) have been introduced by Jakobsson, Juels, and Rivest as particularly simple and efficient verifiable mix nets. These mix nets have been used in several implementations of prominent e-voting systems to provide vote privacy and verifiability. In RPC mix nets, higher efficiency is traded for a lower level of privacy and verifiability. However, these mix nets have never undergone a rigorous formal analysis. Recently, Kahazei and Wikstroem even pointed out several severe problems in the original proposal and in implementations of RPC mix nets in e-voting systems, both for so-called re-encryption and Chaumian RPC mix nets. While Kahazei and Wikstroem proposed several fixes, the security status of Chaumian RPC mix nets (with the fixes applied) has been left open; re-encryption RPC mix nets, as they suggest, should not be used at all.
In this paper, we provide the first formal security analysis of Chaumian RPC mix nets. We propose security definitions that allow one to measure the level of privacy and verifiability RPC mix nets offer, and then based on these definitions, carry out a rigorous analysis. Altogether, our results show that these mix nets provide a reasonable level of privacy and verifiability, and that they are still an interesting option for the use in e-voting systems.
Mass Surveillance and the Subversion of Cryptography
Statement of Principle from the IACR Membership on
Mass Surveillance and the Subversion of Cryptography
The membership of the IACR repudiates mass surveillance and the undermining of
cryptographic solutions and standards. Population-wide surveillance threatens
democracy and human dignity. We call for expediting research and deployment of
effective techniques to protect personal privacy against governmental and corporate