Cryptographic Researcher, Security Innovation, Wilmington, MA, USA
We’re planning to make a hire at Security Innovation to support our NTRU crypto research program, including providing support for the codebase of our NTRU implementations once we make it available under GPL.
Responsibilities will include:
· Work on NTRU crypto research, including efficient signature schemes
· Helping to better understand lattice reduction algorithms, potentially including:
o A complete or partial reimplementation of algorithms developed by Nguyen and Chen to properly understand their claims
o Research into use of the structure of NTRU / ideal lattices to obtain improvements over generic lattice reduction algorithms
o Exploring the relationship between expected-shortest and actual-shortest vector in a lattice and how it affects reduction times
· Support cryptographic queries that come in to NTRU as a result of the GPL move, including participating in discussions on forums such as crypto.stackexchange and others
· Support the codebase of the GPL implementation of NTRU, including:
o General optimizations for the C implementation on 32- and 64-bit processors such as including multiple coefficients in a single word
o Architecture-specific optimizations such as exploring what advantage can be taken of SIMD, etc
o Potentially writing and/or managing a Java implementation
· Support standardization activity
o In particular, manage the passing of one or more NTRU-related TLS ciphersuite drafts through IETF.
Associate Professor, School of Mathematical and Geospatial Sciences, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia
Associate Professor - Mathematical Science
Full-time, Continuing (i.e., permanent) position
Annual Salary: $121,048 to $133,357 + 17% superannuation
Information Security forms one of the research strengths of the School. The Master of Applied Science in Information Security and Assurance is one of the programs in the school with more than 50 coursework students.
Please see the following link for further information about the research group
and the following for further information about Master\\\'s program in Information Security and Assurance
Situated within the College of Science, Engineering and Health, the School of Mathematical and Geospatial Sciences draws together disciplines involving the collection of data, the analysis of data, data security, and the understanding and optimisation of systems through modelling and visualisation. The School has more than 60 academic staff and over 70 postgraduate research students.
Reporting to the Head of School, the Associate Professor - Mathematical Science will be expected to be an active researcher. This will include supervising research students; undertaking and publishing high quality research, and applying for research grants.
Recomputing with Permuted Operands: A Concurrent Error Detection Approach, by Xiaofei Guo and Ramesh Karri
Naturally occurring and maliciously injected faults reduce the reliability of cryptographic hardware and may leak confidential information. We develop a concurrent error detection (CED) technique called Recomputing with Permuted Operands (REPO). We show that it is cost effective in Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and a secure hash
function Grøstl. We provide experimental results and formal proofs to show that REPO detects all single-bit and single-byte faults. Experimental results show that REPO achieves close to 100% fault coverage for multiple byte faults. The hardware and throughput overheads are compared with those of previously reported CED techinques on two Xilinx Virtex FPGAs. The hardware overhead is 12.4-27.3%, and the throughput is 1.2-23Gbps, depending on the AES architecture, FPGA family, and detection latency. The performance overhead ranges from 10% to 100% depending on the security
level. Moreover, the proposed technique can be integrated into various block cipher modes of operation. We also discuss the limitation of REPO and its potential vulnerabilities.
Modelling Time, or A Step Towards Reduction-based Security Proofs for OTP and Kerberos, by Jörg Schwenk
The notion of time plays an important role in many practically deployed cryptographic protocols, ranging from One-Time-Password (OTP) tokens to the Kerberos protocol. However, time is difficult to model in a Turing machine environment.
We propose the first such model, where time is modelled as a global counter T . We argue that this model closely matches several implementations of time in computer environments. The usefulness of the model is shown by giving complexity-theoretic security proofs for OTP protocols, HMQV-like one-round AKE protocols, and a variant of the basic Kerberos building block.
Revocable quantum timed-release encryption, by Dominique Unruh
Timed-release encryption is a kind of encryption scheme that a
recipient can decrypt only after a specified amount of time T
(assuming that we have a moderately precise estimate of his computing
power). A revocable timed-release encryption is one where,
before the time T is over, the sender can \"give back\" the
timed-release encryption, provably loosing all access to the data. We
show that revocable timed-release encryption without trusted parties
is possible using quantum cryptography (while trivially impossible
Along the way, we develop two proof techniques in the quantum random
oracle model that we believe may have applications also for other
Finally, we also develop another new primitive, unknown recipient
encryption, which allows us to send a message to an
unknown/unspecified recipient over an insecure network in such a way
that at most one recipient will get the message.
How to Further Increase Leakage Exploitation Rate in Profiled Side-Channel Attacks?, by Guangjun Fan and Yongbin Zhou and Hailong Zhang and Dengguo Feng
Template Attack is widely accepted to be one of the most powerful side-channel attacks, because it is assumed that one has full knowledge of targeted crypto devices and thus be well capable of characterizing the side-channel leakages. However, whether or not Template Attack exploits side-channel leakages to the fullest is still not clear. In this paper, we present a negative answer to this central question, by introducing a normalization process into original Template Attack. We present Normalized Template Attack, which has the normalization process. Furthermore, we prove that Normalized Template Attack is better that its original counterpart in terms of leakage exploitation rate. We evaluate the key-recovery efficiency of Normalized Template Attack and original Template Attack as well under identical scenarios, by performing attacks against both simulated and real power traces. Our experimental results show that our method is valid end effective. Remarkably enough, this normalization process is of extremely low computation cost. Therefore, we argue that the
normalization process should be integrated as a necessary part of profile attacks in order to better understand the practical threats of these attacks.