Attacking PUF-Based Pattern Matching Key Generators via Helper Data Manipulation, by Jeroen Delvaux and Ingrid Verbauwhede
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are emerging as hardware security primitives. They are typically employed to generate device-unique secret keys. As PUF output bits are noisy and possibly biased or correlated, on-chip digital post-processing is required. Fuzzy
extractors are used to generate reproducible and uniformly distributed keys. Traditionally, they employ an error-correcting code and a cryptographic hash function. Pattern matching key generators
have been proposed as an alternative. In this work, we demonstrate the latter construction to be vulnerable against manipulation of the public helper data. Full key recovery might be possible, although depending on some design choices and one system parameter. We demonstrate our attacks using a 4-XOR arbiter PUF, manufactured in 65nm CMOS technology. We also propose a simple but efficient countermeasure.
Cryptanalysis of the Speck Family of Block Ciphers, by Farzaneh Abed and Eik List and Stefan Lucks and Jakob Wenzel
Simon and Speck are two families of ultra-lightweight block ciphers which were proposed by the U.S. National Security Agency in June 2013. Yet, the specification paper discusses only the design and the performance of both cipher families, the task of analyzing their security has been left to the research community.
In this paper we present conventional differential as well as rectangle attacks for almost all members of the \\speck cipher family, where we target up to 11/22, 12/23, 14/16, 15/29, and 18/34 rounds of the 32-, 48-, 64-, 96-, and 128-bit version, respectively. In addition, we discuss rotational attacks, where we show that these attacks can be easily mounted for the full or almost the full number of rounds for large groups of weak keys.
Efficient General-Adversary Multi-Party Computation, by Martin Hirt and Daniel Tschudi
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set P of n players to evaluate a function f in presence of an adversary who corrupts a subset of the players. In this paper we consider active, general adversaries, characterized by a so-called adversary structure Z which enumerates all possible subsets of corrupted players. In particular for small sets of players general adversaries better capture real-world requirements than classical threshold adversaries.
Protocols for general adversaries are ``efficient\'\' in the sense that they require |Z|^O(1) bits of communication. However, as |Z| is usually very large (even exponential in n), the exact exponent is very relevant. In the setting with perfect security, the most efficient protocol known to date communicates |Z|^3 bits; we present a protocol for this setting which communicates |Z|^2 bits. In the setting with statistical security, |Z|^3 bits of communication is needed in general (whereas for a very restricted subclass of adversary structures, a protocol with communication
|Z|^2 bits is known); we present a protocol for this setting (without limitations) which communicates |Z|^1 bits.
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