*14:13*[Event][New] Practical Cryptography: Algorithms and Implementations using C++

Submission: 15 September 2013

Notification: 15 January 2014

From February 28 to February 28

More Information: http://cfc-crypt.weebly.com/index.html

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Submission: 15 September 2013

Notification: 15 January 2014

From February 28 to February 28

More Information: http://cfc-crypt.weebly.com/index.html

Submission: 15 September 2013

Notification: 15 January 2014

From February 28 to February 28

More Information: http://cfc-crypt.weebly.com/index.html

Submission: 1 January 2014

Notification: 15 April 2014

From August 26 to October 1

More Information: http://www.di.ens.fr/~fouque/cfp-cc

Submission: 31 July 2014

From August 31 to July 31

More Information: http://www.ijiss.org

2013-08-25

I'm looking for a volunteer to edit the videos from TCC 2013. The data consists of about 30 DVDs, or about 100GB of video data. There are two DVDs for each session (the stage and the presentation screen), and they need to be re-encoded for streaming distribution on youtube. If we decide that this is too much, we might opt for only the presentation screen videos from the invited talks, but ideally I'd like to do the following: 1. split the VOB files into one file per talk. The files should be named in such a way that they can be matched to cryptodb, e.g., 24520.mp4 for http://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/data/paper.php?pubkey=24520 2. encode each file as AAC-LC audio with H.264 video, as described on https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/1722171?hl=en. 3. upload the resulting files to www.iacr.org so that they can be archived and uploaded to the IACR youtube channel. If interested, contact cryptodb@iacr.org.

2013-08-24

Submission: 10 September 2013

Notification: 31 October 2013

From November 27 to November 29

Location: Berlin, Germany

More Information: http://cardis.sec.t-labs.tu-berlin.de/index.html

2013-08-23

- Mitsuru Matsui (director)
- Christof Paar (director)
- David Pointcheval (director)
- Bart Preneel (president)
- Christian Cachin (vice president)
- Greg Rose (treasurer)
- Martijn Stam (secretary)

- Michel Abdalla (Returning Officer)
- Josh Benaloh (Chair)
- Tom Berson

2013-08-22

Name: Daniel Wichs

Topic: Cryptographic Resilience to Continual Information Leakage

Category: foundations

Description: In this thesis, we study the question of achieving cryptographic security on\r\ndevices that leak information about their internal secret state to an external attacker. This study is motivated by the prevalence of side-channel attacks, where\r\nthe physical characteristics of a computation (e.g. timing, power-consumption,\r\ntemperature, radiation, acoustics, etc.) can be measured, and may reveal useful information about the internal state of a device. Since some such leakage is\r\ninevitably present in almost any physical implementation, we believe that this\r\nproblem cannot just be addressed by physical countermeasures alone. Instead, it\r\nshould already be taken into account when designing the mathematical specication of cryptographic primitives and included in the formal study of their security.\r\nIn this thesis, we propose a new formal framework for modeling the leakage\r\navailable to an attacker. This framework, called the continual leakage model, assumes that an attacker can continually learn arbitrary information about the internal secret state of a cryptographic scheme at any point in time, subject only to the\r\nconstraint that the rate of leakage is bounded. More precisely, our model assumes\r\nsome abstract notion of time periods. In each such period, the attacker can choose\r\nto learn arbitrary functions of the current secret state of the scheme, as long as\r\nthe number of output bits leaked is not too large. In our solutions, cryptographic\r\nschemes will continually update their internal secret state at the end of each time\r\nperiod. This will ensure that leakage observed in dierent time periods cannot be\r\nmeaningfully combined to break the security of the cryptosystem. Although these\r\nupdates modify the secret state of the cryptosystem, the desired functionality of\r\nthe scheme is preserved, and the users can remain oblivious to these updates. We\r\nconstruct signatures, encryption, and secret sharing/storage schemes in this model.[...]

Name: Marina Samokhina

Topic: The construction and research of cryptographic systems based on linear codes in projective metrics

Category:public-key cryptography

Description:

Main scientific goal of the work was the construction of new real life usable cryptosystem based on linear codes, this system cryptanalysis and its cryptographic strength demonstration.

There are several public key cryptosystems based on linear codes formerly designed. However most of them aren't strong enough.

In my work I review and analyze most substantial and cryptostrong existing systems. I provide detailed description of these systems limitations and vulnerabilities. As a quintessence of my research I introduce new system based on Gabidulin Rank codes in a projective metric. The new system is flexible and can be easily modified into two different structure based systems.

In the conclusion I describe all possible cryptanalytic methods for the new cryptosystem and ensure for its good security level. Few examples of successful implementation of new cryptosystem described in certain section of my work is a strong argue to use the system as a real-life application.

[...]

Submission: 20 February 2014

Notification: 30 April 2014

From August 7 to August 11

Location: Gyeongju, Korea

More Information: http://ants2014.kookmin.ac.kr

We introduce the notion of locally updatable and locally decodable codes (LULDCs). While, intuitively, updatability and error-correction seem to be contrasting goals, we show that for a suitable, yet meaningful, metric (which we call the Prefix Hamming metric), one can construct such codes. Informally, the Prefix Hamming metric allows the adversary to corrupt an arbitrary (constant fraction of) bits of the codeword subject to the constraint that he does not corrupt more than a $\\delta$ fraction of the $t$ ``most-recently changed\" bits of the codeword (for all $1\\leq t\\leq n$, where $n$ is the length of the codeword).

We first construct binary LULDCs for messages in $\\{0,1\\}^{k}$ with constant rate, update locality of $\\bigo(\\log^2 k)$, and read locality of $\\bigo(k^\\epsilon)$ for any constant $\\epsilon