*14:02* [PhD][Update]
Marina Samokhina: The construction and research of cryptographic systems based on linear codes in projective metrics
Name: Marina Samokhina

Topic: The construction and research of cryptographic systems based on linear codes in projective metrics

Category:public-key cryptography

Description:
Main scientific goal of the work was the construction of new real life usable cryptosystem based on linear codes, this system cryptanalysis and its cryptographic strength demonstration.

There are several public key cryptosystems based on linear codes formerly designed. However most of them aren't strong enough.

In my work I review and analyze most substantial and cryptostrong existing systems.
I provide detailed description of these systems limitations and vulnerabilities.
As a quintessence of my research I introduce new system based on Gabidulin Rank codes in a projective metric.
The new system is flexible and can be easily modified into two different structure based systems.

In the conclusion I describe all possible cryptanalytic methods for the new
cryptosystem and ensure for its good security level.
Few examples of successful implementation of new cryptosystem described in certain section of my work is a strong argue to use the system as a real-life application.

[...]

*03:17* [Pub][ePrint]
Locally Updatable and Locally Decodable Codes, by Nishanth Chandran and Bhavana Kanukurthi and Rafail Ostrovsky
We introduce the notion of locally updatable and locally decodable codes (LULDCs). While, intuitively, updatability and error-correction seem to be contrasting goals, we show that for a suitable, yet meaningful, metric (which we call the Prefix Hamming metric), one can construct such codes. Informally, the Prefix Hamming metric allows the adversary to corrupt an arbitrary (constant fraction of) bits of the codeword subject to the constraint that he does not corrupt more than a $\\delta$ fraction of the $t$ ``most-recently changed\" bits of the codeword (for all $1\\leq t\\leq n$, where $n$ is the length of the codeword).We first construct binary LULDCs for messages in $\\{0,1\\}^{k}$ with constant rate, update locality of $\\bigo(\\log^2 k)$, and read locality of $\\bigo(k^\\epsilon)$ for any constant $\\epsilon

*03:17* [Pub][ePrint]
Enforcing Language Semantics Using Proof-Carrying Data, by Stephen Chong and Eran Tromer and Jeffrey A. Vaughan
The soundness of language-level reasoning about programs relies on program execution adhering to the language semantics. However, in a distributed computation, when a value is sent from one party to another, the receiver faces the question of whether the value is *well-traced*, i.e., could it have produced by a computation that respects the language semantics? Otherwise, accepting the value may lead to bugs or vulnerabilities. Proof-Carrying Data (PCD) is a recently-introduced cryptographic mechanism that allows messages in a distributed computation to be accompanied by proof that the message, and the history leading to it, complies with a specified predicate. Using PCD, a verifier can be convinced that the predicate held throughout the distributed computation, even in the presence of malicious parties, and at a verification cost that is independent of the size of the computation producing the value. With a suitable choice of predicate, a program may use PCD to check that values received from the network are well-traced. Unfortunately, previous approaches to using PCD required tailoring a specialized predicate for each application, using an inconvenient formalism and with little methodological support.

This work introduces a novel, PCD-based approach to enforcing language semantics in a distributed computation. We show how to construct a runtime, for an object-oriented language, which ensures that objects received from potentially untrusted parties are well-traced with respect to any prescribed class definitions. This means programmers can analyze language-level properties of distributed programs in a trusted setting, and then use the runtime to generically enforce the same properties in the presence of malicious parties, without needing to be aware of the the underlying cryptographic techniques.

*03:17* [Pub][ePrint]
Leakage Resilient Proofs of Ownership in Cloud Storage, Revisited, by Jia Xu and Jianying Zhou
Client-side deduplication is a very effective mechanism to reduce both storage and communication cost in cloud storage service. Halevi~\\emph{et al.} (CCS \'11) discovered security vulnerability in existing implementation of client-side deduplication and proposed a cryptographic primitive called ``proofs of ownership\'\' (PoW) as a countermeasure. In a proof of ownership scheme, any owner of the same file can prove to the cloud storage server that he/she owns that file in an efficient and secure manner, even if a bounded amount of any efficiently extractable information of that file has been leaked. We revisit Halevi~\\emph{et al.}\'s formulation of PoW and significantly improve the understanding and construction of PoW.

Our contribution is twofold:

\\begin{itemize}

\\item

First, we propose a generic and conceptually simple approach to construct \\emph{Privacy-Preserving} Proofs of Ownership scheme, by leveraging on well-known primitives (i.e. Randomness Extractor and

Proofs of Retrievability) and technique (i.e. sample-then-extract). Our approach can be roughly described as \\textsf{Privacy-Preserving PoW = Randomness Extractor $+$ Proofs of Retrievability}.

Based on our PoW scheme, we also construct a secure client-side deduplication method which is leakage resilient against bot outside attack and inside attack.

\\item

Second, in order to provide a better instantiation of Privacy-Preserving-PoW, we propose a novel design of randomness extractor which improves the state of art by reducing both the random seed length and entropy loss (i.e. the difference between the entropy of input and output) simultaneously.

\\end{itemize}

*03:17* [Pub][ePrint]
MAC Schemes with Efficient Protocols and Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials, by Melissa Chase and Gregory M. Zaverucha
We consider the problem of constructing anonymous credentials for use in a setting where the issuer of credentials is also the verifier, or where the issuer and verifier have a shared key. In this setting we can use message authentication codes (MACs) instead of public key signatures as the basis of the credential system. To this end, we construct two algebraic MAC schemes in prime order groups, along with efficient protocols for issuing credentials, asserting possession a credential, and proving statements about the attributes.Security of the first scheme is proven in the generic group model, and we show that the second is secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, using a dual system-based approach.

Finally, we compare the efficiency of our new systems to two traditional credential systems, U-Prove and Idemix. We show that performance of the new schemes are competitive with U-Prove, and many times faster than Idemix. This brings together the best aspects of these two existing systems: the efficiency of U-Prove combined with the multi-show unlinkability of Idemix.