International Association for Cryptologic Research

IACR News Central

Get an update on changes of the IACR web-page here. For questions, contact newsletter (at) You can also receive updates via:

To receive your credentials via mail again, please click here.

You can also access the full news archive.

Further sources to find out about changes are CryptoDB, ePrint RSS, ePrint Web, Event calender (iCal).

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Trapdoor Smooth Projective Hash Functions, by Fabrice Benhamouda and David Pointcheval

  Katz and Vaikuntanathan recently improved smooth projective hash functions in order to build one-round password-authenticated key exchange protocols (PAKE). To achieve security in the UC framework they allowed the simulator to extract the hashing key, which required simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs that are unfortunately inefficient.

We improve the way the latter extractability is obtained by introducing the notion of trapdoor smooth projective hash function (TSPHF). A TSPHF is an SPHF with a trapdoor, which may not allow to recover the complete hashing key, but which still allows to compute the hash value, which is enough for an application to PAKE with UC-security against static corruptions. We additionally show that TSPHFs yield zero-knowledge proofs in two flows, with straight-line extractability.

Besides those quite interesting applications of TSPHF, we also show how to generically build them on languages of ciphertexts, using any ElGamal-like encryption. Our concrete instantiations lead to efficient one-round UC-secure PAKE, extractable zero-knowledge arguments, and verifiable encryption of Waters signatures. In the case of the PAKE, our construction is the most efficient one-round UC-secure PAKE to date.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Attribute-Based Encryption for a Subclass of Circuits with Bounded Depth from Lattices, by Xiang Xie and Rui Xue

  In this work, we present two Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) schemes for some subclass of circuits based on the Learning with Error (LWE) assumption. Our constructions are selectively secure in the standard model. More specifically, our first construction supports a subclass of circuits with polynomially bounded depth. We call this subclass the OR-restricted circuits which means that for any input $x$, if $f(x)=0$ then for all the OR gates in $f$, at least one of its incoming wires will evaluate to $0$. The second one is a Key-Policy ABE scheme for shallow circuits whose depth is bounded by $O(\\log\\log\\lambda)$, where $\\lambda$ is the security parameter.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Quantum one-time programs, by Anne Broadbent and Gus Gutoski and Douglas Stebila

  A one-time program is a hypothetical device by which a user may evaluate a circuit on exactly one input of his choice, before the device self-destructs. One-time programs cannot be achieved by software alone, as any software can be copied and re-run. However, it is known that every circuit can be compiled into a one-time program using a very basic hypothetical hardware device called a one-time memory. At first glance it may seem that quantum information, which cannot be copied, might also allow for one-time programs. But it is not hard to see that this intuition is false: one-time programs for classical or quantum circuits based solely on quantum information do not exist, even with computational assumptions.

This observation raises the question, \"what assumptions are required to achieve one-time programs for quantum circuits?\" Our main result is that any quantum circuit can be compiled into a one-time program assuming only the same basic one-time memory devices used for classical circuits. Moreover, these quantum one-time programs achieve statistical universal composability (UC-security) against any malicious user. Our construction employs methods for computation on authenticated quantum data, and we present a new quantum authentication scheme called the trap scheme for this purpose. As a corollary, we establish UC-security of a recent protocol for delegated quantum computation.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Limits of provable security for homomorphic encryption, by Andrej Bogdanov and Chin Ho Lee

  We show that public-key bit encryption schemes which support weak (i.e., compact) homomorphic evaluation of any sufficiently \"sensitive\" collection of functions cannot be proved message indistinguishable beyond AM intersect coAM via general (adaptive) reductions, and beyond statistical zero-knowledge via reductions of constant query complexity. Examples of sensitive collections include parities, majorities, and the class consisting of all AND and OR functions.

Our techniques also give a method for converting a strong (i.e., distribution-preserving) homomorphic evaluator for essentially any boolean function (except the trivial ones, the NOT function, and the AND and OR functions) into a rerandomization algorithm: This is a procedure that converts a ciphertext into another ciphertext which is statistically close to being independent and identically distributed with the original one. Our transformation preserves negligible statistical error.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Analysis and Improvement of the Generic Higher-Order Masking Scheme of FSE 2012, by Arnab Roy and Srinivas Vivek

  Masking is a well-known technique used to prevent block cipher implementations from side-channel attacks. Higher-order side channel attacks (e.g. higher-order DPA attack) on widely used block cipher like AES have motivated the design of efficient higher-order masking schemes. Indeed, it is known that as the masking order increases, the difficulty of side-channel attack increases exponentially. However, the main problem in higher-order masking is to design an efficient and secure technique for S-box computations in block cipher implementations. At FSE 2012, Carlet et al. proposed a generic masking scheme that can be applied to any S-box at any order. This is the first generic scheme for efficient software implementations. Analysis of the running time, or \\textit{masking complexity}, of this scheme is related to a variant of the well-known problem of efficient exponentiation (\\textit{addition chain}), and evaluation of polynomials.

In this paper we investigate optimal methods for exponentiation

in $\\mathbb{F}_{2^{n}}$ by studying a variant of addition chain,

which we call \\textit{cyclotomic-class addition chain}, or \\textit{CC-addition chain}. Among several interesting properties, we prove lower bounds on min-length CC-addition

chains. We define the notion of \\GFn-polynomial chain, and use it to count the number of \\textit{non-linear} multiplications required while evaluating polynomials over $\\mathbb{F}_{2^{n}}$. We also give a lower bound on the length of such a chain for any polynomial. As a consequence, we show that a lower bound for the masking complexity of DES S-boxes is three, and that of PRESENT S-box is two. We disprove a claim previously made by Carlet et al. regarding min-length CC-addition chains. Finally, we give a polynomial evaluation method, which results into an improved masking scheme (compared to the technique of Carlet et al.) for DES S-boxes. As an illustration we apply this method to several other S-boxes and show significant improvement for them.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] Using Bleichenbacher\'s Solution to the Hidden Number Problem to Attack Nonce Leaks in 384-Bit ECDSA, by Elke De Mulder and Michael Hutter and Mark E. Marson and Peter Pearson

  In this paper we describe an attack against nonce leaks in 384-bit ECDSA using an FFT-based attack due to Bleichenbacher. The signatures were computed by a modern smart card. We extracted the low-order bits of each nonce using a template-based power analysis attack against the modular inversion of the nonce. We also developed a BKZ-based method for the range reduction phase of the attack, as it was impractical to collect enough signatures for the collision searches originally used by Bleichenbacher. We confirmed our attack by extracting the entire signing key using a 5-bit nonce leak from 4000 signatures.

21:17 [Pub][ePrint] STES: A Stream Cipher Based Low Cost Scheme for Securing Stored Data, by Debrup Chakraborty and Cuauhtemoc Mancillas-Lopez and Palash Sarkar

  The problem of securing data present on USB memories and SD cards has not been adequately addressed in the cryptography literature. While the formal notion of a tweakable enciphering scheme (TES) is well accepted as the proper primitive for secure data storage, the real challenge is to design a low cost TES which can perform at the data rates of the targeted memory devices. In this work, we provide the first answer to this problem. Our solution, called STES, combines a stream cipher with a XOR universal hash function. The security

of STES is rigorously analyzed in the usual manner of provable security approach. By carefully defining appropriate variants of the multi-linear hash function and the pseudo-dot product based

hash function we obtain controllable trade-offs between area and throughput. We combine the hash function with the recent hardware oriented stream ciphers, namely Mickey, Grain and Trivium. Our implementations are targeted towards two low cost FPGAs -- Xilinx Spartan~3 and Lattice ICE40. Simulation results demonstrate

that the speed of encryption/decryption matches the data rates of different USB and SD memories. We believe that our work opens up the possibility of actually putting FPGAs within controllers of such memories to perform low-level in-place encryption.

03:17 [Pub][ePrint] Homomorphic Encryption from Learning with Errors: Conceptually-Simpler, Asymptotically-Faster, Attribute-Based, by Craig Gentry and Amit Sahai and Brent Waters

  We describe a comparatively simple fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem. In previous LWE-based FHE schemes, multiplication is a complicated and expensive step involving \"relinearization\". In this work, we propose a new technique for building FHE schemes that we call the \"approximate eigenvector\" method. In our scheme, for the most part, homomorphic addition and multiplication are just matrix addition and multiplication. This makes our scheme both asymptotically faster and (we believe) easier to understand.

In previous schemes, the homomorphic evaluator needs to obtain the user\'s \"evaluation key\", which consists of a chain of encrypted secret keys. Our scheme has no evaluation key. The evaluator can do homomorphic operations without knowing the user\'s public key at all, except for some basic parameters. This fact helps us construct the first identity-based FHE scheme. Using similar techniques, we show how to compile a recent attribute-based encryption scheme for circuits by Gorbunov et al. into an attribute-based FHE scheme that permits data encrypted under the same index to be processed homomorphically.

21:14 [Event][New] Analyzing Animal Vocal Communication Sequences

  Submission: 24 June 2013
From October 21 to October 23
Location: Knoxville, USA
More Information:

18:17 [Pub][ePrint] On the Security of the TLS Protocol: A Systematic Analysis, by Hugo Krawczyk and Kenneth G. Paterson and Hoeteck Wee

  TLS is the most widely-used cryptographic protocol on the Internet. It comprises the TLS Handshake Protocol, responsible for authentication and key establishment, and the TLS Record Protocol, which takes care of subsequent use of those keys to protect bulk data. TLS has proved remarkably stubborn to analysis using the tools of modern cryptography. This is due in part to its complexity and its flexibility. In this paper, we present the most complete analysis to date of the TLS Handshake protocol and its application to data encryption (in the Record Protocol). We show how to extract a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) from the TLS Handshake Protocol, and how the security of the entire TLS protocol follows from security properties of this KEM when composed with a secure authenticated encryption scheme in the Record Protocol. The security notion we achieve is a variant of the ACCE notion recently introduced by Jager et al. (Crypto \'12). Our approach enables us to analyse multiple different key establishment methods in a modular fashion, including the first proof of the most common deployment mode that is based on RSA PKCS #1v1.5 encryption, as well as Diffie-Hellman modes. Our results can be applied to settings where mutual authentication is provided and to the more common situation where only server authentication is applied.

09:30 [Conf][Crypto] Report on SAC 2012


The Conference on the Selected Areas in Cryptography in 2012 (SAC 2012) was held at University of Windsor, Windsor, Canada on August 15-16, 2012.

SAC 2012 received 87 submissions. Each submission was reviewed by at least three reviewers. 24 papers were selected for publication in the proceedings and acceptance rate was 24/87=27.6%. Two invited talks were given by Vincent Rijmen (KU Leuven) and Ian Goldberg (University of Waterloo) on the topics "Extracts from the SHA-3 competition" and "Privacy Enhancing Technologies for the Internet", respectively.

A digital version of the pre-proceedings was provided to the 55 attendees. Revised versions of the accepted papers were published in the LNCS 7707 by Springer. Most presentation slides for the technical sessions including the invited talks can be found on the conference website at

The program co-chairs were Lars R. Knudsen and Huapeng Wu, who wish to thank the sponsors of SAC 2012, including the Vice President (Research) Office, Faculty of Engineering, and the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Windsor for their enthusiastic and generous support.