International Association for Cryptologic Research

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2013-06-02
18:17 [Pub][ePrint]

This paper investigated the use of instantaneous frequency (IF)

instead of power amplitude and power spectrum in side-channel analysis.

By opposition to the constant frequency used in Fourier Transform, instantaneous frequency reflects local phase differences and allows detecting frequency variations. These variations reflect the processed binary data and are hence cryptanalytically useful. IF exploits the fact that after higher power drops more time is required to restore power back to its nominal value. Whilst our experiments reveal IF does not bring specific benefits over usual power attacks when applied to unprotected designs, IF allows to obtain much better results in the presence of amplitude modification

countermeasures.

18:17 [Pub][ePrint]

For searching keywords against encrypted data, the public key encryption scheme with keyword search (PEKS), and its an extension called secure-channel free PEKS (SCF-PEKS) have been proposed.

In SCF-PEKS, a receiver makes a trapdoor for a keyword, and uploads it on a server. A sender computes an encrypted keyword, and sends it to the server. The server executes the searching procedure (called the test algorithm, which takes as inputs an encrypted keyword, trapdoor, and secret key of the server).

In this paper, we extend the security of SCF-PEKS, calling it adaptive SCF-PEKS, wherein an adversary (modeled as a malicious-but-legitimate\" receiver) is allowed to issue test queries \\emph{adaptively}, and show that adaptive SCF-PEKS can be generically constructed by anonymous identity-based encryption (anonymous IBE) only. That is, for constructing adaptive SCF-PEKS we need not require any additional cryptographic primitive when compared to the Abdalla et al. PEKS construction (J. Cryptology 2008), even though adaptive SCF-PEKS requires additional functionalities. Note that our generic construction needs to apply the KEM/DEM framework (a.k.a. hybrid encryption), where KEM stands for key encapsulation mechanism, and DEM stands for data encapsulation mechanism. We also show that there is a class of anonymous IBE that can be applied for constructing adaptive SCF-PEKS without using hybrid encryption, and propose an adaptive SCF-PEKS construction based on this IBE. Although our second construction is not fully generic, it is efficient compared to the first, since we can exclude the DEM part. Finally, we instantiate an adaptive SCF-PEKS scheme (via our second construction) that achieves a similar level of efficiency for the costs of the test procedure and encryption, compared to the (non-adaptive secure) SCF-PEKS scheme by Fang et al. (CANS2009).

18:17 [Pub][ePrint]

We present the hash function BLAKE2, an improved version of the SHA-3 finalist BLAKE optimized for speed in software. Target applications include cloud storage, intrusion detection, or version control systems. BLAKE2 comes in two main flavors: BLAKE2b is optimized for 64-bit platforms, and BLAKE2s for smaller architectures. On 64-bit platforms, BLAKE2 is often faster than MD5, yet provides security similar to that of SHA-3: up to 256-bit collision resistance, immunity to length extension, indifferentiability from a random oracle, etc. We specify parallel versions BLAKE2bp and BLAKE2sp that are up to 4 and 8 times faster, by taking advantage of SIMD and/or multiple cores. BLAKE2 reduces the RAM requirements of BLAKE down to 168 bytes, making it smaller than any of the five SHA-3 finalists, and 32% smaller than BLAKE. Finally, BLAKE2 provides a comprehensive support for tree-hashing as well as keyed hashing (be it in sequential or tree mode).

18:17 [Pub][ePrint]

In this paper, we tackle the open problem of proposing a leakage-resilience encryption model that can capture leakage from both the secret key owner and the encryptor, in the auxiliary input model. Existing models usually do not allow adversaries to query more leakage

information after seeing the challenge ciphertext of the security games. On one hand, side-channel attacks on the random factor (selected by the encryptor) are already shown to be feasible. Leakage from the encryptor should not be overlooked. On the other hand, the technical challenge for allowing queries from the adversary after he sees the ciphertext is to avoid a trivial attack to the system since he can then embed the decryption function as the leakage function (note that we consider the auxiliary input model in which the leakage is modeled as computationally hard-to-invert functions). We solve this problem by defining the post-challenge auxiliary input model in which the family of leakage functions must be defined before the adversary is given the public key. Thus the adversary cannot embed the decryption function as a leakage function after seeing the challenge ciphertext while is allowed to make challenge-dependent queries. This model is able to capture a wider class of real-world side-channel attacks.

To realize our model, we propose a generic transformation from the auxiliary input model to our new post-challenge auxiliary input model for both public key encryption (PKE) and identity-based encryption (IBE). Furthermore, we extend Canetti et al.\'s technique, that converts CPA-secure IBE to CCA-secure PKE, into the leakage-resilient setting. More precisely, we construct a CCA-secure PKE in the post-challenge auxiliary input model, by using strong one-time signatures and strong extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs, together with a CPA-secure IBE in the auxiliary input model. Moreover, we extend our results to signatures, to obtain fully leakage-resilient signatures with auxiliary inputs using standard signatures and strong extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. It is more efficient than the existing fully leakage-resilient signature schemes.

18:17 [Pub][ePrint]

This paper presents a new generic technique, named sieve-in-the-middle, which improves meet-in-the-middle attacks in the sense that it provides an attack on a higher number of rounds. Instead of selecting the key candidates by searching for a collision in an intermediate state which can be computed forwards and backwards, we here look for the existence of valid transitions through some middle sbox. Combining this technique with short bicliques allows to freely add one or two more rounds with the same time complexity. Moreover, when the key size of the cipher is larger than its block size, we show how to build the bicliques by an improved technique which does not require any additional data (on the contrary to previous biclique attacks). These techniques apply to PRESENT, DES, PRINCE and AES, improving the previously known results on these four ciphers. In particular, our attack on PRINCE applies to 8 rounds (out of 12), instead of 6 in the previous cryptanalyses. Some results are also given for theoretically estimating the sieving probability provided by some subsets of the input and output bits of a given sbox.

18:17 [Pub][ePrint]

Censorship-circumvention tools are in an arms race against censors. The censors study all traffic passing into and out of their controlled sphere, and try to disable censorship-circumvention tools without completely shutting down the Internet. Tools aim to shape their traffic patterns to match unblocked programs, so that simple traffic profiling cannot identify the tools within a reasonable number of traces; the censors respond by deploying firewalls with increasingly sophisticated deep-packet inspection.

Cryptography hides patterns in user data but does not evade censorship if the censor can recognize patterns in the cryptography itself. In particular, elliptic-curve cryptography often transmits points on known elliptic curves, and those points are easily distinguishable from uniform random strings of bits.

This paper introduces high-security high-speed elliptic-curve systems in which elliptic-curve points are encoded so as to be indistinguishable from uniform random strings.

18:17 [Pub][ePrint]

Given an *arbitrary* one-way function F, is it possible to design a signature scheme where the secret key is an input x to F and the public key is y = F(x)? We show that signatures that are \"key-versatile\" in this sense, while also meeting stronger-than-usual security conditions we define, enable us to add signature-based integrity that is \"for-free\" in terms of key material, meaning we can sign with keys already in use for another purpose without impacting the security of the original purpose or in turn being impacted by it. We show applications across diverse areas including (1) security against related-key attack (RKA) (2) security for key-dependent messages (KDM), and (3) joint encryption and signing. We show how to build key versatile signature schemes and then obtain new results in all these application domains in a modular way.

18:17 [Pub][ePrint]

In this paper, to match a lightweight digital signing scheme of which the length of modulus is between 80 and 160 bits, a lightweight hash function is proposed. It is based on MPP and ASPP intractabilities, and regards a short message or a message digest as an input which is treated as only one block. The lightweight hash function contains two algorithms: an initialization algorithm and a compression algorithm, and converts a string of n bits into another of m bits, where 80

18:17 [Pub][ePrint]

An increasing number of cryptographic primitives are built using the ARX operations: addition modulo $2^n$, bit rotation and XOR. Because of their very fast performance in software, ARX ciphers are becoming increasingly common. However, not a single ARX cipher has yet been proven to be secure against one of the most common attacks in symmetric-key cryptography: differential cryptanalysis. In this paper, we prove that no differential characteristic exists for 15 rounds of Salsa20 with a higher probability than $2^{-130}$. Thereby, we show that the full 20-round Salsa20 with a 128-bit key is secure against differential cryptanalysis, with a security margin of 5 rounds. Our proof holds both in single-key and related-key settings. Furthermore, our proof technique only involves writing out simple equations for every addition, rotation and XOR operation in the cipher, and applying an off-the-shelf SAT solver. To prove that Salsa20 is secure against differential cryptanalysis requires only about 20 hours of computation on a single CPU core.

18:17 [Pub][ePrint]

It is important to be able to evaluate information security systems involving humans. We propose an approach in which we consider the system as a cryptographic protocol, and users are modeled as ordinary players. To model the fact that users make mistakes that affect security, we introduce protocol variants that model mistakes or combinations of mistakes. By analysing the base protocol and its variants, and at the same time considering how likely each variant is, we get a reasonable estimate of the real security of the system.

Our work takes the form of a case study of four Norwegian federated identity systems, as well as two proposals for improved systems. The four systems span a good mix of various types of federated identity systems.

18:17 [Pub][ePrint]

We investigate the open problem, namely trapdoor privacy, in

asymmetric searchable encryption (ASE) schemes. We first present two trapdoor privacy definitions (i.e. 2-TRAP-PRIV and poly-TRAP-PRIV) which provide different levels of security guarantee. Motivated by the generic transformation from IBE to ASE, we introduce two key anonymity properties (i.e. 2-KEY-ANO and poly-KEY-ANO) for IBE schemes, so that these properties directly lead to the resulting ASE\'s 2-TRAP-PRIV and poly-TRAP-PRIV properties respectively at the end of a transformation. We then present a simplified

Boyen-Waters scheme and prove that it achieves IBE-IND-CPA, IBEANO

(anonymity), and 2-KEY-ANO security in the random oracle model. Finally, we extend the simplified Boyen-Waters scheme to be based on pairings over composite-order groups and prove that the extended scheme achieves poly-KEY-ANO security without random oracles.