International Association for Cryptologic Research

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2013-05-29
00:17 [Pub][ePrint]

Multivariate cryptography is one of the main candidates to guarantee the security of communication in the post-quantum era. Especially in the area of digital signatures, multivariate cryptography offers a wide range of practical schemes. In \\cite{PB12} and \\cite{PB13} Petzoldt et al. showed a way to speed up the verification process of improved variants of the UOV and Rainbow signature schemes. In this paper we show how we can do even better by a slight variation of their algorithms.

00:17 [Pub][ePrint]

We present a computer-aided framework for proving concrete security bounds for cryptographic machine code implementations. The front-end of the framework is an interactive verification tool that extends the EasyCrypt framework to reason about relational properties of C-like programs extended with idealised probabilistic operations in the style of code-based security proofs. The framework also incorporates an extension of the CompCert certified compiler to support trusted libraries providing complex arithmetic calculations or instantiating idealised components such as sampling operations. This certified compiler allows us to carry to executable code the security guarantees established at the high-level, and is also instrumented to detect when compilation may interfere with side-channel countermeasures deployed in source code.

We demonstrate the applicability of the framework with the RSA-OAEP encryption scheme, as standardized in PKCS#1 v2.1. The outcome is a rigorous analysis of the advantage of an adversary to break the security of assembly implementations of the algorithms specified by the standard. The example also provides two contributions of independent interest: it is the first application of computer-aided cryptographic tools to real-world security, and the first application of CompCert to cryptographic software.

2013-05-28
19:53 [Conf]

FDTC 2012 was held in Leuven, on Sun. 9-th of September 2012, by the Auditorium "Zeger Van Hee" in the "College De Valk" of K.U.Leuven. The workshop attracted 103 participants from 17 countries, in descending order, from Europe, Asia and North America. The technical program included 12 papers: two invited presentations, and 10 regular papers, categorized into four sessions, that were selected from 20 submissions. Each paper was reviewed by at least 3 reviewers and detailed discussions were later conducted to reach final decisions. Most of the presentation slides for the technical sessions are now available on the workshop website (http://conferenze.dei.polimi.it/FDTC12). The workshop proceedings were published by IEEE CS Press and are available on the IEEE Digital Library. Philippe Maurine from Université Montpellier 2 (France) and Bart Preneel from KU Leuven (Belgium), delivered the two invited lectures on the topics "Techniques for EM Fault Injection: Equipments and Experimental Results" and "It's not my Fault – on Fault Attacks on Symmetric Cryptography" respectively.

Guido Bertoni from STMicroelectronics (Italy) and Benedikt Gierlichs from K.U.Leuven (Belgium), were the program co-chairs. David Naccache from École Normale Supérieure (France) was the invited presentations chair. We thank the sponsors CNRS ParisTech and Riscure for their generous support and contributions to the success of the conference, as well as the staff of KU Leuven for their continuous support of FDTC and help with the local arrangements.

19:50 [Conf][CHES]

CHES 2012 was held in Leuven, Belgium, September 9-12, organized by the COSIC research group of the KU Leuven.

This year, there were 2 events co-located with CHES right before and after the CHES workshop, FDTC (as usual on Sunday before CHES, Sept. 9) and a new workshop, PROOFS (on Thursday, Sept. 13). Also there were two tutorials on Sunday aiming at students and newcomers to the community. The tutorials were no-profit events so we were charging only what was needed to cover lunch, coffee breaks and the material distributed and all students got free registration.

The workshops started with the welcome reception on Sunday evening in the garden of Pauscollege (Pope’s college). The conference banquet was held on Tuesday at the Faculty Club and the rump session ttook place on Monday at the workshop venue followed by the concert of Big Band (conducted by Bart Preneel). The participants could choose between Stella Artois brewery visit and the city tour for the social events on Monday afternoon. All details about the CHES program can be found at: https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/ches2012/

The workshop had a total of 416 registrations, out of which 92 were students. This is a new record as the co-location with CRYPTO in 2010 resulted in the attendance of 361 participants (out of which 60 were students).

## Conference facilities

This year year, the conferece hall and the main hotel are at the same site, avoided walking through the cold wind in Beijing.

## Visa-inviation

We made a conference stamp to produce formal invitation letters for 30 participants to obtain the visa, the process went quite smoothly, without "hard case", except for a few cases where we need to provide phone call, fax back confirmations.

## Proceedings

Asiacrypt 2012 Proceedings was produced following the new IACR policy. The registration fee includeed a USB drive containing an electronic copy of the proceedings, and attendees need to pay extra for a paper proceedings. 70 copies of paper proceeding were all sold out at the conference.

## Other events

Together with Asiacrypt 2012, The 8th China International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology (INSCRYPT 2012) was held before the main confernce, and the 2nd Workshop on International View of Cryptography and Security and Their Use in Practice: Focus on Mobile and Embedded Computing was held after the main confernce.

08:52 [Event][New]

Submission: 20 June 2013
From August 11 to August 13
Location: Chicago, USA

05:22 [Pub][ePrint]

In this article it\'s discussed the analytic property of $\\zeta(s)$.

The popular opinion is denied.

05:22 [Pub][ePrint]

We study the problem on how to either prevent identity impersonation (IDI) attacks or limit its consequences by on-line detecting previously unidentified IDI attacks, where IDI attacks are normally caused by the leakage of identity related long-term key. Such problem has, up until now, lacked a provably good solution. We deal with this problem through the scenario on authenticated key exchange with synchronized state (AKESS). This work provides a security model for AKESS protocols, in which we particularly formalize the security of the synchronized state. We propose a two party execution state synchronization framework for symmetric case, based on which we propose a generic compiler for AKESS protocols. Our goal is to compile any existing passively secure key exchange (KE) protocol to AKESS protocol using synchronized state, without any modification on those KE protocols. The proposal is probably secure in the standard model under standard assumptions.

05:22 [Pub][ePrint]

Ristenpart et al. showed that the limitation of the indifferentiability

theorem of Maurer et al. which does not cover all multi stage security notions

but covers only single stage security notions, defined a new concept (reset

indifferentiability), and proved the reset indifferentiability theorem, which

is an analogy of the indifferentiability theorem covers all security

notions S: if H^U is reset indifferentiable from RO, for any security notion,

a cryptosystem C is at least as secure in the U model as in the RO model.

Unfortunately, they also proved the impossibility of H^U being reset

indifferentiable from a RO where H is a one-pass hash function such as ChopMD

and Sponge constructions.

In this paper, we will propose a new proof of molular approach instead of the

RO methodology, Reset Indifferentiability from Weakened Random Oracle, called

as the WRO methodology, in order to ensure the security of C with H^U,

salvaging ChopMD and Sponge. The concrete proof procedure of the WRO

methodology is as follows:

1. Define a new concept of WRO instead of RO,

2. Prove that H^U is reset indifferentiable from a WRO, (here an example of H

is ChopMD and Sponge), and

3. Prove that C is secure in the WRO model.

As a result we can prove that C with H^U is secure by combining the results of

Steps 2, 3, and the theorem of Ristenpart et al. Moreover, for public-key

encryption (as cryptosystem C) and chosen-distribution attack we will prove

that C(WRO) is secure, which implies the appropriateness of the new concept of

the WRO model.