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• Model Cryptographic systems for adherence to specific requirements
• Interact with customers to address questions on impacts of implementation
• Provide guidance to program engineering teams on cryptographic implementation
• Supporting system engineers and designers in architecture trade-offs
• Minimum of 10 years direct related experience with System Engineering Analysis and Development of Cryptographic Systems.
• Technical experience in developing complex software and/or hardware systems for cryptographic systems
• Demonstrated background in System Modeling, System Simulation, and/or Design of Experiments
• Experience architecting, designing, implementing, testing real-time, embedded solutions
• Active DoD Secret clearance with ability to secure special access
• Knowledge of security concerns with real-time operating systems.
• Knowledge of security standards, methods, and policies; risk and threat analysis; technical security safeguard; and operational security measures.
• Experience with all aspects of system design and development process
• Knowledge of Raytheon’s customer needs and organization
• DoD Top Secret clearance preferred
• Bachelor’s of Science (B.S.) in Science, Math, Engineering or related technical field
We are looking for a post-doctoral researcher who will play an active role in building up the research program of the group. The successful candidate will have the unique opportunity of helping to shape the direction of a new research group as it is being set up. The researcher will be identifying potential research topics, helping to organize research seminars on those topics, carrying out research, and advising student research.
The ideal candidate will have the following attributes: You have recently completed (or are about to complete) a doctorate on a system security topic (e.g., platform security, network and protocol security) preferably focusing on mobility and mobile devices and users. You have a strong publication record. You also have research experience in one or more of the following areas: cloud computing, usability evaluations, user interaction design or data analytics. You enjoy and take pride in prototyping your research ideas and experimenting with them. You can communicate fluently in written and spoken English.
Abstract In this note, we show the existence of constant-round computational zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for all . The existence of constant-round zero-knowledge proofs was proven by Goldreich and Kahan (Journal of Cryptology, 1996), and the existence of constant-round zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge was proven by Feige and Shamir (CRYPTO, 1989). However, the existence of constant-round zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for all is folklore, to the best of our knowledge, since no proof of this fact has been published.
PRESENT,an ultra-lightweight block cipher proposed by Bogdanov et al. at CHES\'07.The
block size is 64 bits and the key size can be 80 bit or 128 bit.Using Mathematica 7.0,this paper
obtains the unexpanded polynomial expressions of the output of round 1-6 of PRESENT-80(80-
bit key variant).The time complexity of getting these expressions is 4 minutes on a PC with a
2.6GHz CPU and 8G RAM.Then we expand the expressions of the output of round 1-2 and the
LSB(least significant bit) of the output of round 3 and obtain the ANFs(Algebraic Normal Form)
of these 129(=2*64+1) expressions. The time complexity of getting these ANFs is 22 minutes.It
it known that the time complexity of the classical method of computing the ANF of an n-ary
Boolean function from its truth table is O(n*2^n),with total time complexity of obtaining these 129
ANFs O(129*144*2^144) = O(2^158)(each of the 129 ANFs can be viewed as a 144-ary Boolean
function,where 144=64+80,the sum of the block size and the key size).As an application,we give
a side channel attack on PRESENT-80 under the single bit leakage model proposed by Dinur and
Shamir.If the LSB bit of the output of the 3rd round can be obtained without error,then with 200
known plaintexts,we can set up an equation system in terms of the master key bits and can recover
43 bits key by the Gr¨obner Basis method.Compared with the previous side channel attack
on PRESENT,such as Yang et al. in CANS 2009,Abdul-Latip et al. in ASIACCS 2011 and Zhao
et al. in 2011,each of which needs at least 2^13 chosen plaintexts,the data complexity of our attack
is the best.
security solutions. Hardware based security solutions overcome many of the limitations of classical security while consuming less energy and improving performance. Nanoelectronics based hardware security preserves all of these advantages while enabling conceptually new security mechanisms and security applications. This paper highlights
nanoelectronics based security capabilities and challenges. The paper describes nanoelectronics based hardware security primitives for device identification, digital forensics, and tamper detection. These primitives can be developed using the unique characteristics of emerging nanoelectronic devices such as complex device and system models, bidirectional operation, and temporal drift of the state variable. We conclude by identifying important desiderata and outstanding challenges in nanoelectronics based security.
are able to preserve the secrecy of their keys. With attacks today showing ever increasing sophistication, however, this tenet is eroding. \"Advanced Persistent Threats\" (APTs), for instance, leverage zero-day exploits and extensive system knowledge to achieve full compromise of cryptographic keys and other secrets.Such compromise is often silent, with defenders failing to detect the loss of private
keys critical to protection of their systems. The growing virulence of today\'s threats clearly calls for new models of defenders\' goals and abilities.
In this paper, we explore applications of FlipIt, a novel game-theoretic model of system defense introduced recently. In FlipIt, an attacker periodically gains complete control of a system, with the unique feature that system compromises are stealthy, i.e., not immediately detected by the system owner, called the defender. We distill out several lessons from our study of FlipIt and demonstrate
their application to several real-world problems, including password reset policies, key rotation, VM refresh and cloud auditing.