*19:49*[Event][New] Africacrypt 2013

Submission: 31 January 2013

Notification: 15 March 2013

From June 24 to June 26

Location: Cairo, Egypt

More Information: http://egyptscience.net/Africacrypt2013/index.html

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Submission: 31 January 2013

Notification: 15 March 2013

From June 24 to June 26

Location: Cairo, Egypt

More Information: http://egyptscience.net/Africacrypt2013/index.html

Submission: 15 December 2012

Notification: 15 February 2013

From June 3 to June 4

Location: Madrid, Spain

More Information: http://anss.org.au/nss2013/index.htm

Submission: 1 December 2012

Notification: 20 January 2013

From April 23 to April 25

Location: Irbid, Jordan

More Information: http://www.icics.info/icics2013/

2012-10-14

Zero-correlation linear attack is a new method for cryptanalysis of block ciphers. In this paper we adapt Matrix method to find zero-correlation approximations. Then we present several zero-correlation linear approximations for 14 rounds of Lblock. Finally, we describe a cryptanalysis for 22 rounds of the reduced Lblock. While the previous attacks on Lblock used chosen plaintexts, the new attack needs distinct known plaintexts which is a more realistic model. Also the time complexity is $2^8$ times faster than the previous attack.

NOEKEON is a block cipher having key-size 128 and block size 128,proposed by Daemen, J et al.Shekh Faisal

Abdul-Latip et al. give a side channel attack(under the single bit leakage model) on the cipher at ISPEC 2010.Their

analysis shows that one can recover the 128-bit key of the cipher, by considering a one-bit information leakage from

the internal state after the second round, with time complexity of O(2^68) evaluations of the cipher, and data complexity

of about 2^10 chosen plaintexts.Our side channel attack improves upon the previous work of Shekh Faisal Abdul-Latip

et al. from two aspects. First, we use the Hamming weight leakage model(Suppose the Hamming weight of the lower

64 bits and the higher 64 bits of the output of the first round can be obtained without error) which is a more relaxed

leakage assumption, supported by many previously known practical results on side channel attacks, compared to the

more challenging leakage assumption that the adversary has access to the \"exact\" value of the internal state bits as

used by Shekh Faisal Abdul-Latip et al. Second, our attack has also a reduced complexity compared to that of Shekh

Faisal Abdul-Latip et al. Namely, our attack of recovering the 128-bit key of NOEKEON has a time complexity 20.1

seconds on a PC with 2.6 GHZ CPU and 8G RAM and data complexity of 99 known plaintexts; whereas, that of

Shekh Faisal Abdul-Latip et al. has time complexity of O(2^68) and needs about 2^10 chosen plaintexts.

In this work, we consider the long-standing open question of constructing constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge protocols in the plain model. Resolving this question is known to require non-black-box techniques.

We consider non-black-box techniques for zero-knowledge based on knowledge assumptions, a line of thinking initiated by the work of Hada and Tanaka (CRYPTO 1998). Prior to our work, it was not known whether knowledge assumptions could be used for achieving security in the concurrent setting, due to a number of significant limitations that we discuss here. Nevertheless, we obtain the following results:

1. We obtain the first constant round concurrent zero-knowledge argument for \\textbf{NP} in the plain model based on a new variant of knowledge of exponent assumption. Furthermore, our construction avoids the inefficiency inherent in previous non-black-box techniques such that those of Barak (FOCS 2001); we obtain our result through an efficient protocol compiler.

2. Unlike Hada and Tanaka, we do not require a knowledge assumption to argue the soundness of our protocol. Instead, we use a discrete log like assumption, which we call Diffie-Hellman Logarithm Assumption, to prove the soundness of our protocol.

3. We give evidence that our new variant of knowledge of exponent assumption is in fact plausible. In particular, we show that our assumption holds in the generic group model.

4. Knowledge assumptions are especially delicate assumptions whose plausibility may be hard to gauge. We give a novel framework to express knowledge assumptions in a more flexible way, which may allow for formulation of plausible assumptions and exploration of their impact and application in cryptography.

In the random oracle model, the parties are given oracle access to a random member of

a (typically huge) function family, and are assumed to have unbounded computational power

(though they can only make a bounded number of oracle queries). This model provides powerful

properties that allow proving the security of many protocols, even such that cannot be proved

secure in the standard model (under any hardness assumption). The random oracle model is also

used to show that a given cryptographic primitive cannot be used in a black-box way to construct

another primitive; in their seminal work, Impagliazzo and Rudich [STOC \'89] showed that in the

random function model - when the function family is the set of all functions - it is impossible

to construct (secure) key-agreement protocols, yielding that key-agreement cannot be black-box

reduced to one-way functions. Their work has a long line of followup works (Simon [EC \'98],

Gertner et al. [STOC \'00] and Gennaro et al. [SICOMP \'05], to name a few), showing that given

oracle access to a certain type of function family (e.g., the family that \"implements\" public-key

encryption) is not sufficient for building a given cryptographic primitive (e.g., oblivious transfer).

Yet, in the more general sense, the following fundamental question remained open:

What is the exact power of the random oracle model, and more specifically, of the

random function model?

We make progress towards answering the above question, showing that any (no private input)

semi-honest two-party functionality that can be securely implemented in the random function

model, can be securely implemented information theoretically (where parties are assumed to be

all powerful, and no oracle is given). We further generalize the above result to function families

that provide some natural combinatorial property.

To exhibit the power of our result, we use the recent information theoretic impossibility result

of McGregor et al. [FOCS \'10], to show the existence of functionalities (e.g., inner product) that

cannot be computed both accurately and in a differentially private manner in the random

function model; yielding that protocols for computing these functionalities cannot be black-box

reduced to the existence of one-way functions.

We propose a polynomial time quantum algorithm for solving the

discrete logarithm problem in matrices over finite group rings.

The hardness of this problem was recently employed in the design

of a key-exchange protocol proposed by D. Kahrobaei, C. Koupparis,

and V. Shpilrain. Our result implies that the Kahrobaei et al.

protocol does not belong to the realm of post-quantum cryptography.

2012-10-07

We present a constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge protocol for NP. Our protocol is sound against uniform polynomial-time attackers, and relies on the existence of families of collision-resistant hash functions, and a new (but in our eyes, natural) falsifiable intractability assumption: Roughly speaking, that Micali\'s non-interactive CS-proofs are sound for languages in P.

Standard constructions of garbled circuits provide only static security, meaning the input x is not allowed to depend on the garbled circuit F. But some applications--notably one-time programs

(Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum 2008) and secure outsourcing (Gennaro, Gentry, Parno 2010)--need adaptive security, where x may depend on F. We identify gaps in proofs from these papers with

regard to adaptive security and suggest the need of a better abstraction boundary. To this end we

investigate the adaptive security of garbling schemes, an abstraction of Yao\'s garbled-circuit technique

that we recently introduced (Bellare, Hoang, Rogaway 2012). Building on that framework, we give definitions encompassing privacy, authenticity, and obliviousness, with either coarse-grained or fine-grained adaptivity. We show how adaptively secure garbling schemes support simple solutions for one-time programs and secure outsourcing, with privacy being the goal in the first case and obliviousness and authenticity the goal in the second. We give transforms that promote static-secure garbling schemes

to adaptive-secure ones. Our work advances the thesis that conceptualizing garbling schemes as a first-class cryptographic primitive can simplify, unify, or improve treatments for higher-level protocols.

In this short note we observe that the Peikert-Vaikuntanathan-Waters (PVW) method of packing many plaintext elements in a single Regev-type ciphertext, can be used for performing SIMD homomorphic operations on packed ciphertext. This provides an alternative to the Smart-Vercauteren (SV) ciphertext-packing technique that relies on polynomial-CRT. While the SV technique is only applicable to schemes that rely on ring-LWE (or other hardness assumptions in ideal lattices), the PVW method can be used also for cryptosystems whose security is based on standard LWE (or more broadly on the hardness of ``General-LWE\'\').

Although using the PVW method with LWE-based schemes leads to worse asymptotic efficiency than using the SV technique with ring-LWE schemes, the simplicity of this method may still offer some practical advantages. Also, the two techniques can be used in tandem with ``general-LWE\'\' schemes, suggesting yet another tradeoff that can be optimized for different settings.