Sequential Aggregate Signatures, Multisignatures, and Verifiably Encrypted Signatures Without Random Oracles
Abstract We present the first aggregate signature, the first multisignature, and the first verifiably encrypted signature provably secure without random oracles. Our constructions derive from a novel application of a recent signature scheme due to Waters. Signatures in our aggregate signature scheme are sequentially constructed, but knowledge of the order in which messages were signed is not necessary for verification. The aggregate signatures obtained are shorter than Lysyanskaya et al.’s sequential aggregates and can be verified more efficiently than Boneh et al.’s aggregates. We also consider applications to secure routing and proxy signatures.
- Content Type Journal Article
- Pages 1-34
- DOI 10.1007/s00145-012-9126-5
- Steve Lu, Los Angeles, CA, USA
- Rafail Ostrovsky, Los Angeles, CA, USA
- Amit Sahai, Los Angeles, CA, USA
- Hovav Shacham, La Jolla, CA, USA
- Brent Waters, Austin, TX, USA
From: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 14:01:59 GMT
- Journal Journal of Cryptology
- Online ISSN 1432-1378
- Print ISSN 0933-2790
Post-doc, Universite catholique de Louvain
Wireless sensor nodes (WSN) are likely to be one of the more vulnerable parts of a sensor network. These devices can be attacked by standard network based approaches but also by physical means if they are left unattended in remote sites. While much research effort has been spent on improving the network security of WSN, the protection of the nodes and especially their protection against physical attacks has been, until now, neglected.
The objective of this project is to prevent physical attacks against sensor nodes, by developing means to improve the tamper resistance of these low cost devices without significantly increasing their cost. In a first phase that took place over the last 20 months, the project allowed defining cost effective countermeasures for the selected cryptographic primitives and designing a secure co-processor to be integrated in a sensor node prototype. The second phase will entail the analysis of the manufactured device\'s actual resistance against side-channel attacks and its integration in the prototype.
The research will take place in the framework of a European project involving high-level academic and industrial experts. The researcher will also benefit from the dynamic research environment of the UCL Crypto Group (Université catholique de Louvain), with strong interactions with researchers working on related subjects.
The candidate should hold a PhD in electronics, computer science or mathematics, with strong interests in algorithms and signal processing. A preliminary background in cryptology and side-channel attacks is an important asset.