Ph.D. Student, Post-Doc, Intel Collaborative Research Institute
for Secure Computing (ICRI-SC) at TU-Darmstadt
The Intel Collaborative Research Institute for Secure Computing (ICRI-SC) conducts security research for mobile and embedded systems and supports industry and scientific research to improve the reliability of mobile and embedded devices as well as the ecosystem around them. We are currently looking for highly skilled scientific personnel to complete our team.
Applicants should hold Diploma, Master or PhD Degree in Computer Science or Electrical Engineering and bring well-founded knowledge and experience in IT-Security. In particular, we are looking for candidates that have expertise in one or more of the following areas:
- Mobile operating system security (e.g., Android, iOS)
- Embedded system security and embedded processors (e.g., ARM and Intel Atom)
- Lightweight Cryptography with focus on emerging technologies such as RFID and NFC
- Hardware security (e.g., Physically Unclonable Functions)
- Trusted Computing
- Design, development, analysis of System-on-Chip (SoC) IP blocks and associated tools
How to Apply
Your application should include your current curriculum vitae, MSc/Diploma certificates and grades, a letter of motivation stating your interest in the position and your research interests, and at least two letters of recommendation.
PhD studentship in Applied Cryptography, Royal Holloway, University of London
Applications are invited for a PhD studentship to work on a collaborative research project between Thales UK Research and Technology (TRT) and the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London.
The project is concerned with the application of cryptographic techniques to protect data in scenarios such as cloud computing, outsourcing, or other situations where secure storage and access to data is required on potentially untrusted platforms. There has been a lot of recent research into developing theoretical techniques that support these objectives, including searchable encryption and predicate encryption schemes in particular. The project will investigate the practical issues concerning the selection, implementation and deployment of such schemes for a variety of real application scenarios.
The student will spend most of the time in the academic setting of the ISG, but will be required to spend a minimum of three months at Thales UK’s Reading-based research and technology facility.
We are looking for a strong candidate with background in mathematics, computer science or electronic engineering (knowledge of cryptography is desirable, but not essential). The successful candidate will have good programming skills, communication and team-working skills; a strong interest in security is also desirable.
Funding Notes: The studentship is funded by the UK EPSRC and TRT and will pay university fees plus a stipend of £19,590 per annum) for three years. Note that there are rules for eligibility (please visit http://www.epsrc.ac.uk/funding/students/Pages/eligibility.aspx BEFORE applying for the position).
Application: Informal inquiries to Prof. Keith Martin (keith.martin(at)rhul.ac.uk) or Dr Carlos Cid (carlos.cid(at)rhul.ac.uk).
Postdoctoral and Research Fellowships, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia
The Queensland University of Technology (QUT) in Brisbane, Australia, invites applications for its 2012 Vice-Chancellor\'s Research Fellowships. Up to 10 fellowships are available across the university. Areas of interest include all aspects of information security.
QUT has an active research group in cryptography, network security, and digital forensics, with a leading national profile and strong international links.
Applicants for a Postdoctoral Fellowship should have completed (or be under examination for) a PhD and be early career researchers (less than five years in an academic role). Applicants for a Research Fellowship should be established researchers with between five and ten years of research experience since completion of their PhD. Fellows will be offered an appointment on a fixed-term full-time basis for a period of 3 years. Fellowships include a research support grant of $20,000.
Nicky Mouha: Automated Techniques for Hash Function and Block Cipher Cryptanalysis
Name: Nicky Mouha
Topic: Automated Techniques for Hash Function and Block Cipher Cryptanalysis
Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques that ensure the confidentiality and integrity of information. This relatively new field started out as classified military technology, but has now become commonplace in our daily lives. Cryptography is not only used in banking cards, secure websites and electronic signatures, but also in public transport cards, car keys and garage door openers.
Two building blocks in the domain of cryptography are block ciphers and (cryptographic) hash functions. Block ciphers use a secret key to transform a plaintext into a ciphertext, in such a way that this secret key is needed to recover the original plaintext. Hash functions transform an arbitrary-length message into a fixed-length hash value. These hash values can serve as "fingerprints" for the original messages: it should be infeasible to find two distinct messages with the same hash value (a collision).
Yet, Wang et al. recently showed that finding collisions is feasible for MD5 and SHA-1, two of the most commonly used hash functions today. Although the SHA-2 family currently remains unbroken, its design is very similar. For this reason, the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched an international competition for a new hash function standard: SHA-3.
The research performed in this Ph.D. thesis closely follows the evaluation period of the SHA-3 competition. Results were obtained for hash functions ARIRANG, BLAKE, ESSENCE, Hamsi, Khichidi-1, LUX, Sarmal, Skein and TIB3. Outside of the competition, results were also obtained for a simplified version of the hash function HAS-V. In the area of cryptographic theory, observations were made on the resistance of regular hash functions against the birthday attack.
The most commonly used hash functions: MD5, SHA-1 and SHA-2, as well two out of the five SHA-3 finalists (BLAKE and Skein) use operations such as addition modulo 2 to the power o[...]
The Discrete Logarithm Problem in non-representable rings, by Matan Banin and Boaz Tsaban
Bergman\'s Ring $E_p$, parameterized by a prime number $p$,
is a ring with $p^5$ elements that cannot be embedded in a ring of matrices over any commutative ring.
This ring was discovered in 1974.
In 2011, Climent, Navarro and Tortosa described an efficient implementation of $E_p$
using simple modular arithmetic, and suggested that this ring may be a useful source
for intractable cryptographic problems.
We present a deterministic polynomial time reduction of the Discrete Logarithm Problem in $E_p$
to the classical Discrete Logarithm Problem in $\\Zp$, the $p$-element field.
In particular, the Discrete Logarithm Problem in $E_p$ can be solved, by conventional computers,
in sub-exponential time.
Along the way, we collect a number of useful basic reductions for the toolbox of discrete logarithm solvers.
3D Hardware Canaries, by Sébastien Briais and Stéphane Caron and Jean-Michel Cioranesco and Jean-Luc Danger and Sylvain Guilley and Jacques-Henri Jourdan and Arthur Milchior and David Naccache and T
3D integration is a promising advanced manufacturing process offering a variety of new hardware security protection opportunities. This paper presents a way of securing 3D ICs using Hamiltonian paths as hardware integrity verification sensors. As 3D integration consists in the stacking of many metal layers, one can consider surrounding a security-sensitive circuit part by a wire cage.
After exploring and comparing different cage construction strategies (and reporting preliminary implementation results on silicon), we introduce a \"hardware canary\". The canary is a spatially distributed chain of functions $F_i$ positioned at the vertices of a 3D cage surrounding a protected circuit. A correct answer $(F_n \\circ \\ldots \\circ F_1)(m)$ to a challenge $m$ attests the canary\'s integrity.